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Abstract 
Nowadays information is everywhere. Organisations process, store and create 
information in unprecedented quantities to support their business processes. Similarly, 
people use, share and synthesise information to accomplish their daily tasks. Indeed, 
information and information technology are the core of business activities, and a part of 
daily life.  
Information has become a crucial resource in today‘s information age and any 
corruption, destruction or leakage of information can have a serious negative impact on 
an organisation.  Thus, information should be kept safe. This requires the successful 
implementation of information security, which ensures that information assets are only 
used, modified and accessed by authorised people. 
Information security faces many challenges; and organisations still have not 
successfully addressed them. One of the main challenges is the human element. 
Information security depends to a large extent on people and their ability to follow and 
apply sound security practices.  Unfortunately, people are often not very security-
conscious in their behaviour; and this is the cause of many security breaches.  There 
are a variety of reasons for this such as a lack of knowledge and a negative attitude to 
security.  
Many organisations are aware of this; and they attempt to remedy the situation by 
means of information security awareness programs. These programs aim to educate, 
train and increase the security awareness of individuals.  
However, information security awareness programs are not always successful. They are 
not a ―once-off remedy‖ that can quickly ―cure‖ information security. The programs need 
to be implemented effectively, and they require an ongoing effort. Unfortunately, this is 
where many organisations fail. Furthermore, changing individuals‘ security behaviour is 
difficult due to the complexity of factors that influence everyday behaviour. 
In view of the above, this research project proposes an alternative approach in the form 
of a personal information security agent. The goal of this agent is to influence 
individuals to adopt more secure behaviour. There are a variety of factors that need to 
be considered, in order to achieve this goal, and to positively influence security 
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behaviour. Consequently, this research establishes criteria and principles for such an 
agent, based on the theory and practice.  
From a theoretical point of view, a variety of factors that influence human behaviour 
such as self-efficacy and normative beliefs were investigated. Furthermore, the field of 
persuasive technology has provided for strategies that can be used by technology to 
influence individuals. On the practical side, a prototype of a personal information 
security agent was created and evaluated through a technical software review process. 
The evaluation of the prototype showed that the theoretical criteria have merit but their 
effectiveness is largely dependent on how they are implemented. The criteria were thus 
revised, based on the practical findings. The findings also suggest that a personal 
information security agent, based on the criteria, may be able to positively influence 
individuals to be more secure in their behaviour.  
The insights gained by the research are presented in the form of a framework that 
makes both theoretical and practical recommendations for developing a personal 
information security agent. One may, consequently, conclude that the purpose of this 
research is to provide a foundation for the development of a personal information 
security agent to positively influence computer users to be more security-conscious in 
their behaviour. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction
1.1 Orientation 
Today‘s economy depends on the secure flow of information within and across 
organisations. Any disruption or leakage of this information flow is costly and 
endangers the organisation‘s business continuity. A single security breach can 
have significant negative consequences for an organisation such as financial loss, 
corporate liability and loss of credibility (Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, & Raghunathan, 
2004).  
Politt (2005) states that the average cost of a serious security breach for UK 
organisations amounts to £10000 and for large organisations it is in the region of 
£120000. Thus, information is a valuable asset that requires protection. This gives 
rise to the field of information security, which aims to protect information by 
ensuring that such information is read, heard, modified, distributed and otherwise 
used only by people who have the right to do so. 
Organisations are increasingly connected over the Internet, which has penetrated 
almost every business sector. For most employees, Internet connectivity has 
become a necessity, as it is used, amongst others, to conduct commercial 
transactions, share information and interact with others on a daily basis. This 
certainly has many benefits, but it also introduces a variety of information security 
threats. These threats include viruses, worms, port-scanning software, spyware, 
adware, malware, keyloggers, rootkits, and botnet applications (Herley, 2009). 
Internet users are increasingly being targeted by cyber criminals; and the number 
of security threats is on the rise (Herley, 2009; Huang, Rau, & Salvendy, 2010). 
For example, the Sophos security threat report (Sophos, 2011) measured a 10% 
increase in spam reports, a 13% increase in phishing and a 4% increase in 
malware between December 2009 and December 2010. Therefore, to protect 
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themselves, users should be aware of information security threats and follow 
sound security practices. Indeed, this is of critical importance since any 
inappropriate action of a user could result in a security breach that would affect the 
entire organisation (Gross & Rosson, 2007). 
Information security has also been driven by new laws, regulations and standards, 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), and the Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard (PCI-DSS) that have been introduced. These require organisations to 
give information security due care and due diligence (Von Solms & Von Solms, 
2004).  
Thus, many organisations have been prompted to introduce policies and 
procedures to regulate the behaviour of individuals with regard to information 
security and to ensure their compliance. However, these policies are only effective 
if they are followed by employees. Therefore, many organisations would like to 
influence their employees‘ to adopt a more security-conscious behaviour, in order 
to become more compliant (Beautement & Sasse, 2009). 
Based on the above, it follows that the effectiveness of information security 
depends to a large extent on humans. Furnell and Thomson (2009a, p. 10) 
support this, by stating that: ―One of the most prevalent problems facing the 
successful implementation of information security practices and procedures is the 
human element‖. Indeed, humans are referred to as the ―weakest link‖ in 
information security (Lineberry, 2007; Vroom & Von Solms, 2004), since they are 
so often the cause of information security failure. 
 
It is therefore necessary to promote and cultivate a culture of secure behaviour 
amongst the individuals of an organisation, in order to create a secure information 
environment. 
1.2 Problem Background 
The effectiveness of information security in an organisation is largely dependent 
on the secure behaviour of its employees. Unfortunately, employees often do not 
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show secure behaviour; and a substantial number of information security breaches 
originate from internal misconduct (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000; Stanton, Stam, 
Mastrangelo, & Jolton, 2005).  
A common reason for this is the lack of information security awareness amongst 
employees. Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, and Benbasat (2010) define information security 
awareness as an employee‘s knowledge of information security, and the 
organisation‘s information security policy. Organisations attempt to address the 
lack of awareness by means of information security awareness programs. These 
programs focus on increasing employees‘ awareness regarding the secure use of 
information resources and consequences of insecure behaviour, as well as 
providing training to improve their skill levels (D‘Arcy & Hovav, 2007). However, 
security awareness programs do not always achieve the envisaged results.  
Interviews conducted by Albrechtsen (2007) showed that security awareness 
campaigns had little effect, and did not influence the security behaviour of the 
users. The reasons that were given for this were as follows: 
 
 A limited amount of time is available to comprehend the information given;  
 The idea that the gifts and prizes were more important than the security 
message;  
 A tendency to quickly forget the security advice and the tips provided;  
 A belief that one already knows the information given, and that there is 
nothing new to learn. 
 
The respondents in Albrechtsen‘s (2007) study thus asked for other tools, rather 
than for any new policies, rules or guidelines, which could influence their 
information-security behaviour. 
Similarly, Ng, Kankanhalli and Xu (2009) found that security awareness programs 
did not significantly affect a person‘s security behaviour. According to Valentine 
(2006), one of the reasons for this may be that security awareness programs are 
often too generic, and use a ―one-size-fits-all‖ approach, which is not effective. 
Furthermore, results obtained by D‘Arcy and Hovav (2007) suggest that security 
awareness training and education is the most neglected countermeasure when 
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compared with other measures, and that more resources should be allocated to 
this area. Thus, there may also be a lack of management support. 
Research also highlights other issues that contribute to insecure behaviour. A lack 
of knowledge leads to security being poorly understood. Thus, the security risks 
are often not visible to users, or not being correctly evaluated by them (Besnard & 
Arief, 2004; West, 2008). However, Furnell, Byrant and Phippen (2007) found that 
even when users claimed to be knowledgeable about security issues, they did not 
demonstrate effective security practices. Thus, there may be a lack of motivation 
to behave securely. This may be due to a negative attitude towards security, and 
believing that it only ―gets in the way‖ of one‘s daily tasks (Adams & Sasse, 1999; 
Furnell & Thomson, 2009b).  
Indeed, users are often more motivated to continue with their primary task and 
relegate security to second place (West, 2008). Another factor that is relevant in 
the organisational context is the opinion of users, that they will not be ―caught‖ 
when they behave in an insecure way. For example, D‘Arcy and Hovav (2009) 
found that users with more advanced computer knowledge believed that they 
could circumvent monitoring technologies. Finally, users may also doubt that the 
recorded security logs are reviewed on a regular basis (D‘Arcy & Hovav, 2007). 
The human element in information security is often not properly addressed; or 
sometimes, it may not even be addressed at all (Lineberry, 2007; Thomson, Von 
Solms, & Louw, 2006). Furthermore, the causes of insecure behaviour are 
complex; and therefore, changing users‘ behaviour can be difficult. In view of this, 
there is a need to find alternative ways to influence users to adopt more secure 
behaviour. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
From the previous section, it becomes evident that the problem of insecure user 
behaviour is still far from being solved. Some of the factors regarding insecure 
user behaviour discussed were:  
 
 A lack of knowledge and understanding;  
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 A lack of security risk visibility, as well as any proper evaluation of them; 
 Users being under the impression that they will not get ―caught‖; 
 Trade-off between work and information security; 
 Generic, mass-market awareness programs, which are not always effective. 
 
It can therefore be argued that users frequently do not know their individual 
information security state. Furthermore, a user is often unaware whether his/her 
behaviour is secure or insecure. This may give the user the idea that he/she is not 
the problem, even though he/she is behaving in an insecure way. Therefore, the 
problem statement for this research project is as follows: 
 
 
A lack of individual, context-specific information security information contributes 
to insecure user behaviour. 
 
 
This suggests the need to provide the user with individual feedback on his/her 
information security status. By providing this feedback, it may be possible to 
address some of the challenges mentioned in section 1.2, and the problem 
mentioned above. The next section will further elaborate on how this research 
intends to address the problem, by providing the research questions and 
objectives. 
1.4 Research Questions and Objectives 
1.4.1 Questions 
This research project aims to address the problem of insecure user behaviour 
through a Personal Information Security Agent (PISA). The aim of the PISA is to 
promote security-conscious behaviour in individuals by providing individual 
security feedback and guidance to the user.  By providing users with a concise, at 
a glance, overview of their security status the PISA can assist users to easily 
evaluate their security state. Furthermore, the PISA may remind the user of 
important issues, as well as provide tips and useful information to improve the 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
6 
 
security knowledge and awareness of the user. For example, the PISA could 
notice that a user spends a significant amount on Facebook, and thus provide the 
user with advice regarding the best practices to follow, in order to secure one‘s 
personal details on Facebook. In addition, the PISA could monitor a user‘s 
behaviour.  
From this, the following main research question can be posed: 
 
Primary research question: 
 
 
 What should the design principles of a PISA be, in order to positively 
influence secure user behaviour? 
 
In order to answer the above question, the following secondary research 
questions need to be considered: 
 
 
 What factors contribute to insecure user behaviour? 
 What criteria should be included in the design of a PISA? 
 
Based on the above, it is possible to establish some research objectives. These 
will be discussed in the next subsection. 
1.4.2 Objectives 
This study proposes the development of a PISA that keeps users ―on their toes‖ 
and cultivates secure user behaviour by providing individual, context-sensitive 
information on the user‘s security status. The study will therefore propose a 
framework to address the design of such a PISA.  
 
The primary objective of the research is: 
 
 To propose a framework for developing a PISA, which aims to enhance and 
positively influence users‘ security behaviour. 
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This primary objective leads to the following secondary objectives: 
 
 To determine the factors that should be considered when attempting to 
positively influence users‘ security behaviour;  
 To establish the criteria that should be included in the design of a PISA. 
 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to address the human element in 
information security, by proposing a framework for developing a PISA that aims to 
influence users to adopt a more secure behaviour pattern. 
 
In this section, both primary and secondary research questions, as well as the 
objectives of the research were given. It therefore becomes evident that the main 
deliverable of the research is a framework that provides guidance for developing 
a PISA. Furthermore, the goal of such a PISA is to influence an individual 
towards more security-conscious behaviour. The next section describes the 
research process, and how the researcher established such a framework. 
1.5 The Research Process 
The research process describes the ―route‖ that was followed to arrive at a 
conclusion. During a research process, a variety of research ―methods‖ and 
―instruments‖ are used. For the purpose of this research, the following were used: 
Argumentation: An argument is defined as ―a coherent series of statements 
leading from a premise to a conclusion‖ (Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 
2004, p. 66). Therefore, an argument provides a set of claims, in order to support 
another claim, which is the conclusion to the argument. 
Literature Review: A literature review provides a researcher with the relevant 
theory that can be used for argumentation – it provides support to the claims in an 
argument. According to Hofstee (2006, p. 91), a literature review has several 
other purposes as well. It shows that one is aware of related work done in one‘s 
research field, and that the research has significance. Furthermore, it provides a 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
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theory base for the research one intends to do; and it identifies its relationship to 
other work. 
Prototyping: A prototype refers to the ―first form of something‖ (Waite & Hawker, 
2009, p. 738). Prototyping has a variety of applications, and can be used to 
discover new possibilities, find solutions to problems, and shape ideas (Kelley, 
2001). It is also often used to determine the feasibility of an idea or new product 
(Davis, 1995, p. 40). A more elaborate discussion on prototyping will be provided 
in Chapter 5. 
Questionnaires: A questionnaire typically consists of a set of questions that are 
answered by research participants. It is a data-collection instrument that is used by 
researchers to obtain information on the thoughts, feelings, attitudes, beliefs, 
values, perceptions, personality and behavioural intentions of the research 
participants (Johnson & Christensen, 2010, pp. 162-163). 
Technical Software Review: During a technical software review, a group of 
reviewers evaluate the suitability of a software product for its intended use; and 
they seek to identify any discrepancies from its specifications (IEEE, 2008, p. 11). 
Therefore, technical software reviews are a form of group or peer review in 
software development. Chapter 6 provides a more detailed discussion on software 
reviews. 
Therefore, four research ―methods‖ and one research ―instrument‖ were used. 
These formed part of the research process and were used as follows: 
The aim of this research project is to investigate the design elements that need to 
be considered for a technological software artefact, the PISA, to influence users 
towards more secure behaviour. However, influencing behaviour is a difficult task, 
which is dependent on many factors. Thus, a literature review on information 
security, human behaviour and how users can be influenced to be more security 
conscious was conducted. 
 
During the literature review, the relevant literature was identified through keyword 
searches, and by following the references in articles that had already been 
collected. Most of the literature stemmed from electronic databases, such as 
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Google Scholar and Science Direct. The literature review focused primarily on 
information security and human behaviour. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
the sources were collected by means of the main literature review, as well as 
several secondary literature reviews. Thus, the literature review may be regarded 
as an ongoing ―research process‖ in its own right. 
 
The literature review provided the theoretical basis that led to the proposal of a set 
of criteria, by means of argumentation, for the development of a PISA, as will be 
described in Chapter 4. However, the theory needs to be tested in practice as well. 
In view of this, a prototype of a PISA was developed that implemented the 
proposed criteria. Consequently, the prototype may be seen as the medium 
whereby an indirect evaluation of the proposed criteria was conducted.  
In order to evaluate the prototype, a technical software review process, according 
to the IEEE 1028 Standard for Software Reviews (IEEE, 2008), was followed. This 
included assembling a review team, providing review documentation and material 
to reviewers, conducting review meetings, as well as the examination and use of 
the prototype by the reviewers. Chapter 6 provides a more detailed discussion on 
the technical software review process.   
Once the review process had been completed, two review questionnaires were 
presented to the reviewers: one on the prototype and the implemented criteria, 
and another on the overall usability of the prototype. Thus, by evaluating the 
prototype, conclusions were drawn on the proposed criteria.  
Based on these conclusions, and the results of the questionnaires, the proposed 
criteria were revisited and modified accordingly. This then provided the basis for a 
framework for the development of a PISA. One may, therefore, conclude that the 
proposed framework has its foundation in both theory and practice. 
1.6 Delineation and Limitations 
This research project focused on the design attributes of a PISA in a Microsoft 
Windows operation system environment. Furthermore, the development of the 
prototype was limited by time constraints. 
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1.7 Overview of the Chapters 
Chapter 1: The first chapter introduces the research area and discusses the 
problem background. It provides an overview of the research and what the 
objectives are. Therefore, it paves the way for the chapters that follow. 
Chapter 2: In this chapter, a more detailed discussion on information security and 
related concepts, such as confidentiality, integrity and availability will be provided. 
It highlights various threats to information security, in particular humans and their 
insecure behaviour. The focus of the chapter is on the human challenge, as it 
investigates the causes that contribute to insecure behaviour, and how this is 
traditionally addressed in organisations. Furthermore, a brief discussion on risk 
management and the use of controls to protect information is also given. Thus, the 
chapter provides an overview of information security, with the focus on the human 
element. 
Chapter 3: This chapter addresses human behaviour and the factors that 
influence it. It discusses existing theories on human behaviour, such as the theory 
of planned behaviour and the Social Cognitive Theory. Based on these theories, 
the chapter describes some determining factors of behaviour, such as self-
efficacy. Furthermore, it introduces the field of persuasive technology, and how it 
has been applied in information security. Thus, the chapter provides an insight into 
factors that influence human behaviour; and it describes a research field that 
provides strategies to persuade users by means of computer technology. 
Chapter 4: The concept of a PISA is introduced in this chapter. It states the 
objectives for a PISA; and it proposes criteria, which consist of functions, such as 
to educate, and characteristics, such as context-sensitivity.   
Chapter 5: This chapter provides an introduction to prototyping, by discussing 
various forms of prototypes, and three main prototyping approaches: exploratory, 
experimental and evolutionary. It then describes the development of the PISA 
prototype and how the proposed criteria in Chapter 4 were implemented.  
Chapter 6: After the PISA prototype was built, it had to be evaluated. Therefore, 
this chapter discusses the five different software reviews that are recognised by 
the IEEE 1028 standard for software reviews. The chapter motivates the choice of 
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the review, and provides an overview of the technical software review process that 
was followed. It concludes with a discussion on the findings of the review. 
Chapter 7: The proposed criteria described in Chapter 4 are revisited and 
modified, based on the findings in Chapter 6. Based on this, the framework for 
developing a PISA is presented and described. Therefore, the chapter provides 
the main deliverable of the research. 
Chapter 8: This chapter concludes the research, by revisiting the research 
objectives, and discussing to what extent these objectives have been achieved. It 
also indicates some future research possibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Layout of chapters 
1.8 Conclusion 
Humans are the cause of many security breaches and their insecure behaviour 
often endangers organisations‘ information assets. It is also clear that security 
Chapter 3 – Cultivating secure behaviour 
Chapter 4 – Criteria for a Personal Information Security Agent 
Chapter 5 – Prototyping the Personal Information Security Agent 
 
Chapter 6 – Evaluation of the Personal Information Security Agent 
prototype 
 
Chapter 7 – A Framework for a Personal Information Security Agent 
Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
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awareness programs are not always effective in promoting security-conscious 
behaviour. Therefore, this research proposes an alternative approach to 
addressing the human element in information security: in the form of a PISA.  
The research goal is to develop a conceptual framework for the design of a PISA 
that aims to positively influence user behaviour. A PISA may, therefore, help 
organisations to effectively reduce the insider threat, by cultivating and promoting 
a culture of secure behaviour. However, it can also be useful to computer users in 
general.  
One may conclude that the human element is one of the main challenges 
information security faces. Therefore, the next chapter will provide an overview of 
information security by focusing on the human challenge. 
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Chapter 2  
Information Security: A human challenge
2.1 Introduction 
Information is ubiquitous in today‘s world and we come into contact with it every 
day. Information is created by means of categorisation, contextualisation, 
calculation or condensing of the data (Davenport & Prusack, 2000, p. 4). 
Therefore, information has meaning and can be thought of as ―data that makes a 
difference‖ (Davenport & Prusack, 2000, p. 3).  
Information is valuable as it can be used to make better decisions regarding what 
actions to take. Furthermore, information allows one to become more 
knowledgeable. Alavi and Leidner (2001, p. 109) define knowledge as ―information 
possessed in the mind of individuals‖ that is personalised and ―related to facts, 
procedures, concepts, interpretations, ideas, observations, and judgments‖.  
Humans transform information into knowledge by comparing information, 
evaluating the consequences and implications of information, making connections 
to related information, or by communicating and exchanging information 
(Davenport & Prusack, 2000, p. 5). Therefore, by means of this process we are 
able to synthesise information into knowledge. 
Furthermore, Davenport and Prusack (2000, p. xxiv) point out that in an 
organisation, the only sustainable advantage ―comes from what it collectively 
knows, how efficiently it uses what it knows, and how readily it acquires and uses 
new knowledge‖. One can, consequently, conclude that data, information and 
knowledge are interlinked, and that they are all valuable to some extent, data 
being the least valuable and knowledge the most.  
Figure 2.1 summarises, this by showing the relationship between data, information 
and knowledge in terms of value and meaning. 
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Figure 2.1: Data, information and knowledge (Chaffey & Wood, 2005) 
From the above, it follows that information should be kept safe, as it can be of 
strategic advantage. A discipline that is concerned with the protection and safety 
of information, is thus called information security. 
In describing information security, one should perhaps first consider security on its 
own. The word security has its etymological roots in se – without and cura – care 
(Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 2004, p. 1123), or to be concerned. 
Therefore, one may say that information security should free us from being 
concerned about information. The ISO/IEC 27002 (2005, p. viii) standard defines 
information security as, ―the protection of information from a wide range of threats 
in order to ensure business continuity, minimize business risk, and maximize 
return on investments and business opportunities‖.  
In today‘s world, information is created, collected, stored, processed, and 
transmitted in vast quantities every second. Information security is, therefore, of 
vital importance, since we live in the information age. Indeed, one may argue 
information security is of equal value to an organisation or individual, as is the 
information itself. It is therefore, important to understand information security and 
related concepts, such as confidentiality, integrity and availability, as well as the 
practices that can be used to protect information.  
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The objective of the chapter is, therefore, to provide some insight regarding these 
issues. Furthermore, information security faces several challenges, of which the 
human challenge is considered to be the greatest. This calls for new solutions to 
be found in addressing information security, as humans are seen as a significant 
threat to it. Therefore, the discussion will also focus on the human challenge and 
some of the reasons that contribute to it.  
2.2 Information Security in an Information Age 
We live in the information age. Alvin Toffler (1980) refers to this as the ―third 
wave‖. In the ―first wave‖, people lived in an agricultural society – based on 
agriculture; while in the ―second wave‖ people lived in an industrial society – based 
on labour. Now, we are in the ―third wave‖, living in an information society, where 
information is the basic material for workmanship. Furthermore, Castells (1996, p. 
1) stated that: "A technological revolution, centred around information technology, 
is reshaping, at [an] accelerated pace, the material basis of society‖.  
This rapid technological advancement since the 20th century has resulted in a 
world that is dependent on information technology and the free and secure flow of 
information. According to Dontamsetti and Naranayan (2009, pp. 27-28), a 
country‘s strength is measured by how much of its economy is information-based, 
and how networked it is. Similarly, successful organisations are those that harness 
and use information to their competitive advantage. Information and information 
technology has become an enabler to most of the processes in an organisation. 
Indeed, information is ―the lifeblood of modern organizations and core to most 
business processes‖ (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2006, p. 408).  
We can no longer go back to a manual process, should information technology 
become temporarily unavailable. If the technology fails, the organisation would 
come to a standstill. Furthermore, a loss or leakage of information could have 
various negative consequences, ranging from negative publicity to financial losses 
(Dlamini, Eloff, &  Eloff, 2009). Because of this dependence on information and 
information technology, there is a crucial need for information security to protect 
this valuable asset. 
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A few generations ago life was simple. People were born into a world that was 
very much the same as that of their parents and grandparents. New inventions 
were slow to come and slow in being superseded. What one would learn from 
one‘s parents was known for generations, and would be useful during one‘s entire 
life. Nowadays, new inventions occur almost on a daily basis. What one knows 
today may no longer be relevant tomorrow. This is especially true for the field of 
information technology, which is advancing at a rapid pace.  
The pace is often measured by the increasing processing power of computers. 
This has increased exponentially over the past few decades. The exponential 
increase in computing power is referred to as Moore‘s law (Intel, n.d.), which 
states that: ―The number of transistors incorporated in a chip will approximately 
double every 24 months‖. Since Moore‘s law has been valid for the past few 
decades, it has been used by the futurist Raymond Kurzweil to predict the future of 
technology.  
In a recent article in Time Magazine, Lev Grossman (2011), reports on these 
predictions, as well as the new technological advances that could lead to 
technological singularity. Singularity refers to the idea that in the future, we will 
create technology that is more intelligent than humans. According to the article, 
Kurzweil predicts that by the year 2045 we may have reached singularity. 
However, there is no guarantee that technological advancement will continue at 
the current pace, nor that Moore‘s law will remain valid. Furthermore, it remains 
doubtful that we will master artificial intelligence to the point where it becomes 
human intelligence. Thus, singularity may only be a fantasy. However, it is certain 
that as technology advances, more and more information will be created, stored 
and processed electronically. 
Most information today is in electronic format. Therefore, it is true to say that 
technological advancement in information technology, as well as other areas, will 
inevitably affect information security. Indeed, this is one of the challenges faced by 
information security – to cope with the ongoing technological change.  It is a 
human challenge as well. People are faced with new technology that has features 
which they have never used before. They do not understand how it works and are 
unable to evaluate the security risks properly. For example, Schneier (2003, p. 29) 
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states that the average computer user performs many tasks, such as sending 
emails, online banking and shopping – without being aware of the security risks. 
Furthermore, he concludes that, ―Technological progress is now faster than our 
ability to absorb its implications‖ (Schneier, 2003, p. 29). Cyber criminals have also 
realised this, and are increasingly targeting home computer users, as they are 
more vulnerable (Wash, 2010).   
Dontamsetti and Naranayan (2009, p. 28) argue that the nature of information 
security has evolved from a technological focus to becoming process-focused, and 
now is beginning to focus on the human element. The shift in focus is the result of 
realising that technology and its related processes are only as good as the people 
that use them. It is therefore, commonly accepted that humans are the ―weakest 
link‖ in information security, and the main cause for information security failure 
(Lineberry, 2007; Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001).  
This rapid technological progress is certainly one of the contributing factors to why 
humans are the ―weakest link‖. However, there are other factors as well, which will 
be discussed in a later section. Furthermore, one could argue that if we can 
eliminate this ―weak link‖, information security would nowadays not be such an 
important issue. Unfortunately, this is impossible, as humans are an integral part 
of information systems. However, an attempt can and should be made to influence 
them towards more secure behaviour.     
In this section, information security in today‘s information age has been discussed. 
Rapid technological advancement has been described as a contributing factor to 
information security failure. Furthermore, we have become dependent on 
information and information technology. Information security is, therefore, of vital 
importance in our world today.  
Thus, the foundation or pillars of information security should be well known, as 
well as the important concepts that are related to it.  
2.3 The Pillars of Information Security 
A good understanding of information may be provided by discussing 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. These three concepts may be considered 
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to be the pillars of information security (Schneier, 2004, p. 122). However, other 
related aspects, such as privacy and legislation will also be discussed in this 
section. 
2.3.1 Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability  
Information security ensures the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of 
information (ISO/IEC27002, 2005). Most threats to information security aim at 
compromising one or more of the CIA pillars (Choo, 2010). Confidentiality means 
that only those who are authorised have access to an information asset (Pfleeger 
&  Pfleeger, 2006, p. 10). This access includes reading, viewing, and printing, as 
well as knowing something about the asset.  
Integrity refers to whether the information is in its original state. It ensures that the 
information has not been modified by an unauthorised party. Therefore, ―Every 
piece of data is as the last authorised modifier left it" (Schneier, 2004, p. 122). 
Considering these definitions, one realises that confidentiality and integrity are 
closely related. The former is about unauthorised reading, while the latter is about 
unauthorised writing.  
Availability ensures that information can be accessed by a legitimate party 
whenever it is needed (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006, p. 10). The definition provided 
by the ISO/IEC 27001(2005, p. 2) standard states that any such information 
should be ―accessible and usable upon demand‖. Therefore, availability may be 
defined as providing the right information at the right time to the right person. 
As mentioned earlier, most threats target one or more of the CIA. These threats 
include malicious software, phishing, botnets and the human element. A 
discussion on these threats will be provided in section 2.4.  
2.3.2 Privacy  
What is privacy? This question is not easy to answer. There is no universally 
accepted definition for privacy, nor have its value and scope been assessed 
(Cremonini, Braghin, & Ardagna, 2009, p. 470). A similar view was provided by 
Branscomb (1995, as cited in Holvast, 2007, p. 738) who stated: "The good news 
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about privacy is that eighty-four percent of us are concerned about privacy. The 
bad news is that we do not know what we mean".  
The U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Brandeis, referred to privacy as ―the right to be 
let alone‖ (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). This early definition is most probably the 
simplest. A more detailed definition is given by Alan Westin (1967) in his seminal 
work:  
Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others. Viewed in terms of the relation of the individual to 
social participation, privacy is the voluntary and temporary withdrawal of a 
person from the general society through physical or psychological means, 
either in a state of solitude or small-group intimacy or, when among larger 
groups, in a condition of anonymity or reserve. (p. 7)  
Furthermore, Cremonini et al. (2009, p. 471) see it as ―the friction that reduces the 
spread of personal information, that makes it more difficult and economically 
inconvenient to gain access to it‖. Westin‘s (1967) definition highlights two 
aspects: being in control of what others know about you and the control of one‘s 
personal space. The definition of Cremonini et al. (2009) allows for some flexibility 
between no information flow and the free flow of information. One could say that 
privacy advocates that each individual should have control over the ―tap‖ that 
regulates this information flow. 
Everybody has a need for privacy. This realisation has led to privacy being 
declared a fundamental right in 1948 by the United Nations. It is mentioned in the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 12 (United Nations, 
1948): ―No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone 
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks‖. 
Preserving privacy is critical (Dlamini et al., 2009), since the amount of information 
we collect, store, share, and use is unprecedented (Flanagin & Metzger, 2008). 
Furthermore, it is common nowadays for people to share their personal 
information through various social networking websites, often neglecting their 
privacy. 
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There are over 750 million people sharing their personal information through the 
social networking website Facebook (Facebook, 2011). Gross and Acquisti (2005) 
studied over 4000 Carnegie Mellon University students, and the information they 
share on Facebook. They found that, ―personal data is generously provided, 
limiting privacy preferences are hardly used; only a small number of members 
change the default privacy preferences, which are set to maximize the visibility of 
users profiles‖.  
Similarly, research done by Sophos (2007) investigated the careless behaviour of 
Facebook users with regard to privacy. A fictitious profile was created on 
Facebook to send out friend requests. The profile had only some basic details and 
it used a picture of a green plastic frog. Because of the limited amount of 
information provided on the profile it was impossible for other users to determine 
whether they knew ―the frog‖, or not. However, many still accepted ―the frog‖ as a 
friend; and thereby, they allowed a stranger to have access to their personal 
details. Thus, information shared on Facebook can be easily used to create digital 
dossiers of users and their behaviour  (Gross & Acquisti, 2005).  
Other websites could also threaten privacy. Researchers at Berkeley University 
found that some websites use ―respawning‖ cookies and ―ETags‖ to track users 
from one website to another (Ayenson, Wambach, Soltani, Good, & Hoofnagle, 
2011). This was even possible when cookies were disabled in the browser, or 
when the ―private browsing mode‖ was chosen. With Google‘s Street View, 
anyone‘s home is just a few mouse clicks away. However, there are still some 
countries that oppose Street View; as it came to light that Google also collected 
private Wi-Fi data (Kiss, 2010). Furthermore, mobile phones increasingly include 
GPS capabilities which can be used to find a user‘s location. Therefore, it is easy 
to suspect that humans are losing more and more control over their privacy and 
personal information. This highlights the need to protect privacy in today‘s world of 
instant information sharing.  
However, maintaining control of information ownership is challenging, as well. This 
will be discussed next. 
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2.3.3 Ownership  
Ownership of information is difficult to control. Many companies collect information 
about their customers. Sometimes, this information is sold or marketed to others 
and customers have no control over it, nor are they remunerated for it (Pfleeger &  
Pfleeger, 2006, p. 608). Furthermore, information is easy to replicate. Once 
information has been created, it can be infinitely reproduced and shared (Mason, 
1986). Therefore, to protect the ownership of information, laws have been created; 
and patents or copyrights have been granted to owners (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 
2006, p. 649).  
However, enforcing these legal devices poses a challenging task.  
In 2001, Brahm Cohen created the Bittorrent protocol (Duguid, 2006), which 
facilitates the sharing of large files over the Internet (Lallie & Briggs, 2011). 
According to Hartley (2011), Bittorrent has over 100 million users worldwide, and 
is extensively used for peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing. Furthermore, P2P creates 
globally the most Internet traffic, ranging from 43 percent in Northern Africa, to 70 
percent in Eastern Europe (Schulze & Mochalski, 2009). P2P is, in most cases, 
used for the distribution of illegal digital content, ranging from books to the latest 
motion pictures.  
This is a major headache for organisations, like the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of America 
(MPAA), which strive to protect copyrighted material and intellectual property 
(Damiani, De Capitani di Vimercati, Paraboschi, & Samarati, 2003). These 
organisations have filed many lawsuits against P2P websites, such as 
―thepiratebay.org‖. However, P2P cannot easily be shut down, since most of the 
websites claim that they are not responsible for the content which is shared. It is 
the people that upload and download the content. This raises an ethical question: 
Has our society become unethical, since it shares illegal material over the 
Internet?  
Another issue complicating the matter is the global nature of the Internet, as well 
as the number of users. How does one file a lawsuit against 100 million users 
distributed across various countries? It is impossible. One may conclude that the 
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ownership of information and the illegal distribution of digital content will remain an 
important and challenging issue in the future. This could be addressed by 
improving ethics in the computing technology field, or by finding new ways in 
which laws can be better ―applied‖.  
Since information ownership raises both ethical and legal issues, a discussion on 
ethics and legislation will now follow. 
2.3.4 Laws and Ethics  
Laws provide the foundation of what is right and wrong in society. However, it is 
impossible to create laws to enforce all forms of behaviour in society (Pfleeger &  
Pfleeger, 2006, p. 693). In areas where there is no established law, ethics become 
important. Ethical behaviour is ―acting in ways consistent with one's personal 
values and the commonly held values of the organization and society‖ (Sims, 
2003, p. 100). Therefore, it is behaviour that is commonly accepted as being 
correct and fair.  
Table 2.1 provides a comparison between ethics and laws. From this, it becomes 
evident that ethics are ―fluid‖, while laws are ―rigid‖. 
Table 2.1: Laws versus ethics (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006, p. 694) 
The need for ethics stems from human greed and egotism (Leiwo & Heikkuri, 
1998). People often consider their own welfare above that of others. Furthermore, 
Law Ethics 
Described by formal, written documents Described by unwritten principles 
Interpreted by courts Interpreted by each individual 
Established by legislatures representing 
all people 
Presented by philosophers, religions, 
professional groups 
Applicable to everyone Personal choice 
Priority determined by courts if two laws 
conflict 
Priority determined by an individual if two 
principles conflict 
Court is final arbiter of "right" No external arbiter 
Enforceable by police and courts Limited enforcement 
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Singer (1999) in his fundamental work describes various ethical issues, such as 
abortion, euthanasia, animal rights, and the obligations of the wealthy towards the 
poor. These issues make ethics important. Having differentiated between laws and 
ethics, the question can rightfully be asked: Where does information fit, in relation 
to laws and ethics?  
In his seminal paper, Mason (1986) described four ethical issues of the information 
age. The issues that he described were: (1) Privacy: what information should be 
kept private and what should be shared? (2) Accuracy: who is responsible for the 
authenticity on information and who is responsible for the adverse effects of 
erroneous information? (3) Property: who owns information and the channels 
through which it flows and what should the price of information be? (4) 
Accessibility: who should have the right to obtain information and under what 
conditions? Ethical issues, such as those described by Mason (1986), lead to the 
establishment of information ethics.  
Information ethics addresses ethical challenges in the world of data, information, 
and knowledge, with their relevant life cycles, including creation, elaboration, 
distribution, communication, storage, protection, usage, and possible destruction 
(Floridi, 2008). Floridi (2008) calls this world of information the ―infosphere‖.  
Traditionally, information ethics has been regarded as an ―ethics of informational 
resources,‖ an ―ethics of informational products,‖ or an ―ethics of the informational 
environment‖ (Himma & Tavani, 2008). However, Floridi‘s (1999, 2005) 
information ethics is a more universal ―macroethics‖. He sees everything in the 
infosphere as an informational entity that has some minimum worth that should be 
ethically respected. All informational entities, such as humans, organisations, 
databases, websites, and documents can be potential agents that affect other 
entities, as well as potential patients that are affected by other entities (Bynum, 
2008, pp. 28-48).  
In information ethics, the actions of a moral agent are evaluated in terms of the 
contribution made in the growth and the benefits it makes to the infosphere 
(Floridi, 2005).  Furthermore, Floridi (2005) states that any process, action or 
event that negatively affects the infosphere increases entropy. Entropy is the 
destruction, corruption, pollution, and depletion of informational objects, or any 
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form of impoverishment of being (Floridi, 2008). Information ethics determines 
what is right and wrong, on the strength of four basic moral laws (Floridi, 2008): 
1. Entropy ought not to be caused in the infosphere (null law). 
2. Entropy ought to be prevented in the infosphere. 
3. Entropy ought to be removed from the infosphere. 
4. The flourishing of informational entities, as well as of the whole infosphere, 
ought to be promoted by preserving, cultivating, and enriching their 
properties. 
Therefore, someone‘s decisions and actions should be based on how they would 
affect the infosphere. In particular, to what degree these decisions and actions 
respect the worthiness and ethical claims of the informational entities involved. 
Floridi (1999) provides the example of a husband who reads the diary of his wife, 
without her permission, and finds only the confirmation of their love in it. Although 
this does not have any negative consequences to the wife or the husband, the 
husband has still acted in a wrong manner, because of a lack of care and respect 
for his wife and her information.  
In the previous section it was mentioned that the illegal P2P sharing of information 
is difficult to control by means of laws. One may, therefore, argue that ethics 
should be applicable, and should prevent individuals from illegally sharing and 
copying information. However, studies, such as those of Martin and Woodward 
(2011), Siegfried (2004), Peace, Galletta and Thong (2003) indicate that this is 
often not the case.   
Thus, one may conclude that society, or at least the younger generation, does not 
view the illegal sharing and copying of information as being unethical or unlawful. 
Ferrell, Fraedrich and Ferrell (2009, p. 8) report that the chairman of an 
outsourcing company that dealt with one third of the Fortune 500 companies 
disclosed that over $1 billion in reported cash and assets did not even exist. These 
companies had been manipulating their financial information by inflating their 
earnings and assets for years.  
Therefore, in recent years many new laws and regulations, such as the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (Nohlberg & Bäckström, 2007), have been introduced to address 
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concerns regarding corporate governance, protection of privacy, accountability for 
financial information, the authenticity and integrity of data, and the security of 
information assets (Smedinghoff, 2008). Most organisations however find it a 
challenging task to ensure compliance with these laws and regulations (Johnson & 
Goetz, 2007). Furthermore, organisations that operate internationally must comply 
with laws and regulations in all their countries of operation. Finally, Smedinghoff 
(2008) identified four legal trends in the United States and internationally that will 
shape the information security landscape for most organisations. They are: 
1. A continuing expansion of the responsibility to protect information and 
provide security;  
2. An emergence of a legal standard for compliance; 
3. A focus on the responsibilities organisations have regarding specific data 
elements and security countermeasures; 
4. The obligation to inform people when a security breach may have 
compromised their personal information. 
These trends will require organisations to prove due care and due diligence in all 
aspects of security.  
Information ethics provides a holistic view of ethics in the information domain. It 
provides guidelines, which when followed, promote ethical behaviour amongst 
informational entities – and in the infosphere, in general. Indeed, information ethics 
should be promoted, since unethical behaviour can be seen as a precursor to 
unlawful behaviour. The unlawful behaviour of organisations with regard to 
information has resulted in new legislation being introduced to prevent it. 
Therefore, organisations need to be more responsible and careful in the decisions 
they make and the actions they take.  
Furthermore, emerging legal trends will require organisations to focus on 
information security and the threats it faces. A discussion on such threats follows.  
2.4 Threats to Information Security  
There are many threats to information security. A threat refers to anything that can 
endanger an organisation‘s information assets or infrastructure (Gregory, 2003, p. 
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11). It is a set of circumstances that can result in the loss of, or harm to, 
information (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006, p. 6). An attack generally occurs when a 
threat is able to exploit a vulnerability, and affects an information asset (Von Solms 
& Von Solms, 2008, pp. 90-91).  
Therefore, a vulnerability is a weak point in the security of a system, such as a 
wrongly configured firewall (Landwehr, 2001). Threats come in many forms, and a 
discussion on some of the major threats follows. This will provide an 
understanding of the ―tools of the trade‖, as used by cyber criminals. Furthermore, 
it will show that humans can be seen as a significant threat. 
2.4.1 Malicious Software  
Malicious software or malware are programs that are created for the sole purpose 
of destroying or harming their intended targets (Gregory, 2003, p. 12). These 
programs are generally distributed by cyber criminals via the Internet. Viruses, 
Trojan horses and worms are all regarded as malware. 
A virus is a malicious piece of computer code, which when activated, can have 
various negative results (Gregory, 2003, p. 12). These can range from erasing or 
altering documents to changing the system‘s configuration, to less-serious effects, 
such as displaying annoying messages on the screen. Viruses can be embedded 
in various documents, such as Adobe PDF or Microsoft Word files. Simply opening 
the infected file causes the virus to be executed, which can lead to disastrous 
consequences.   
Worms are programs that are designed to propagate themselves from one system 
to another (Gregory, 2003, p. 13). This replication often results in a ―slowing down‖ 
of the system, as more and more system resources are used by the worm. In 
addition, worms can create havoc by altering installed programs, changing system 
configurations, deleting documents or installing software that allows a cyber 
criminal to remotely control the computer at a later stage. Therefore, worms can 
be considered viruses that automatically replicate and spread from one system to 
the next. A worm often spreads itself, by automatically sending itself to all the 
contacts it finds in an email program‘s address book, for example.  
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A Trojan horse is a program that masquerades as another program (Gregory, 
2003, p. 13). These programs are commonly spread through attachments in 
emails. The email message will try to entice the reader to open and view the 
attached file. Once the attachment has been opened, the Trojan horse is 
activated, and can then perform any number of malicious actions.  
Malware comes in many varieties; and cyber criminals are constantly tweaking 
and improving them. There is a constant arms race between cyber criminals and 
security companies that provide antivirus or antimalware software. Therefore, 
unless users keep their software updated, it will not be effective. Unfortunately, 
users do not always do this. A more detailed discussion on insecure user 
behaviour will be provided in section 2.4.4. 
2.4.2 Identity Theft and Phishing  
In the United States, the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (ITADA) 
(Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, 1998) defines an identity 
thief as someone who ―knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a 
means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or 
abet, any unlawful activity‖. Therefore, identity theft refers to obtaining and 
collecting information about an individual for fraudulent purposes. Identity theft can 
be divided into two categories: existing account fraud and new account fraud 
(Roberds & Schreft, 2009).  
Existing account fraud refers to, for example, the use of someone‘s existing credit 
card details to steal money and perform illegal transactions. New account fraud 
occurs when a criminal uses another person‘s information to open new accounts in 
the victim‘s name. These accounts are then used for illegal activities, such as 
obtaining loans. Identity theft is indeed big business today. In the USA, 8.1 million 
people had already been victims of identity theft in 2010 (Javelin Strategy & 
Research, 2011). Furthermore, the total annual fraud was amounted to $37 billion, 
although this had decreased from $56 billion in the previous year. 
Phishing is one of the most common methods used by cyber criminals to obtain 
sensitive information, for the purpose of identity theft. It can be defined as ―the 
criminally fraudulent process of attempting to acquire sensitive information such as 
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usernames, passwords, and credit-card details by masquerading as a trustworthy 
entity in an electronic communication‖ (Caballero, 2009, p. 230). The process of 
phishing often occurs as follows: the cyber criminal sends out emails to potential 
victims that pretend to be from a legitimate entity, such as a bank. These emails 
try to persuade the user to perform an action, such as clicking on a link. Upon 
clicking this link, the user will be taken to a website that resembles the legitimate 
website. Any information entered on this website will then be used for fraudulent 
purposes.  
The success rate of phishing attacks can be increased through the collection of 
additional private information, which is normally available on social networking 
websites. As mentioned in section 2.3.2, this information can be used to create 
profiles of the targeted individuals. A study conducted at the Indiana University in 
the United States found that such information dramatically increased the success 
rate of a phishing attack (Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, & Menczer, 2007). In the 
experiment the spoof email that came from a friend had a 72% success rate 
versus 16% success rate, when the email came from an unknown person.  
Preserving privacy on the Internet is therefore essential, and the users of social 
networking websites need to find a secure balance between what they share and 
what they keep private. 
2.4.3 Botnets, Hacktivism and Information Warfare  
A botnet is ―a collection of compromised Internet computers being controlled 
remotely by attackers for malicious and illegal purposes‖ (Wang & Ramsbrock, 
2009, p. 119). Cyber criminals use viruses, worms, Trojan horses and other 
malware to install automated software, known as a ―bot‖, on a victim‘s computer. 
This bot makes the victim‘s computer a ―zombie‖, which can be remotely controlled 
and used to launch further attacks, such as, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks. DDoS attacks suspend the availability of targeted systems by 
overwhelming them with large amounts of traffic (DeNardis, 2007, p. 694).  
For example, each computer in a botnet might be instructed to make a request to 
a website at the same time. This may then result in the website‘s server running 
out of system resources and collapsing. Therefore, the website has effectively 
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been ―shut down‖, and its availability has thereby been affected. Wang and 
Ramsbrock (2009, pp. 122-123) describe the botnet lifecycle as follows: 
1. Creation: a cyber criminal known as a ―botmaster‖ develops the bot 
software to remote control the targeted computers. This stage may also 
include testing of the software in a network. 
2. Infection: a victim‘s computer can be infected through a software 
vulnerability, a drive-by download, an email attachment or a Trojan horse. 
3. Rallying: during this process the bot starts up for the first time and tries to 
contact the command and control (C & C) server(s). 
4. Waiting: once the bot has joined the botnet, it waits for instructions from the 
―botmaster‖. Only small amounts of network traffic are sent between the bot 
and C & C server(s) – in order to avoid detection. 
5. Execution: whenever the bot receives instructions via the C & C network 
from the ―botmaster‖, it will execute them. These instructions can include 
scanning for new victims, sending spam and DDoS traffic. 
6. Finally, after execution, the bot returns to the waiting state. Should the 
victim‘s computer be rebooted, or the bot lose its connection to the C & C 
network, it will start the rallying process again. Once connected again, the 
bot will wait for further instructions.    
In 2009, a botnet called Mariposa was detected. It consisted of 12.7 million 
compromised computers belonging to home users, businesses, government 
agencies and universities from 190 countries; and it was created to steal 
confidential information (Panda Security, 2010). By the end of 2009, in a 
collaborated effort of security experts and law-enforcement agencies, the botnet 
was shut down. One of the reasons why botnets can grow so large is described by 
Anderson (2001), who states that computer users may be willing to buy antivirus 
software for $100 to protect themselves, but will not consider spending even $1 on 
preventing their computers from participating in attacks on major e-commerce 
websites.  
DDoS attacks are also used by hacktivists. Hacktivism is a form of electronic 
activism (Jordan & Taylor, 2004, p. 1). It is a combination of hacking and political 
activism (Samuel, 2004, p. 123). Recently hacktivism occurred in the form of 
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support for the controversial WikiLeaks website. The hacktivism group called 
―Anonymous‖, launched ―Operation Payback‖ targeting Paypal, VISA and 
MasterCard with DDoS attacks (Addley & Halliday, 2010).  
The companies were attacked because they terminated all payments to 
WikiLeaks. A spokesman for the ―Anonymous‖ group stated, ―Anonymous is 
supporting WikiLeaks not because we agree or disagree with the data that is being 
sent out, but we disagree with any form of censorship on the internet" and that the 
Internet should remain ―open and free for everyone‖ (Addley & Halliday, 2010). 
However, DDoS attacks are not the only ―weapons‖ of hacktivists. According to 
Samuel (2004, pp. 123-124), hacktivism attacks also include: 
1. Site defacements: hacking into a website‘s server and placing a political 
message on the home page. 
2. Site redirects: hacking into a website server and configuring it so that 
visitors are redirected to another website. 
3. Information theft: hacking into an organisation‘s network and stealing 
information. Often the attack is made public to embarrass the organisation 
for its poor security. For example, the LulzSec group posted the usernames 
and passwords of Sony users (Tsukayama, 2011). 
4. Site parodies: creating websites with a similar address and appearance to 
mock or make fun of the original website. 
5. Virtual sabotage: activities that damage the information technology of the 
targeted organisation. 
6. Software development: creating software for political purposes. 
Conway (2003, p. 13) however points out that hacktivists are not cyber terrorists. 
He argues that hacktivists are ―engaged in disruption not destruction‖. 
Furthermore, a hacktivist is unlikely to become a terrorist, since his/her motives 
are different. 
Information warfare refers to the use of information as an instrument of war (Himes 
& Joseph, 2006). Furthermore, it is destructive, and is commonly used for 
terrorism or crime (Himes & Joseph, 2006). Therefore, cyber terrorists are involved 
in information warfare. However, using information as an instrument of war may be 
considered as psychological warfare. Psychological warfare refers to using 
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information against the human mind (Libicki, 1995). For example, information that 
is presented in the media can be used as a powerful tool to influence the national 
will of the enemy. A more detailed definition for information warfare is given by 
Janczewski and Colarik (2008, p. xiv) who define information warfare as, ―a 
planned attack by nations or their agents against information and computer 
systems, computer programs, and data that result in enemy losses‖.  
In the view of this definition, the cyber attack on Estonia in 2007 may be 
considered information warfare. The cause of the attacks was the removal of a 
statue honouring the death of Soviet soldiers from the central square in Tallinn, the 
capital city of Estonia (Lesk, 2007). This led to widespread protests by Russians in 
Estonia and Russia. Simultaneous with the protests, DDoS attacks began against 
Estonian government websites, government institutions and key businesses, such 
as banks.  
Estonia is a country that is highly dependent on Internet technology; and the 
attacks, therefore, caused a wide range of services to become unavailable.  
Because of this dependency and its inability to counter the attacks, it had to cut its 
Internet connection to the outside world. Eventually, the attacks stopped and 
Estonia returned to normal. Although some claims were made that the Russian 
government was involved in the attack, most security experts agreed that it was a 
rather uncoordinated attack by Russian individuals. However, the attacks 
demonstrated the impact information warfare can have.  
A planned national attack would certainly have severe consequences in our 
Internet-dependent world. 
2.4.4 The Human Element  
Humans are known to be the ―weakest link‖ in information security (Lineberry, 
2007). Despite having the best technology in place to safeguard its information 
assets, an organisation still remains vulnerable to the human threat (Johnson, 
2006; Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 3). Employees work with information every day. 
However, their behaviour is often not secure.  
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A study done by the Ponemon Institute (2009) amongst 967 end-users of 
corporate information technologies found that there is an increasing trend in 
insecure behaviour. For example, between 2007 and 2009, there was a 10% 
increase in insecure USB memory stick usage, and a 4% increase in switching off 
security software. This is also reflected by Deloitte‘s (2010, p. 4) global security 
survey amongst 150 technology, media and telecommunication organisations. 
This states that ―employees and internal threats remain a significant problem that 
is often overlooked due to a focus on external threats‖.  
Furthermore, the survey highlights the issue of risk-perception. Technological 
advancement allows employees to work and access the Internet from almost 
anywhere via the use of smart phones, laptops and wireless networking. However, 
these advancements seem to have outpaced employees‘ awareness of the risks 
and consequences involved. This confirms that technological advancement is one 
of the fundamental challenges of information security, as was mentioned in section 
2.2.  
West (2008, p. 36) similarly states that ―Users do not think they are at risk‖. He 
argues that most people believe that they are less vulnerable to risks than others.  
Humans fall prey to social engineering. Social engineering can be defined as 
―using social skills and personal interaction to get someone to reveal security-
relevant information and perhaps even to do something that permits an attack‖ 
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006, p. 405). A social engineer uses psychological tricks to 
influence the victim into providing sensitive information (Peltier, 2006). According 
to Peltier (2006), social engineers exploit qualities of human nature such as: 
1. The willingness to help: employees are trained to help customers. 
2. Trusting the people we deal with: a person generally trusts someone until 
they are found to be unreliable. 
3. Fear of disciplinary action: if verification takes too long, an employee might 
―let it slide‖, in order to avoid being reprimanded by his superior. 
4. The willingness to cut corners: sometimes we become lazy. For example, 
an employee might take short cuts, in order to leave work early.  
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Some humans do not need to be ―socially engineered‖. They will deliberately 
damage information assets. This is known as the insider threat. Insiders pose a 
significant threat to information security (Blackwell, 2009; D‘Arcy & Hovav, 2009). 
Blackwell (2009, p. 1) defines an insider, as someone who ―has legitimate access 
to an organization, its systems, information or other resources‖. The well-known 
phrase: your best friend is your worst enemy, comes to mind here. Therefore, 
insiders can severely harm an organisation because they have easy access, know 
the ―ins and outs‖ of everyday operations and where valuable targets are located 
(Blackwell, 2009).  
The motives for an insider attack are wide and varied, including financial problems, 
job dissatisfaction, divorce and relationship changes, drug abuse, alcoholism, 
revenge and mere enjoyment (Blackwell, 2009; Shropshire, 2009).   
The above discussion on threats to information security highlights the need for 
information security to be managed effectively. However, of the threats discussed, 
the human element is regarded as being among the most difficult to address. In 
the section which follows, a more detailed investigation into the ―human threat‖ will 
be given. 
2.5 The Human Challenge  
Security is a people problem (Schultz, 2005). Indeed, a substantial number of 
security failures are caused by people (Cranor, 2008; Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000). 
Therefore, many organisations would like to influence their employees to adopt 
more secure behaviour (Beautement & Sasse, 2009). However, this is a difficult 
task, and as Schneier (2004, p. xii) points out ―…Mathematics is logical; people 
are erratic, capricious and barely comprehensible‖. This section will describe some 
of the factors that contribute to human security failure. Furthermore, a common 
way of addressing the human challenge will be discussed. 
2.5.1 Why are humans the “weakest link”?  
People do not necessarily understand security. They often have a poor mental 
model of security, due to a lack of knowledge, or the complexity of security 
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systems (Chiasson, Van Oorschot, & Biddle, 2006; Egelman, Cranor, & Hong, 
2008). Mental models determine the way we think about an issue; they influence 
our understanding and guide our behaviour (Van Boven & Thompson, 2003). 
Therefore, they can be used to determine why people behave in a certain way.  
Research done by Wash (2010) investigated the effect that inaccurate mental 
models have on security behaviour. Results showed that, depending on their 
mental model, a person would make different security decisions. For example, 
those who believe that viruses are ―buggy software‖, would also tend believe that it 
is not necessary to run antivirus software. 
Information security may sometimes conflict with work-related goals that people 
have (Sasse et al., 2001). This leads to information security becoming a 
secondary task. Beautement and Sasse (2009) found that employees have a 
limited compliance budget for security. When this budget runs out, employees will 
start to take short cuts, in order to get the job done more easily. Therefore, 
Beautement and Sasse (2009, p. 10) concluded that the ―extra effort employees 
will make to comply with security policies is a limited resource‖; and it needs to be 
managed correctly.   
Negative attitudes toward information security may result in a disregard for 
information security and a lack of motivation. Information security is often seen as 
an inconvenience, an unnecessary evil that interferes with daily work tasks and 
goals (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Furnell & Thomson, 2009b; Ng et al., 2009). 
Employees may be seen as ‗paranoid‘ or ‗pedantic‘, and even untrustworthy by 
their colleagues when following security practices (Sasse et al., 2001). Thus, 
employees may disregard security in order to maintain a good relationship with 
colleague. 
Others may feel that security is pointless, since cyber criminals will always be a 
―step ahead‖ (Dourish, Grinter, Delgado de la Flor, & Joseph, 2004). Furthermore, 
Furnell and Thomson (2009b) discuss the issue of security fatigue. This is where 
an employee follows good security practices, but as time passes, becomes 
fatigued by it. In the end, security is being more and more ignored. 
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According to Sasse et al. (2001), employees may think that the security 
regulations are unrealistic and ignored by most of their fellow employees, as well.  
Furthermore, D‘Arcy and Hovav (2007) found that although employees were 
aware that their behaviour was being monitored, they believed that the recorded 
logs were not reviewed regularly. In another study, the results suggested that 
advanced computer users believe they can circumvent monitoring technologies, to 
engage in insecure activities (D‘Arcy & Hovav, 2009).  
Therefore, employees may believe that they would not be ―caught‖ or held 
accountable for their wrong behaviour.   
West (2008) states that humans‘ capability to process information is limited. In 
order to conserve mental resources, we make quick decisions based on heuristics. 
Therefore, we may not read the entire text of a warning or prompt. As a result, 
human errors occur. Reason (1990) developed a conceptual framework called the 
generic error-modelling system (GEMS) that classifies human errors as slips, 
lapses and mistakes. A slip occurs when an action is performed incorrectly, such 
as clicking the wrong button. Lapses are due to human memory failure, for 
example, forgetting to log off from a computer would be a lapse. Finally, a mistake 
occurs when a planned action has an unintended result.  
A lack of usability in security systems is often the reason why security fails. If 
security is too difficult to use, people will find a way around it (Leach, 2003; 
Schultz, 2005). In their seminal paper, Saltzer and Schroeder (1975, p. 1282) 
stated that ―it is essential to design the human interface for ease of use, so that 
users routinely and automatically apply the protection mechanisms correctly‖. 
However, it was only in the late 1990s that usability in security was considered 
again.  
In 1999, Whitten and Tygar (1999) evaluated the usability of an encryption 
program. They found that most users were not able to use the program effectively. 
More recently, Chiasson et al. (2006) still found that two password managers had 
major usability problems. Some of the problems may be a result of the conflict 
between usability and security. For example, when considering the use of 
passwords, usability would require short, easily remembered passwords that do 
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not change often. The opposite is true for security, where long, complex 
passwords are required, which are changed often.  
Therefore, a balance should be found between usability and security. 
2.5.2 Addressing the human challenge  
In order to reduce the likelihood of security incidents, organisations attempt to 
influence individuals to adopt more secure behaviour.  
Having an information security policy is regarded as the basis for disseminating 
sound security practices and reducing the occurrence of security incidents 
(Whitman, 2004). An information security policy provides employees with an 
insight of what security behaviour is expected of them. For example, a section on 
computer usage may state that employees should use passwords with a minimum 
length of 6 characters, and that these passwords should consist of numbers as 
well as letters. It thus highlights the responsibilities employees have with regard to 
protecting information.  
However, many organisations have information security policies, but they still 
struggle to improve the security behaviour of their employees. This may be due to 
the policy not being read or properly understood by the employees. In other 
instances, the policy may not be tailored to the organisation, or it may not be kept 
up to date. Furthermore, there may also be a lack of enforcement. This could 
explain why Doherty and Fulford (2005) found ―no statistically significant 
relationship between the existence and application of information security policies 
and the incidence or severity of security breaches‖.  
Another commonly used way to achieve this is through security awareness 
programs. These programs aim to raise the employees‘ awareness regarding 
information security and their responsibilities in safeguarding information assets 
(D‘Arcy & Hovav, 2007). Security awareness programs can make use of various 
techniques to educate and create awareness. Some of these techniques are as 
follows: (Brodie, 2008): 
1. Security awareness website: a website that educates users regarding 
information security. 
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2. Helpful hints: hints can be used to aid in the training. These hints can be in 
the form of tips and reminders that reiterate certain important aspects. 
3. Visual aids: these can be effectively used to attract attention. For example, 
posters can be created with some catchy security phrases. 
4. Promotions: distributing flyers, pencils or other merchandise that brings 
home some security message.   
However, these security awareness programs do not always have the envisaged 
results (Ng et al., 2009). Some of the factors contributing to this failure are: 
1. The program is too generic, and it targets an audience that is too large 
(Valentine, 2006).  
2. Participants‘ tendency to forget the message after a while (Albrechtsen, 
2007). 
3. The belief that the programs‘ message is nothing new, and is, in any case, 
irrelevant (Albrechtsen, 2007). 
4. Participants are provided with too much information in a short period of time 
(Herold, 2010). 
5. The belief that cyber criminals will always find ―a way in‖, even if one 
behaves securely (Weirich & Sasse, 2001). 
6. A lack of management support and adequate finances (Herold, 2010). 
7. Security education, awareness and training being neglected by 
organisations in favour of other countermeasures (D‘Arcy & Hovav, 2007). 
Security awareness programs should be complemented with security training that 
aims to increase the knowledge and skills needed to effectively protect information 
assets. Organisations thus enrol their employees for security training to instil 
sound security practices. Unfortunately, the training efforts are often constrained 
by high costs and the limited amount of time available for such training. 
Furthermore, May (2008) points out that presenters and authors of training 
material often fail to get the message across. The training may, therefore, not be 
as successful as was envisaged. 
In view of the above discussion, finding additional ways to influence people to 
adopt secure behaviour would indeed be beneficial. 
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2.6 Protecting Information  
In the light of the information and arguments provided in the previous section, it is 
important that information is managed effectively. Information security 
management aspects are defined by the ISO/IEC 27001 (2005, p. 2) standard, as 
―that part of the overall management system, based on a business risk approach, 
to establish, implement, operate, monitor, review, maintain and improve 
Information Security‖. Furthermore, it is stated that this includes ―organizational 
structure, policies, planning activities, responsibilities, practices, procedures, 
processes and resources‖.  
From this definition, it becomes evident that risk management plays an important 
role in information security. Therefore, information security management can be 
seen as: the mitigation of information security threats to an acceptable level, in 
order to ensure business continuity and prosperity. The next section will discuss 
risk management in more detail. 
2.6.1 Risk Management  
Organisations increasingly depend on information and information technology. 
Therefore, it is essential for organisations to protect their information assets from 
security risks (Gerber & Von Solms, 2005). An information security risk can be 
defined as the likelihood of something going wrong and damaging information 
assets (Caballero, 2009, pp. 231-232). Von Solms and Von Solms (2008, p. 90) 
state that a risk consists of an asset, a threat and a vulnerability. Furthermore, the 
size of a risk is a combination of impact that the threat would have on the asset 
and the probability of the threat exploiting the vulnerability (Von Solms & Von 
Solms, 2008, p. 91). Consequently, a threat exploits a vulnerability to negatively 
affect the asset.  
Risk management may be defined as those ―coordinated activities to direct and 
control an organization with regard to risk‖ (ISO/IEC27002, 2005, p. 2). These 
coordinated activities generally include (Stoneburner, Goguen, & Feringa, 2002): 
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1. Risk assessment: this process identifies the assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities; and makes recommendations regarding possible controls. It 
also evaluates the likelihood and impact of the identified threats.  
2. Risk mitigation: this refers to prioritising, implementing, and maintaining the 
appropriate risk-reducing countermeasures. Through this process, risk is 
mitigated to an acceptable level. This can be achieved through methods, 
such as risk avoidance, limitation or transference. 
3. Continual evaluation and reassessment: new threats may surface due to 
the ongoing change an organisation experiences. Therefore, this process 
continuously tries to identify new threats and reassesses existing threats. 
An important aspect of risk management is the use of security controls. Security 
controls mitigate a risk (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2008, p. 91). The US National 
Institute of Standards and Technology classifies information security controls into 
three categories: management, operational and technical (Stoneburner et al., 
2002). These categories will be discussed in the following sections. 
2.6.2 Management Controls  
Management controls include information security policies, guidelines, standards 
and procedures. These controls are often established by management as part of a 
larger information security management system (ISMS) (ISO/IEC27001, 2005). 
They communicate to all employees what is expected of them, and what the result 
of non-compliance would be.  
A policy is ―a high-level statement of enterprise beliefs, goals, and objectives and 
the general means for their attainment for a specified subject area‖ (Peltier, 2004, 
p. 44). In an organisation, there is commonly a corporate information security 
policy, from which several sub-policies stem. These sub-policies then contain 
guidelines, standards and step-by-step procedures relating to a particular subject. 
It is essential that employees follow and adhere to an organisation‘s information 
security policies (Vroom & Von Solms, 2004). However, enforcing this is a 
challenging task (Johnson & Goetz, 2007). West (2008, p. 40) argues that, 
―Having a corporate security policy that is not monitored or enforced is tantamount 
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to having laws but no police‖. It is therefore, important to evaluate employees‘ 
compliance with regard to such policies.  
In order to address this, Von Solms and Von Solms (2006) proposed a Direct and 
Control model. The model is shown in Figure 2.2, and it covers three levels of 
management: strategic, tactical and operational.  
 
Figure 2.2: The direct and control model (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2006) 
Furthermore, the model describes three fundamental actions that occur across 
these management levels, which are direction, execution and control. The Board 
strategically directs the organisation and provides a set of directives. These 
directives are then ―expanded‖ by each management level into the applicable 
policies and company standards, until they become step-by-step guidelines and 
procedures. These procedures then guide the actions that are to be executed. The 
control process ensures that the directives, as well as the policies, standards, 
guidelines and procedures that stem from them, are followed. 
At the operational level, data are captured from a wide range of entities. These 
data are then compiled and integrated into reports. The reports become more 
concise at each management level. In the end, the Board should receive high-level 
feedback, together with a summary of the important issues. An important aspect of 
the model is that everything in the ―Direct‖ part should ideally be measurable. 
Therefore, Von Solms and Von Solms (2006)  require that, ―Any statement which 
cannot be measured in some way should not appear in a directive or policy if 
compliance to that statement has to be monitored‖.  
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This is consistent with the idea that what cannot be measured cannot be 
managed. 
2.6.3 Operational Controls  
The operational controls ensure that operational threats are kept at bay. They 
cover functions, such as disaster recovery and incident-response planning 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2010, p. 62). Operational controls also deal with the 
development of security education, training and awareness programs (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2010, p. 62). In addition, they include back-up operations and systems 
maintenance that help to ensure the continuity of operations. Operational controls 
therefore, help to ensure that the daily operations in an organisation run easily and 
without any untoward incidents. 
2.6.4 Technological Controls  
Technological controls refer to products and processes. They protect information 
by means of technology. Common technological controls include, amongst others: 
1. Encryption: this refers to a scrambling technique that ensures the 
confidentiality of information. Data that are in clear text are transformed into 
unintelligible cipher text (Pfleeger &  Pfleeger, 2006, pp. 38-39).    
2. Steganography: whereas encryption scrambles the information, 
steganography hides it. A variety of software tools exist that allow the user 
to hide one file in another file (Ellis, 2009, p. 324). For example, a Word 
document may be hidden in a picture file, such as a JPEG file. The resulting 
picture still looks the same as the original.  
3. Firewalls and Antivirus software: a firewall protects an organisation‘s 
network from outside intruders, such as hackers. Antivirus software is used 
to detect and quarantine various types of malware.   
Finally, it should be noted that the security controls discussed above need to be 
integrated with each other. For example, technological controls will support the 
compliance with policies; and most technological controls do have some 
management action associated with them. 
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2.7 Conclusion  
We live in a world that has grown dependent on information and information 
technology. Information can be seen as the ―currency‖ of modern-day economies. 
It is a driver for most of today‘s business processes. Therefore, it is imperative for 
organisations and individuals to protect their information assets. However, this is a 
challenging task, as humans are facing constant technological advances. This 
leads to humans being unaware of the risks and threats that are introduced with 
new technology. Furthermore, cyber criminals target individuals through methods, 
such as phishing, botnets, and malware. The information security field has, 
therefore, identified humans as the ―weakest link‖, and the cause of many security 
incidents.  
Other factors that contribute to this are: a lack of knowledge, negative attitudes, 
conflicting goals and poor usability. Therefore, information security is indeed a 
human challenge.  
Organisations use management, operational and technological controls to address 
and mitigate any threats to information security. One of the controls used to 
influence employees to adopt more secure behaviour is an information security 
awareness program. Many organisations have adopted information security 
awareness programs, to educate, train and make employees more aware of 
information security and related threats. Unfortunately, these programs are not 
always implemented effectively. Therefore, a need to find additional and better 
ways to influence individuals‘ behaviour to adopt more secure behaviour exists.  
However, human behaviour is complex, and has many aspects to it. Therefore, an 
investigation is needed to identify the factors that will influence human behaviour.  
The next chapter will describe some of the factors that need to be considered 
when influencing a person. It will discuss what influences our behaviour, and 
describe some related theories. Furthermore, it will introduce the persuasive 
technology field. This field concerns itself with the use of technology to persuade 
an individual to perform certain actions. 
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Chapter 3  
Cultivating Secure Behaviour
3.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter the need to cultivate secure behaviour with regard to 
information assets was highlighted. This is not an easy task, as human behaviour 
is complex. Due to this complexity, there is a vast amount of research literature 
that deals with human behaviour. This comes from various disciplines, such as 
psychology, economics and sociology. This chapter will, therefore, not attempt to 
describe all the factors that govern human behaviour. However, some principles 
that often influence our behaviour as well as the various behavioural theories, 
such as the theory of planned behaviour, will be discussed.  
Based on this, a brief discussion will follow on the criteria that should be 
considered when attempting to influence humans to adopt a more secure 
behaviour. Finally, the field of persuasive technology will be introduced, and its 
persuasive strategies will be discussed. 
3.2 What influences our behaviour? 
There are many factors that influence behaviour. However, Cialdini (2001, p. X) 
argues that most factors can be related to six fundamental psychological principles 
that influence our behaviour. These principles are: reciprocation, consistency, 
social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity. Furthermore, we live in a complex 
world, which is constantly changing; and we have many decisions to make on a 
daily basis. In order to save time, energy and to conserve mental power, people 
tend to use heuristics to make their decisions. This allows for an automatic 
response – without the need to think – when a trigger feature is present in a 
situation.  
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Cialdini (2001, p. 5) cites the experiment of Langer, Blank and Chanowitz (1978), 
which demonstrated how the word ―because‖ triggers such an automatic response. 
In the experiment, a researcher asked people waiting in a line to use a copier as 
follows: "Excuse me, I have five pages. May I use the Xerox machine, because I'm 
in a rush?" The result was that 94 percent of those asked let the researcher skip 
ahead of them in the line. Then the question was changed to: "Excuse me, I have 
five pages. May I use the Xerox machine?" In this case, 60 percent of those asked 
complied in the affirmative. However, when the question was changed to: "Excuse 
me, I have five pages. May I use the Xerox machine because I have to make 
some copies?" Still 93 percent complied with the request, even though no real 
reason was given. Therefore, the word ―because‖ seems to have triggered an 
automatic response.  
Another heuristic which people use is the price of a product. Generally, if a product 
has a high price, it is assumed to be of good quality (Rao & Monroe, 1989). For 
example, the high price of a wine positively influenced the perceived taste and 
pleasantness ratings it received (Plassmann, O‘Doherty, Shiv, & Rangel, 2008). 
Often the use of heuristics can lead to bad decisions. Hammond, Keeney and 
Raiffa (1998) discussed various heuristic traps, such as basing a decision on 
previously poor decisions, which is often done to avoid admitting to mistakes that 
were made in the past. However, in today‘s demanding world, where many 
decisions need to be made on a daily basis, people need heuristics (Cialdini, 
2001, p. 7).  
In this way, heuristics play a major role in the choices people make and the 
behaviour patterns that result. 
Heuristics, however, are not the only aspect to consider with regard to human 
behaviour. As mentioned earlier, Cialdini (2001) contends that there are six 
fundamental principles that influence behaviour. The following sections discuss 
each of the six principles, namely: reciprocation, consistency, social proof, liking, 
authority, and scarcity. 
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3.2.1  Reciprocation  
It is deeply embedded in human nature that when someone does a favour for us, 
we want to return the favour in some way. Reciprocation is, therefore, a powerful 
method that can be used to influence people‘s behaviour. It creates a feeling of 
indebtedness and obligation towards the other person. Furthermore, most people 
do not want to be seen as someone who only takes, but does not return 
something. An experiment conducted amongst 81 Stanford University students by 
the psychologist, Dennis Regan (1971), and cited by Cialdini (2001, pp. 23-24) 
demonstrates this. It investigated the effect a favour had on the participants, with 
regard to buying raffle tickets from the person doing the favour. In some cases, the 
person would buy the participant a Coke and in others not.  
It was found that those who received the Coke from the person, bought twice as 
many raffle tickets as those who did not. Furthermore, it did not matter whether the 
person was liked or disliked by the participant. Those that received the favour 
were always buying more tickets. Therefore, by doing a favour to a person, it is 
possible to increase the chances that the person will behave in a manner that is to 
one‘s advantage in the future. 
3.2.2  Consistency  
People value consistent behaviour. If someone says one thing, but does another, 
he/she is regarded as unreliable, and not to be trusted. Therefore, people will often 
go out of their way in order to be consistent with what they have previously said or 
done. By having a person commit to something, he/she can be ―set up‖ for future 
behaviour. Furthermore, the most influential commitments are those that are 
active, public, and require effort (Cialdini, 2001, pp. 81-82). 
An example of this is where residents were asked in a survey if they would be 
willing to spend three hours collecting money for the American Cancer Society. 
Many residents agreed, since they wanted to be seen as charitable. The result of 
this commitment was a 700 percent increase in volunteers, when a few days later 
the American Cancer Society asked for volunteers amongst those surveyed 
(Sherman, 1980, as cited in Cialdini, 2001, p. 63). Therefore, the residents 
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followed the behaviour pattern to which they had committed themselves a few 
days earlier. They matched their subsequent actions with their words. 
3.2.3  Social Proof  
According to Cialdini (2001, p. 101), ―we view a behavior as correct in a given 
situation to the degree that we see others performing it‖. Therefore, people are 
influenced by the behaviour of others, and use it to validate their own behaviour. 
This is known as ―social proof‖. It provides a convenient mental shortcut to identify 
what the correct behaviour is. 
Social proof can also lead to pluralistic ignorance (Cialdini, 2001, p. 111). 
Pluralistic ignorance is the unfortunate event that occurs when a group of people 
remain inactive, even though someone is in need of help. For example, a person 
may notice someone lying on the ground, and being uncertain whether or not help 
is needed, he/she looks at the behaviour of others. Seeing that no one else 
investigates, he/she also ignores it. In the end, everyone is influenced by the 
inertia of everyone else, resulting in a situation where no one acts.  
The influence of social proof is most powerful when a person is uncertain, or when 
behaviour is observed in similar people (Cialdini, 2001, p. 119). For example, a 
child will be more influenced by the behaviour of other children of the same age 
than by the behaviour of adults. Thus, people that are doubtful of what the correct 
behaviour is in a certain situation will adapt their behaviour to those who are most 
like themselves. Certainly, this would also be applicable in situations where a 
person is under pressure, or has limited time to think about the correct behaviour – 
the person would simply follow the ―group‘s behaviour‖. 
3.2.4  Liking  
Attractive people often have an advantage in influencing others. A very attractive 
woman may be able to convince a man to do almost anything. Furthermore, 
attractive people are often seen as very talented and intelligent. Cialdini (2001, p. 
148) calls this the ―halo effect‖ – where a person‘s positive characteristics 
determine how the person is perceived by others.  
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Not only physical attractiveness causes liking. There are other factors as well, 
such as similarity, compliments and association (Cialdini, 2001, pp. 150-167). We 
like people more if they share our views, behave in a similar way, or have the 
same background. Furthermore, if someone gives a compliment, there is a 
tendency to automatically like the person. Association is often used by companies 
to increase their public liking. They achieve this by sponsoring events, such as the 
Olympic Games, Football matches and Formula One racing.  
Sponsorship indirectly influences the purchasing behaviour of the fans, by 
persuading them to purchase the sponsor‘s products, in order to facilitate the 
sporting event(s) loved by the fans (Dees, Bennett, & Villegas, 2008). The 
sponsors hope that the positive feelings that the fans have for the event become 
linked to the sponsor‘s products (Mason, 2005). From this one may conclude that 
liking instils a positive feeling in people which then opens the door for future 
influencing. 
3.2.5  Authority  
Authority leads to obedience in individuals. Children grow up seeing their parents 
as authorities and following their instructions. Therefore, one may argue that being 
obedient to someone with authority is natural to human behaviour.  
Cialdini (2001, pp. 180-184) cites the famous experiment conducted by Milgram 
(1963, 1974) regarding authority and obedience. The experiment investigated the 
willingness of individuals to administer increasingly more painful electrical shocks 
to another person, when requested to do so by an authoritative supervisor. In a 
laboratory setting, participants were asked to administer electric shocks, ranging 
from 15-450 volts. The supervisor instructed the participants to increase the 
voltage every time the other person being tested gave a wrong answer to a 
question. However, the person answering the questions and receiving the shocks 
was an actor who had to pretend that he/she was receiving real shocks by 
showing agonising pain, crying out and violently protesting against the ―electrical 
shocks‖. Therefore, those administering the shocks were left with the impression 
that the shocks were real.  
Chapter 3  - Cultivating Secure Behaviour 
48 
 
The experiment had disturbing results, indicating the power of authority (Milgram, 
1963). All of the 40 participants went up to the 300 volt level, where the actor 
started kicking the wall and stopped responding to questions. Of the participants, 
five opted out after giving the 300 volt shock; and a further nine stopped before 
reaching 390 volts. However, the majority of the participants (26) went all the way 
up to the potentially lethal level of 450 volts indicated with ―XXX‖.  
More recently, Burger (2009) asked the question whether nowadays Milgram‘s 
(1963) experiment would have the same results. He investigated this by 
conducting a similar experiment to Milgram‘s, where the participants‘ willingness to 
continue administering electrical shocks after 150 volts, was determined. The 
results he obtained showed that most of the participants would continue beyond 
150 volts with the electrical shocks. Therefore, Burger (2009) argues that if 
Milgram‘s experiment were done nowadays, very similar results to those of nearly 
50 years ago would be obtained. 
Authority can be easily conveyed through the way one looks. Cialdini (2001, pp. 
188-196) describes how titles, clothes and accessories can be used to achieve 
this. For example, someone dressed in a police uniform would have a better 
chance of ordering a person in the street to do something than someone in casual 
clothes. In this way, the principle of authority can pose a significant threat to 
security. Con artists and social engineers can, by simply dressing up in a certain 
way, obtain access to otherwise restricted areas.  
Long (2008, p.14) discusses how easily he entered a building, pretending to be a 
phone technician. Furthermore, to determine the correct dress, one politely asks a 
delivery person, an electrician, a plumber, or a technician for permission to take a 
few photographs, and makes up a story that this is for a child who wants to be an 
electrician, plumber or technician some day. 
Milgram‘s (1963, 1974) experiment showed that authority is a very strong factor in 
influencing people. People have a natural tendency to obey those whom they 
believe to be superior or more authoritative. Authority can, therefore, be effectively 
used to influence individuals. Unfortunately, the principle of authority can also be 
easily exploited, and used to facilitate criminal activities. Thus, care should be 
taken that the perceived authority is ―real‖ and authentic. 
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3.2.6  Scarcity  
The scarcity principle can influence people, since items and opportunities seem 
more valuable when they are less available (Cialdini, 2001, p. 205). For example, 
marketing and sales people will often influence potential buyers by stating that 
there is only a limited number available of a specific item. Another tactic is to state 
that the item is available, or on a special, only for a limited time period. 
Furthermore, for increased effectiveness, both tactics are often combined. Cialdini 
(2001, pp. 208-209) discusses two major sources that contribute to the scarcity 
principle‘s ability to influence people. Firstly, people tend to use an item‘s 
availability as a heuristic shortcut to assess the quality and value of an item. 
Therefore, if an item is nearly sold out, it has to be good. Secondly, if an item or 
opportunity becomes less available, people lose the ability to obtain or choose it. 
People are strongly opposed to losing freedoms. Cialdini (2001, p. 209) supports 
this argument, with the psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981). The theory contends that whenever personal freedom is reduced or 
threatened, the person will react against this, by trying to preserve or re-establish 
the freedom.  
Thus, a person will buy more of a product, as it becomes less available.   
The discussed principles may be seen as an indirect security threat. By applying 
these principles, a social engineer might be able to influence an organisation‘s 
employees, so that they can gain access to information assets. Nohlberg (2009, 
pp. 17-21) describes various ways in which the principles impact information 
security. For example, based on the social proof principle, employees may adopt 
the general attitude of other employees to information security, instead of what is 
prescribed by policies.  
Furthermore, the scarcity principle explains why secret or banned information is 
seen as more valuable, and is more wanted by people. Therefore, a hacker is 
more likely to go after classified and confidential information than information that 
is generally available. Limiting the availability of information may, therefore, 
increase the chance of it being ―attacked‖.  
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A person who is liked may get his/her requests granted more often. Social 
engineers can increase being liked through familiarity. Mitnick and Simon (2002, 
pp. 42-43) describe how a social engineer obtained credit card details, by building 
familiarity and trust with the targeted person. The social engineer became well 
acquainted with the targeted victim, by having several phone calls with the target 
over a couple of weeks.  
Security breaches can be made possible through the reciprocation principle, as 
well. An example provided by Mitnick and Simon (2002, pp. 55-60) details how a 
hacker obtained remote access to a target‘s computer by first doing a favour for 
the targeted victim. The favour then allowed the hacker to ask the target to install 
Trojan software, which then provided the hacker with remote access to the 
computer.  
One may conclude that these principles can facilitate a number of security 
breaches, since they allow information thieves to influence their targets. The 
principles provide a basic understanding of how human behaviour may be 
influenced. However, there are other more personal aspects as well, that influence 
human behaviour. Therefore, a discussion regarding theories that describe some 
of these aspects will follow. 
3.3  Theories of human behaviour  
Fundamentally, science and theory seeks to discover truth. Science is based on 
theories that allow researchers to describe ―how things work‖. Theory can be 
defined as "an explanation or explanatory system that discusses how a 
phenomenon operates and why it operates as it does" (Johnson & Christensen, 
2010, p. 62). Furthermore, Culler (2009, p. 3) argues that theory is more than a 
hypothesis. It describes what is difficult to understand, involves complex relations, 
and is not easily proven or disproven.  
Not all theories are good. Some may lead research in the wrong direction and 
prevent research from progressing. Other theories could cause confusion by using 
different terms for the same principle. This leads Miner (2005, pp. 11-12) to 
provide the following list of criteria that can be used to identify a good theory: 
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1. Contribution: theories should contribute to science, by allowing researchers 
to better understand a phenomenon; 
2. Delineation: there should be a clear indication of the domain where the 
theory is applicable; 
3. Direction: theories should provide researchers with direction and focus; 
4. Value: a good theory adds value to the research domain; 
5. Validation: it should be possible to test the theory; and it should be clear  
how to prove or disprove the theory; 
6. Consistency: good theory is consistent within itself, and with the existing 
facts;  
7. Simplicity: good theories explain the phenomenon in an easily 
understandable way. 
The above criteria can, therefore, assist in the selection of theories on human 
behaviour. In addition, they provide an understanding of the characteristics of 
good theory, and they elaborate on the definition of theory provided earlier. 
As already mentioned, there is a significant amount of literature that considers 
human behaviour. Similarly, there have been many theories established to 
describe and understand human behaviour. The principles described by Cialdini 
(2001), and already discussed earlier, are sometimes reflected in the concepts of 
these theories. However, the theories provide further insight and describe other 
important factors that impact on behaviour.  
Therefore, a discussion on these theories will now follow. 
3.3.1 The Rational Choice Theory  
Rational choice theory is based on economic assumptions (Scott, 2000, p. 126). 
According to this theory, human behaviour is a continual process of choosing 
between different courses of action (Jackson, 2005, p. 29). The decision on what 
actions to take is based on a cost-benefits analysis. People evaluate the expected 
benefits and costs of the different actions and choose the actions that have the 
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highest benefit or the lowest cost to them (Jackson, 2005, p. 29; Scott, 2000, p. 
126). Therefore, people strive to behave in a profitable way.  
Rational choice theory has proven to be a predictor of behaviour across a wide 
range of disciplines (Darnton, 2008). However, its simplistic view has received 
considerable criticism. Most of the criticism stems from one or more of the 
underlying assumptions of rational choice theory (Jackson, 2005, p. 35): 
1. That behaviour is controlled by rational deliberations; 
2. That the decision-making process is one of individual rationality;  
3. That choice is only based on costs and benefits.  
Humans do not always make rational choices. In fact, many choices are more 
irrational than rational. A reason for this is that decision-making is often limited. It 
is bounded by psychological and environmental constraints (Darnton, 2008). The 
idea of bounded rationality is not a new one. Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon 
(1955, 1957) described it; and he argued that the information an individual has, 
and the cognitive or computational abilities are often insufficient to make perfect 
decisions. Therefore, an individual who lacks information and is under time 
pressure will not be able to make a rational decision.  
Another factor is that humans rely on heuristics to reduce the mental effort of 
decision-making. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) describe three heuristics that 
people use to make judgements in conditions of uncertainty: 
1. Representative: judgements are based on the similarity to a certain context 
or previous experience, and not on actual probability; 
2. Availability: the probability of an event is determined by how easily it is 
recalled; 
3. Adjustment and Anchoring: using an initial reference point, which is then 
adjusted, in order to determine the outcome. 
Although these heuristics are effective, they can lead also to several errors of 
judgement. For example, the belief that the probability of a coin coming up tails on 
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a particular toss increases with the number of consecutive heads that preceded 
that toss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
More recently, psychologists have contended that there are two modes of thinking 
and reasoning, referred to as System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich & West, 2000). 
The System 1 refers to intuition; and it is fast, automatic, effortless, associative, 
and often emotionally charged – therefore, more prone to error; System 2 is 
reasoning, which is slower, serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled – therefore, 
likely to be less erroneous (Kahneman, 2003).  
The cognitive system, therefore, makes decisions through two processes that run 
simultaneously. However, the rationality of the decision is dependent on the extent 
to which System 1 or System 2 is used. Thus, the more System 1 is used, the less 
rational the decisions will be, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, critics have pointed out the emotional or affective dimension of 
decision-making (Jackson, 2005, p. 37). People may simply disregard rationality 
because of how they feel. For example, a person will buy an Apple IPhone 
because he/she likes the sleek design or the Apple brand, even though there is 
another mobile phone with the same features at a lower cost. Others may join a 
charitable organisation, which does not support their own self-interest. 
Finally, individual rationality is questioned, since decisions that are made in a 
social context often need to consider the wishes and interests of others. An 
individual‘s decisions will be influenced by the group of people amongst whom 
he/she finds himself/herself.  
In view of these critiques, there has been a research effort to come up with 
alternative conceptual theories of human behaviour. These theories expand on the 
idea of rational choice, by integrating other factors, such as social norms and self- 
efficacy as determinants of human behaviour. They provide for a broader 
understanding of human behaviour. Thus, a discussion on some of these theories 
follows. 
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3.3.2 The Social Cognitive Theory  
Social cognitive theory (SCT) is regarded as one of the most influential theories on 
human behaviour (Venkatesh, Morris, & Davis, 2003). The theory was developed 
by Bandura (1986), and it sees human behaviour in terms of a triadic model of 
reciprocal determinism. According to SCT, human behaviour is the product of 
dynamic interaction between personal factors, behaviour and the environmental 
factors (McAlister, Perry, & Parcel, 2008, p. 170).  
Figure 3.1 shows this interaction. The factors may vary in strength and the 
reciprocal influences do not all occur at the same time (Bandura, 1989). According 
to Bandura (1989), personal factors, such as thoughts, beliefs, expectations, self-
perception and feelings influence behaviour. On the other hand, the effects of 
behaviour will affect the thought patterns, beliefs and emotional state of a person. 
 
Figure 3.1: The triad of reciprocal determinism adapted from Pajares (2002) 
In the personal-environmental factors relationship, personal beliefs, expectations 
and cognitive abilities are developed and modified by social influences. Therefore, 
personal factors are shaped by the society and environment in which one lives and 
grows up. Furthermore, a person‘s physical characteristics, social status and role 
will determine the reactions that he/she evokes from the social environment. 
Therefore, without saying or doing anything, a person can affect their social 
environment.  
In the behaviour-environmental factors relationship an individual‘s behaviour 
affects the nature of the environment he/she experiences. For example, a child will 
be praised if it behaves in a praiseworthy manner, and disciplined if it behaves 
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improperly. The environment, in turn, will partly determine the behaviour. Thus, a 
child is likely to repeat the behaviour for which it was praised. One may, therefore, 
conclude that a person‘s behaviour is both a product and a producer of the 
environment.  
SCT describes some key concepts that influence human behaviour. These 
concepts can be grouped as follows: psychological determinants of behaviour, 
observational learning, environmental determinants of behaviour, self-regulation, 
and moral disengagement (McAlister et al., 2008, p. 170). A discussion on these 
concepts now follows. 
The psychological determinants of behaviour include self-efficacy and outcome 
expectations. Self-efficacy is defined in Bandura‘s (1977, p. 193) seminal paper, 
as ―the conviction that one can successfully execute the behavior required to 
produce the outcomes‖; and this is regarded as one of the main determinants of 
behaviour. The perceived self-efficacy one has with regard to the behaviour, will 
determine whether an attempt will be made to perform the behaviour, the amount 
of effort expended and how long one would persist (Bandura, 1982).  
Someone who doubts his capabilities of performing the behaviour, is less likely to 
attempt and successfully execute it. According to Bandura (1977), self-efficacy can 
be increased through: 
1. Personal mastery experiences, such as successfully changing a tyre on a 
motor vehicle; 
2. Vicarious experiences, where one observes others successfully executing 
the action;   
3. Verbal persuasion that provides convincing arguments regarding one‘s 
capability of performing the behaviour; 
4. A positive psychological and emotional state that is free from anxiety, 
stress, fear and arousal.  
As described in section 3.2.3, the influence others have can be increased if they 
have similar characteristics. Thus, vicarious experience can be improved when 
those being observed have similar characteristics to the observer.  
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Outcome expectations are an individual‘s beliefs regarding the result and value of 
performing the behaviour (McAlister et al., 2008, p. 172). The concept is similar to 
rational choice theory, where behaviour is influenced by the anticipated benefits 
and costs. However, SCT also considers social outcome expectations and self-
evaluative expectations. The former is the belief regarding how others will judge 
the behaviour; and the latter is how the people would expect to feel regarding 
themselves, when performing the behaviour (McAlister et al., 2008, p. 172). 
Observational learning refers to how people‘s behaviour is influenced and 
shaped by what is learned through observation (McAlister et al., 2008, p. 173). 
What a person is able to observe depends on family, friends and peers, cultural 
and media models. For example, in a country such as Japan, with a ―tight‖ culture, 
people tend to behave in a proper way, as defined by culture and society, which is 
not the case in a country with a more ―loose‖ culture, such as the United States 
(Triandis, 1989). 
Environmental determinants refer to environmental influences that have an 
impact on behaviour. Two environmental influences described by McAlister et al. 
(2008, p. 172) are incentive motivation and facilitation. Incentive motivation is the 
basic concept, where people are given rewards for correct behaviour and receive 
punishments for incorrect behaviour. Facilitation aims to support an individual in 
performing the behaviour. Thus, making it easier to do the right thing and more 
difficult to do the wrong thing. 
Self-regulation is the idea that people can manage their own behaviour by 
acquiring a set of skills. Therefore, humans are able to influence themselves. This 
can occur through self-monitoring, goal-setting, personal feedback, self-reward, 
self-instruction, and by finding other people to support these self-regulatory efforts. 
Through moral disengagement a person can violate the moral standards learned. 
Moral disengagement, therefore, facilitates criminal or violent behaviour. The 
mechanisms of moral disengagement include euphemistic labelling, which is the 
use of words to make the violence less offensive; diffusion and displacement of 
responsibility, thereby attributing decisions to someone else; and the perceived 
moral justification for violent actions, by describing them as beneficial and even 
perhaps necessary. 
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SCT is ―ambitious‖ in the sense that it considers a large number of factors that 
impact on an individual‘s behaviour. These factors interact in a dynamic way to 
influence the resultant behaviour. It therefore, becomes evident that human 
behaviour is complex and not easily described. However, SCT regards self-
efficacy as being most influential (Bandura, 1977, 1982). Thus, when trying to 
influence a person to adopt a certain behaviour, it is essential to strengthen the 
person‘s belief of being able to perform the particular behaviour. 
3.3.3  The Theory of Planned Behaviour  
The theory of planned behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991) is one of the most well-
known theories on human behaviour . It can be seen as an extension of the theory 
of reasoned action (TRA) (Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), as it includes 
the additional factor of perceived behavioural control (Armitage & Conner, 2001). 
Similar to the TRA, in the TPB the main determinant of behaviour is the intention 
to perform the behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). This intention represents the motivational 
factors a person has to perform the behaviour.  
It indicates ―how hard people are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are 
planning to exert, in order to perform the behavior‖ (Ajzen, 1991, p. 181). 
Therefore, the stronger the intention is, the more likely it is that the behaviour will 
be performed. However, Ajzen (1991) pointed out that intention can only be 
applicable if the person can freely decide to perform or not to perform the 
behaviour. TPB, as shown in Figure 3.2, describes three factors that determine a 
person‘s intention to perform a behaviour; attitude towards the behaviour, 
subjective norms and the perceived behavioural control (PBC).  
 
Figure 3.2: The theory of planned behaviour (Armitage & Conner, 2001) 
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However, these three factors are based on a person‘s salient beliefs, which are 
further divided into behavioural, normative and control beliefs. TPB argues that 
someone can have many beliefs regarding a specific behaviour, but only some of 
these beliefs are salient at any particular time. In its basic form, TPB sees human 
behaviour as a function of these salient beliefs. 
Attitude refers to how positively or negatively a person evaluates the behaviour. 
According to TPB, behavioural beliefs are the precursors of attitude. These beliefs 
are linked to the outcome or costs that are associated with the behaviour. Thus, 
these beliefs resemble the principles of rational choice theory. 
Subjective norms are based on normative beliefs. They refer to a person‘s beliefs 
regarding what others think about one performing the behaviour. In particular, 
what individuals who are important to the person would think – such as friends or 
parents. Normative beliefs are formed by the perceived likelihood that these 
important individuals would approve or disapprove of the behaviour.  
Perceived behavioural control (PBC) is defined as the ―perception of the ease or 
difficulty of performing the behavior of interest‖ (Ajzen, 1991, p. 183). This is 
similar to the concept of perceived self-efficacy, as described by SCT. Therefore, 
an individual who is confident of his/her ability to perform the behaviour is more 
likely to take action. PBC is based on an individual‘s control beliefs. Control beliefs 
are perceptions regarding factors that support or hinder the execution of the 
behaviour. They are also linked to the availability of resources and opportunities to 
perform the behaviour.  
Furthermore, control beliefs are influenced by previous experiences and second-
hand information from friends and acquaintances (Ajzen, 1991). 
According to TPB, behaviour is governed by how positive a person feels about the 
behaviour, the opinions of others who are seen as important, and the belief in 
one‘s own capabilities of performing the behaviour. Based on these 
considerations, one can influence behaviour by modifying any of these three 
factors. For example, by making it easier to perform the behaviour, a person‘s 
attitude can be positively modified. TPB, therefore, provides an insight into how 
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one can change a person‘s intention towards certain behaviour – and ultimately 
influence the person. 
3.3.4 The Goal-setting Theory 
In SCT, goal-setting was described as facilitating self-regulation. Goals, therefore, 
enable people to influence their own behaviour. The Goal-setting Theory was 
developed by the industrial-organisational psychologists, Locke and Latham 
(2002) over a period of nearly four decades. It is based on the idea that goals 
affect our actions. In particular, the theory states that specific and difficult goals 
lead to improved performance. Furthermore, simply asking people to do their best 
was found to be ineffective.  
The theory describes four mechanisms through which goals affect us: 
1. Goals focus our attention on the actions required to achieve the goal; 
2. Goals increase the amount of effort exerted, which is particularly true for 
high goals; 
3. Goals increase persistency, when individuals are in control of the time they 
spend on tasks; 
4. Goals lead us to find, discover, and use new knowledge and strategies that 
would help us to achieve the goal.  
Goals are, therefore, able to increase our task performance. However, there are 
important factors that have a moderating effect on goals. These factors are: goal 
commitment and importance, feedback, self-efficacy and task complexity (Locke & 
Latham, 2002).  
Goals are only meaningful if people commit themselves to achieving them. The 
amount of commitment can be increased by making the goal more important to 
the person. For example, a reward can be offered to those who achieve the goal. 
Self-efficacy, or the belief that one is able to reach the goal, would also affect 
goal commitment. Therefore, an increase in self-efficacy has a positive effect on 
goal commitment.  
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Furthermore, the effectiveness of a goal can be further enhanced by providing 
continuous feedback regarding the progress towards the goal. This feedback 
directs one‘s efforts, by indicating what has been done, and what still needs to be 
done. It allows people to readjust their strategy of achieving the goal.  
Finally, task complexity affects goals, in that complex tasks are dependent on the 
individual‘s ability to find and implement new strategies that enable the completion 
of the task. People‘s ability to do this varies significantly. Therefore, the effect of 
goal setting is reduced when tasks are complex, and increased when they are 
simple. 
Goal-setting theory describes how goals can be effective in supporting self-
regulation. Goals can strengthen the execution of certain behaviour patterns. For 
example, someone who wants to become fitter and healthier through running 
would be more likely to succeed, when setting goals and using a pedometer, 
which gives feedback on the distance run. Similarly, goals may also support a 
person‘s security behaviour.  
Thus, the principles of goal-setting theory may be used to enable and facilitate 
secure behaviour in individuals. 
3.3.5 The Protection Motivation Theory  
Rogers‘ (1975) protection motivation theory (PMT) provides an understanding of 
fear appeals and the effect they have on human behaviour. A fear appeal can be 
defined as ―a persuasive message with the intent to motivate individuals to comply 
with a recommended course of action through the arousal of fear associated with a 
threat‖ (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010, pp. 550-551). According to Rogers (1983), 
two processes occur that will determine the behaviour in response to a fear 
appeal: threat appraisal and coping appraisal.  
Threat appraisal refers to the process whereby an individual evaluates the 
perceived severity of and vulnerability to the threat. Therefore, computer users 
may consider the likelihood that a virus could infect their computers and the impact 
this would have on them. The threat appraisal would determine the level of fear, 
which, in turn, then influences the user‘s protection motivation. Protection 
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motivation is regarded as a determinant of protective behaviour, as it ―arouses, 
sustains, and directs activity‖ (Rogers 1975, p. 99).  
However, the coping appraisal affects the protection motivation as well.  
Coping appraisal determines to what extent the individual believes he/she can 
deal with the threat. Furthermore, it increases or decreases the probability that the 
recommended course of action will be followed. Factors that influence coping 
appraisal are the belief that one is capable of performing the recommended action, 
and the belief that the action would be effective in mitigating the threat. Computer 
users may, therefore, evaluate their ability to install antivirus software, and 
whether this would protect them against a virus. Both the threat and the coping 
appraisal will determine the resultant protection motivation or the intention to 
perform the recommended protective behaviour.  
PMT contends that fear appeals are effective, when they convince the individual 
that: 
• The problem is serious;  
• It may affect him/her;   
• It can be avoided by following the recommended action;  
• The recipient is capable of performing the executing the recommended 
action to avoid the problem. 
These guidelines can, therefore, be used to create fear appeals that are able to 
influence people. 
The described theories provide one with various ―tools‖ that can be used to 
influence an individual‘s behaviour. It may be as simple as providing an incentive; 
or it may be more involved, such as changing the intention and self-efficacy of a 
person. Furthermore, goals and fear appeals can support, facilitate and keep 
users ―on their toes‖ in following the behaviour. It should also be noticed that some 
factors, such as self-efficacy occur in more than one theory. Thus, theorists have 
tried to come up with a set of criteria for influencing individuals.  
This will be further discussed in the subsequent section. 
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3.4  Criteria for influencing humans  
Various theories and factors that influence human behaviour have been 
discussed. It can be seen that there is a degree of overlap in the discussed 
theories. For example, both TBP and SCT consider normative beliefs and the 
perceived ability to perform the behaviour, or self-efficacy, as being important. 
Furthermore, self-efficacy is also found in PMT in the form of coping appraisal. On 
this basis, there have been attempts to create an integrated model of human 
behaviour.  
Connor and Norman (2005, p. 18) report that major theorists, including Bandura 
(SCT), and Fishbein (TPB) have tried to ―identify a finite set of variables to be 
considered in any behavioral analysis‖ (Fishbein et al., 2001, p. 3, as cited in 
Conner & Norman, 2005, p. 18). The eight factors they identified are depicted in 
the integrated model shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3: An integrative model of behaviour adapted from Conner and Norman (2005, p. 19) 
The model has three primary determinants: intention, skills and environmental 
constraints. Based on these, the behaviour will be performed if the individual has a 
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strong intention, the necessary skills to perform the behaviour, and there are no 
environmental constraints that prevent the behaviour. The other five factors 
influence intention. An individual will have a strong intention to perform the 
behaviour if there is social pressure to perform the behaviour, more perceived 
benefits than costs, believes the behaviour to be consistent with his/her self-
image, has high self-efficacy beliefs and expects a positive emotional reaction 
from the behaviour. 
Conner and Norman (2005, p. 20) state that the integrative model logically 
incorporates several key factors of the main theories. However, they also point out 
that it includes some factors not found in the main theories, such as self-
discrepancy and emotional reaction. Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
model does not include perceived severity, which is the key to PMT, or goals 
which are the key to goal-setting theory.  
This highlights the difficulty of coming up with a concrete set of criteria for 
influencing individuals.  
In view of the above, research in information security has investigated the 
effectiveness of some concepts described by the behavioural theories, such as 
perceived threat severity and self-efficacy. Herley (2009) argued that people make 
a cost/benefit analysis, when deciding whether to follow a certain security advice 
or not. The study done by Bulgurcu et al. (2010) supports this argument, as it has 
shown that the benefits of compliance, the cost of compliance, and the cost of 
non-compliance all had a significant impact on an individual‘s intention to comply 
with security policies. In addition, they also found that attitude, normative beliefs, 
and self-efficacy had a significant impact on an employee‘s intention to comply.  
Similarly, Anderson and Agarwal (2010) found that attitude, social norms and the 
feeling of ownership regarding a computer influenced an individual‘s intention to 
protect that computer. Furthermore, their results supported PMT, because the 
concern regarding a security threat, the perceived effectiveness of the 
countermeasure and self-efficacy all influenced the attitude towards the security-
related behaviour.  
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Other research has also revealed that perceived susceptibility and severity, 
perceived benefits and costs, perceived effectiveness of countermeasures, self-
efficacy and response efficacy determine to a large extent the security behaviour 
of individuals (Liang & Xue, 2010; Ng et al., 2009; Pahnila, Siponen, & Mahmood, 
2007; Woon, Tan, & Low, 2005; Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008) 
It is evident that the various concepts described by the theories should be 
considered in anything that attempts to influence behaviour. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that they also influence security behaviour. They are therefore relevant 
to cultivating secure behaviour. The concept of persuasion is also relevant, since 
individuals‘ behaviour can be influenced by persuasion. Furthermore, technology 
can be used to persuade individuals. Therefore, an investigation into how 
technology persuades follows. 
3.5  Technology that persuades us  
Nowadays technology is all around us. Using a mobile phone or reading one‘s 
emails has become an integral part of daily life. Technology has increased 
productivity, and in many cases made life easier. It can also be used to influence 
behaviour and persuade people. The field of persuasive technology, otherwise 
known as ―captology‖, is relatively new, as it was first introduced during Computer-
Human Interaction (CHI) in 1997, an ACM conference on human factors in 
computing systems (Fogg, 1998).  
According to Fogg (2003, p. 1), persuasive technology can be defined as 
―interactive computing systems designed to change people‘s attitudes and 
behaviours‖. Captology is an acronym for Computers As Persuasive Technology 
(Fogg, 1998); and it investigates how people are motivated and persuaded when 
interacting with computing technology. Furthermore, its focus is on how attitude or 
behavioural change can be achieved through human-computer interaction. 
3.5.1  Principles of Persuasive Technology  
Captology describes the persuasive abilities of computing technology through 
three functional roles that computing technology can assume. Computing products 
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can operate as tools, media or as social actors; and they are often a mixture of 
these functional roles. Fogg (2003, p. 23) calls this the functional triad of 
captology.  
The basic function of computers is that of a tool, helping people to complete their 
tasks easier, faster and more efficiently. Computers also enable people to do 
things that would be otherwise impossible, such as performing thousands of 
calculations in a few seconds.  
In the media role, computers convey information through symbols, both audio and 
video. Therefore, computers can be used to create stimulating virtual realities, 
environments and simulations.  
Based on the experiments he conducted, Fogg (2003, p. 26) argues that people 
often see computing products as being ―alive‖ in some way. Furthermore, people 
can become emotionally involved in computing products and respond to them in a 
human way, sometimes praising or swearing at them. Thus, computers can also 
assume the role of social actors. 
According to Fogg (2003, p. 27), computers can persuade and influence people in 
various ways. However, the persuasive strategies differ, depending on the 
functional role played by the computer. The functional roles, therefore, allow one 
to analyse and categorise various persuasive strategies.   
In the following sections the various persuasive strategies will be discussed. 
3.5.2  Strategies for Persuasive Tools  
Fogg (2003, pp. 32-53) describes seven strategies, namely: reduction, tunnelling, 
tailoring, suggestion, self-monitoring, surveillance and conditioning that can be 
used by persuasive tools to persuade users and to influence their behaviour. 
Some of these strategies are also based on principles found in behavioural 
theories. A discussion on these strategies follows below. 
Reduction makes it simpler to perform a task or target behaviour. A complex task 
can be reduced to a few simple steps – or even to a single step. Therefore, the 
idea behind reduction is to make life easier. The underlying theory is that making 
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the behaviour easier reduces the cost of performing the behaviour. Therefore, the 
benefit/cost ratio increases, and a person would be more likely to engage in the 
target behaviour. This reflects the assumptions of rational choice theory, where 
people make decisions based on the perceived benefits and costs. Websites often 
use reduction, during their sign-up process, to increase the number of users that 
sign up. For example, the Twitter website only requires a name, email, password 
and username to sign up and create a user account (Twitter, 2011).  
Just like reduction, tunnelling also aims at making things easier. However, 
tunnelling focuses on providing step-by-step guidance and help, as a user 
performs the behaviour or completes a process. Fogg (2003, p. 36) points out that 
this is effective because people value consistency. Once people commit to a 
tunnelling process, they tend to follow through with it. Tunnelling can have a ―lock-
in‖ effect, as designers determine the content, pathways and nature of the 
activities the user experiences.  
It is therefore important that tunnelling be done in an ethical manner. Fogg (2003, 
p. 37) recommends that users should be able to exit the tunnelling process at any 
time, without any negative effects.   
Tailoring refers to providing information that is relevant to the individual‘s needs, 
interests, personality, usage context, or other factors that are relevant to the 
individual. According to Fogg (2003, p. 37), research shows that tailored 
information is more effective than generic information in influencing behaviour and 
attitude. For example, Noar, Benac and Harris (2007) found in their meta-
analytical review that tailored messages are more effective than generic or 
targeted messages in persuading individuals to change their health behaviour. 
Tailoring, therefore, increases the persuasiveness of the message. 
Through suggestion, people can be directed towards a specific behaviour. The 
principle of suggestion is that computing technology is more persuasive when it 
provides suggestions at the right time. Timing is, therefore, critical in making 
suggestions effective. However, identifying the right time to make a suggestion is 
difficult, as it involves a consideration of environmental factors, such as physical 
settings, as well as personal factors, such as a person‘s mood (Fogg, 2003, p. 43).  
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Therefore, the effective implementation of a suggestion requires user-context 
awareness. 
Self-monitoring allows people to monitor themselves and facilitates changes in 
their attitude and behaviour, in order to achieve a predetermined goal. By 
providing feedback regarding progress and performance, self-monitoring makes it 
easier for people to determine how well they are performing the target behaviour. 
According to Fogg (2003, p. 44), this increases the chance that people will persist 
in the behaviour. It also allows people to gain a better understanding of their 
capabilities. Therefore, the self-monitoring strategy reflects the principles 
described by the goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham, 2002), as well as those of 
the SCT (Bandura, 1986).  
A powerful way to influence the behaviour of individuals is through surveillance. 
Surveillance allows one party to monitor the behaviour of another party. It 
effectively influences behaviour, since people who know they are being observed 
will try to behave in accordance with the rules prescribed by the observer. 
Generally, this is because the evidence provided by surveillance can lead to 
punishments or rewards. However, Fogg (2003, p. 48) also stresses the point that 
to be effective at changing behaviour, surveillance needs to be overt and not 
covert. Individuals should, therefore, know that they are being watched.  
Conditioning uses positive reinforcements to change and shape behaviour or 
change existing behaviour into habits. Many computer games use conditioning to 
entice players to keep on playing. For example, players can score points, 
accumulate gold or other resources, search for rare items and progress to another 
level. Fogg (2003, p. 51) argues that positive reinforcements are most effective 
when they immediately follow the desired target behaviour. Furthermore, the 
reinforcement should occur randomly, and not follow every performance of the 
behaviour. 
Thus, by implementing the above strategies, computers may become powerful 
tools, through which individuals can be influenced. Some of these strategies, such 
as tailoring and tunnelling, also raise ethical concerns, since they can be exploited 
for the wrong reasons. Therefore, persuasive strategies should only be 
implemented in an ethical and correct way. Certainly, persuading users to be more 
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security conscious in their behaviour would be an acceptable use of persuasive 
technology strategies. 
3.5.3  Strategies for Persuasive Mediums  
A computer, in the role of a medium, can influence behaviour in the real world by 
providing people with simulations. The simulations allow people to explore cause-
and-effect relationships, provide vicarious experiences and help rehearse the 
target behaviour. Fogg (2003, pp. 61-82) discusses the three types of persuasive 
simulations. 
Cause-and-effect simulations persuade people to change their attitude or 
behaviour by allowing them to immediately see the results of their actions. The 
results are conveyed in a realistic way, which enables the user to obtain an 
understanding of the consequences that their attitude or behaviour has. 
Furthermore, the simulations allow users to explore and experiment without fear of 
real-world consequences to their actions. In this non-threatening exploratory 
mode, people are more open to form new attitudes or to adopt new behaviours. 
The simulations also persuade in subtle ways, since users often do not recognise 
the biases in the simulation, because they are immersed in it, and are processing 
the various aspects of the experience. 
Environment simulations provide users with a safe place in which to rehearse 
the target behaviour. The simulations can create situations that motivate and 
reward users for performing the target behaviour. Furthermore, the virtual 
environment is controllable; and users can start and stop the simulation at any 
time. Users can also assume various roles, enabling them to view scenarios from 
multiple perspectives. 
Object simulation refers to creating simulations in the real-world context. This 
allows users to experience how their daily life would be affected by what is 
simulated. The simulations are less dependent on imagination and more credible, 
as they clearly demonstrate the impact certain attitudes or behaviours have. For 
example, a motor vehicle, which has been modified to respond in a delayed and 
unpredictable manner, could simulate the effect that alcohol has on driving (Fogg, 
2003, p. 79). 
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Simulation provides individuals with a deeper understanding of their behaviour. 
This allows individuals to learn and reconsider their behaviour. Furthermore, 
simulations can be used for training purposes. A user who successfully performs 
the target behaviour in a simulated environment will become more confident. Thus, 
simulation can also be used to strengthen self-efficacy. 
3.5.4  Strategies for Persuasive Social Actors  
People can respond to computers in a social manner. The digital pets or 
―Tamagotchis‖ that were popular during the late 1990s demonstrate how people 
can interact with computers, as if they were alive (Fogg, 2003, p. 90). Computers, 
in the social actor role, persuade by using various social cues that result in a social 
response from the users.  
Fogg (2003, pp. 90-114) describes five types of social cues: attractiveness, 
similarity, praise, reciprocity, and authority. The effectiveness of these social cues 
can be based on the principles described by Cialdini (2001).  
Visual attractiveness increases the persuasive power of computing technology. 
The basis for this is that attractive people are more persuasive than unattractive 
people. This strategy therefore builds on Cialdini‘s (2001, p. 144) principle of liking. 
Thus, if an interface is liked and physically attractive, users may see the product 
as more intelligent, capable, reliable and credible. 
Computing technology is more persuasive if it has similarity with the target 
audience that is to be persuaded. Fogg (2003, p. 95) investigated this by 
conducting a computer personality study. In the experiment, both dominant and 
submissive computer personalities were created. The dominant computer would 
always go first during interaction, and the messages showed confidence, and were 
in a bold, assertive typeface. For the submissive computer, the opposite was true. 
Based on a personality test, the most dominant and submissive people were 
chosen as participants. The results showed that participants preferred the 
computers that were perceived to be similar to their own personality. Furthermore, 
participants judged similar computers to be more competent, likeable and 
beneficial, and thus more persuasive. This also confirms the idea that similarity 
increases liking, as described by Cialdini (2001, p. 151).  
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Language can be used to influence people. Computing products often ask a 
question or provide a confirmation message. However, they can also praise the 
user. Praise has a positive impact on the users‘ emotional state. It may also 
increase levels of self-efficacy, since users will feel that they have done a good 
job. Fogg (2003, p. 104) found that both sincere and insincere praise improved the 
mood of participants and made them more open to persuasion.  
Therefore, praise can facilitate the persuasive effort. 
Cialdini‘s (2001, p. 19) principle of reciprocity is also valid in the captology 
domain. According to Fogg (2003, p. 108), people feel the same sense of 
indebtedness towards computers that do them a favour, as they do to real people. 
In his study, Fogg (2003, p. 108) found that participants who had worked with a 
computer that was helpful and did favours in the first task, did almost twice as 
much work for the computer in the second task, as those who worked with an 
unhelpful computer. The reciprocity rule can, therefore, assist in influencing 
behaviour. 
By assuming the social role of a teacher, doctor, expert or a similar role, a 
computer can leverage the power of authority (Fogg, 2003, p. 111). As described 
by Cialdini (2001, pp. 180-185), authority can exert a strong influence on people. 
Authorities are seen as trustworthy, competent, and intelligent. Therefore, their 
opinions are valued. One may conclude that through authority, the persuasive 
capabilities of computing technology can be increased. 
The five social cues discussed can be effectively used to increase the 
persuasiveness of computing products. However, Fogg (2003, p. 114) stresses the 
point that designers need to understand when it is appropriate to use social cues. 
Where efficiency and time are of the essence, the use of social cues could irritate 
and distract users. Therefore, social cues should be applied with care. 
3.5.5  Persuasive Technology applied to Information Security  
Persuasive technology has been applied successfully to domains, such as health, 
safety and marketing. It has been used to persuade people to reduce their water 
consumption at taps (Arroyo, Bonanni, Lee, & Selker, 2005), to encourage 
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physical activity (Consolvo, Klasnja, McDonald, & Landay, 2009) and healthy living 
(Del Valle & Opalach, 2005), as well as in influencing people to buy more at 
supermarkets (Cosley, Lam, Albert, Konstan, & Riedl, 2003).  
Recent research done by Yeo, Rahim and Ren (2009) extended the application of 
persuasive technology to the field of information security. Their research 
investigated the effectiveness of a web-based program in changing the attitudes of 
users towards information security awareness. The program used two persuasive 
strategies, namely, tunnelling and praise, and focused on email management, 
password management and virus protection.  
Thirty students were recruited in the study, and their attitude towards information 
security awareness was tested, before and after, using the web-based program. 
The final results showed that the program was able to positively change the 
attitudes of participating students towards information security aware behaviour.  
Furnell, Gennatou and Dowland (2002) created a software prototype that allowed 
users to explore various security scenarios, and to learn by applying 
countermeasures in these scenarios. Thus, the prototype simulated real-life 
security scenarios and provided a safe environment, in which users could be 
trained in the use of countermeasures. Security simulations may, therefore, 
indirectly influence users to make safer security decisions. 
Other research done by Forget, Chiasson and Biddle (2007) proposed a 
persuasive authentication framework to address the issue of insecure passwords. 
Their framework is based on the following persuasive principles:  
1. Personalisation: providing tailored information, to offer a more personal 
experience and give well-timed personal advice; 
2. Simplification: simplifying the tasks that users should perform, and providing 
guidance; 
3. Monitoring: users are more likely to comply and perform the desired 
behaviour, when they know that their behaviour is monitored; self-
monitoring enables users to determine how well they perform the particular 
behaviour; 
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4. Conditioning: using various forms of reinforcement to influence the 
behaviour of users; 
5. Social Interaction: this refers to using social cues, such as similarity, where 
a system that appears to share similar attitudes, traits, and character would 
probably be more persuasive. 
The framework, therefore, incorporates most of Fogg‘s (2003) persuasive 
strategies. Forget et al. (2007) applied the simplification, personalisation and 
conditioning principles of their framework to the creation click-based graphical 
passwords. They found that the principles successfully persuaded users to create 
more secure passwords. The persuasive authentication framework was created as 
an effective educational tool that helps users to create more secure passwords. It 
does not consider other security issues. However, Forget et al. (2007) are of the 
opinion that their framework can also be used to educate users on security 
certificates, phishing, encryption, malware, and many other security issues, as 
well. They therefore argue, that Fogg‘s (2003) persuasive principles, on which 
their framework is based, can be effectively used to educate and influence users 
to adopt more secure behaviour patterns. 
3.6  Conclusion 
Several factors contribute to an individual‘s behaviour. Self-efficacy, normative 
beliefs, perceived benefits and costs, environmental constraints, goal commitment 
and attitude are some of the factors that influence behaviour. These and other 
factors that were discussed provide a basic understanding of what governs 
behaviour. They can be seen as a ―roadmap‖ to human behaviour. Therefore, in 
attempting to cultivate secure behaviour, it is important to consider them.  
Many people, if not most, use computers nowadays to create, process, store and 
communicate information. It is in a computer environment that ―the action 
happens‖. Furthermore, computing technology is becoming more and more 
pervasive. It therefore, makes sense to use computers as facilitators to cultivate 
secure behaviour.  
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People‘s behaviour can be influenced through persuasion. Captology provides 
various persuasive strategies, such as tailoring and conditioning, whereby 
computers can persuade. There is evidence that these persuasive strategies are 
also effective in the information security domain. Therefore, the persuasion 
strategies can be of assistance to a computing product that aims at influencing 
users to adopt more secure behaviour. Indeed, when establishing a set of criteria 
for such a technological product, it would make sense to include some persuasive 
strategies. However, there are other criteria as well, that are of importance. Based 
on this, the following chapter will propose a set of criteria for a technological 
personal information security agent. 
 
 
 74 
 
Chapter 4  
A Personal Information Security Agent
4.1 Introduction  
Information security is nowadays essential for the survival of most organisations. 
However, to be able effectively to secure information, every employee needs to be 
actively involved in the protection of information and the related technologies 
associated therewith (Johnson & Goetz, 2007). Recently, the publishing giant 
Conde Nast, transferred close to £5 million into a fraudulent account over a six-
month period (Swaine, 2011). These transfers were made by an authorised 
employee who was tricked by a phishing email, pretending to be from their 
accountants.  
This illustrates that the incorrect behaviour of a single employee can indeed cause 
significant damage. Furthermore, in Chapter 2 it was shown that organisations 
often use security awareness programs to educate, train and increase the level of 
information security awareness amongst their employees. However, these security 
awareness programs do not always have the envisaged results. Some of the 
reasons, as mentioned in Chapter 2, were that the programs are too generic, 
attendees tending to forget the message, and a lack of management support. 
Finding alternative ways to influence employees to adopt a more secure behaviour 
would, therefore, be beneficial to organisations.  
Similarly, not only employees of organisations should be made aware of sound 
information security practices, but also home computer users. Home computer 
users commonly bank and shop online, as well as share information through 
emails, instant messaging and social networking sites. This places them at risk 
because of the associated threats. However, home computer users are generally 
left on their own, when it comes to information security. When buying a new 
computer, one is not made aware of the threats, and of proper information security 
practices.  
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Therefore, home computer users tend to be unaware of sound information security 
practices. This makes them easy targets for cyber criminals. Cyber criminals have 
realised this, and are increasingly targeting home computer users, as they are 
more vulnerable (Furnell, 2008; Wash, 2010).  
The methods used by cyber criminals include phishing emails, social engineering, 
botnets, malware, and spoof websites, aiming at stealing user information. 
Successful attacks using these methods often lead to identity and information 
theft, which in the end can result in financial losses to the individual. Therefore, it 
would also be beneficial to home computer users if they were to be made more 
aware of information security, along with necessary sound controls to practise it. 
Based on the above, this chapter introduces the idea of a personal information 
security agent (PISA) that aims to influence individual computer users to adopt 
more secure behaviour patterns. The chapter will discuss the objectives and 
proposed criteria for such a PISA. Some of the criteria are based on the principles 
of influencing human behaviour and persuasive technology that were discussed in 
the previous chapter.  
Therefore, this chapter will provide an understanding of what the PISA is, and will 
describe its proposed functions, for example, to persuade users to become more 
security aware, together with the characteristics, such as context sensitivity. 
4.2 A Personal Information Security Agent  
Nowadays, more and more information is created, processed and stored in 
electronic form. Indeed, there has been an explosion of digital content and media 
over the past years (Flanagin & Metzger, 2008). Furthermore, information 
technology is penetrating every aspect of business; and similarly, the Internet is 
becoming increasingly pervasive and a part of daily life. These developments have 
enhanced life in many ways (Flanagin & Metzger, 2008).   
However, they have also introduced security threats to both employees of 
organisations and home computer users. Indeed, many organisations are aware of 
this; and they are trying to make employees more alert to the security threats 
through several forms of security awareness programs. However, it was also 
Chapter 4  -  A Personal Information Security Agent 
76 
 
mentioned that security awareness programs do not always achieve the envisaged 
results, and that home users are generally left on their own, when it comes to 
information security. Therefore, it is proposed that a PISA should be used to make 
individuals more aware of information security and related threats in their personal 
computer environment, whether in a business environment or at home.  
A PISA may be able to address some of the shortcomings of current day security 
awareness programs by being context sensitive, and by providing specific 
feedback to the individual user. The user should be able to assess his/her 
personal information security status at a glance. Furthermore, relevant and 
immediate feedback may be provided regarding user actions that affect security on 
the computer. Therefore, the PISA can be thought of as an interactive dashboard, 
which provides a range of important security-related information to individual 
users.  
The Microsoft Windows operating system is by far the most ubiquitous computer 
operating system. Today, most computer users (92.90%) are using a Windows-
based operating system (Net Applications, 2011). Therefore, when buying a new 
computer, it would generally have the latest version of Windows already installed. 
It is, therefore, appropriate to investigate the default security features Windows 
offers to its users. 
4.2.1 Information Security in Windows  
The latest version of the Windows operating system is Windows 7. It has much 
improved security features compared with previous versions (MacDonald, 2009). 
For example, technologies such as BitLocker, which allows for full hard drive 
encryption, and user account control, which prevents programs from making 
unauthorised changes to the computer, have both been improved. In the previous 
version of Windows, known as Vista, the user account control feature has often 
been criticised for displaying numerous prompts, which irritated users (MacDonald, 
2009). This has prompted Microsoft to allow the user to set the amount of 
notifications he/she wants to receive in Windows 7. Improvements to BitLocker 
include the addition of smart card authentication and a data recovery agent 
(MacDonald, 2009). Other improvements to Internet Explorer and the Windows 
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Firewall were made as well. Thus, Windows 7 can be considered the most secure 
Windows operating system to date. 
All editions of Windows 7 come with the Action Center, which is a central place, 
where a user can view and configure security and maintenance settings 
(Microsoft, 2011a). The Action Center is divided into two sections: a security 
section and a maintenance section. The security section monitors security items, 
such as virus protection, spyware protection, firewall status and Windows updates. 
Information regarding backups and system maintenance is provided in the 
maintenance section. Figure 4.1 shows a screenshot of the Action Center. 
 
Figure 4.1: A screenshot of the Action Center in Windows 7 
The Action Center is integrated into the taskbar through a flag icon in the 
notification area. Upon clicking on the Action Center‘s flag icon, a list of the 
security issues to be addressed by the user is displayed. However, unless the user 
clicks the flag icon, he/she will not be reminded again of pending issues after a 
notification has been displayed. Also, due to improved customisability in Windows 
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7, a user can turn off these messages. Users may also find it difficult to evaluate 
their security status, since the Action Center does not provide an indication of the 
overall security status.  
Therefore, users can easily become ignorant and unaware of security issues in a 
Windows 7-based environment. 
In order to further investigate this issue, a survey, using a basic questionnaire, was 
conducted amongst a focus group of ten individuals consisting of postgraduate 
students and staff members, all knowledgeable in the information security field. A 
sample size of ten individuals was used, since this was a probe and it was 
assumed that the individuals would be more informed regarding security issues. 
Thus, one may reason that the results would not be much better for a general 
person who had no knowledge of information security.  
The questionnaire consisted of 10 questions and it may be found in Appendix A. 
The following highlights some of the questions and the responses: 
 How often do you view Action Center messages by clicking on the flag in 
the notification area? 
o Never = 7 
o Once a week = 1 
o 2-4 times a week = 2 
 How often do you take action on Action Center messages? 
o Never = 6 
o Occasionally = 2 
o Sometimes = 1 
o Frequently = 1 
 How often do you ignore Action Center messages? 
o Occasionally = 1 
o Frequently = 6 
o Always = 3 
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The above results suggest that the Action Center is not very effective in positively 
influencing computer users. 
One possible reason that may contribute to this is that it does not provide 
immediate feedback. For example, when one turns the Windows 7 firewall off, 
there is no message given regarding the potentially dangerous action. Surely, a 
computer user should immediately receive an indication that this is not 
recommended to do, and that the system is now more vulnerable to threats. 
Therefore, one may argue that the default security provided by Windows 7 is not 
optimal.   
A PISA may be able to address these shortcomings of the Action Center. This 
may, for example, be achieved by providing immediate personal feedback 
regarding a user‘s actions that negatively affect security, and also by indicating the 
overall security status. Thereby, the PISA could attempt to influence users to 
adopt a more secure behaviour, as well as reinforcing it. However, there are 
additional objectives for the PISA, which will be discussed subsequently. 
4.2.2 Objectives of the Personal Information Security Agent  
By taking all of the above into account, one can conclude that the main goal of the 
PISA is to influence users to adopt a more secure behaviour. In order to achieve 
this, the following objectives were established: 
 Provide the user with an indication of his/her current security status.  
 Be context-sensitive – by monitoring user actions and alerting the user 
immediately when a performed action has negatively influenced his/her 
security status. 
 Enable, influence and persuade the user to improve his/her security status.  
 Be easy to use and not frustrate the user.  
 It should not easily be disabled.  
 Be configurable to some extent, because users may have different security 
needs. 
 Be able to report certain users who consistently refrain from following 
recommended security practices – this is only relevant in an organisational 
context. 
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 Educate the user regarding relevant security items. 
Thus, the above-mentioned objectives aim to support and promote security-
conscious behaviour, and ultimately to influence the users. Furthermore, to 
achieve these objectives, a set of criteria has been proposed for the PISA as well. 
A discussion on these criteria follows. 
4.3 Criteria for a Personal Information Security Agent  
The proposed criteria of the PISA aim to support and facilitate the PISA‘s main 
function of influencing users to adopt a more secure behaviour, and its related 
objectives. These criteria have been divided into functions and characteristics. The 
functions refer to what the PISA should do, while the characteristics describe the 
supporting attributes. Therefore, the criteria provide a basic understanding of the 
PISA and its underlying principles. 
4.3.1 Functions  
Persuade: Fogg (1998, p. 225) has synthesised various definitions to define 
persuasion as: ―an attempt to shape, reinforce, or change behaviors, feelings, or 
thoughts about an issue, object, or action‖. Persuasion implies a voluntary change; 
and it is not the same as coercion, which implies force (Fogg, 2003, p. 15). 
Therefore, persuasion may be regarded as a ―soft‖ way to influence individuals. 
Weirich and Sasse (2001) point out that users cannot be forced to behave in a 
certain way, but an attempt to persuade them should be made.  
Furthermore, in the previous chapter it was reported that persuasive strategies can 
be effectively used by computing technology to influence individuals. Therefore, 
the PISA should persuade users to adopt a more secure behaviour, by using 
persuasive technology principles and techniques. Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa 
(2009) have developed a framework for designing and evaluating persuasive 
systems. The framework organises the persuasive techniques into four categories, 
namely: the primary task, dialogue, system credibility, and social support 
categories; and it provides implementation examples for each technique.  
Chapter 4  -  A Personal Information Security Agent 
81 
 
According to them, the categorisation makes Fogg‘s (2003, pp. 31-114) 
persuasive techniques more practical for systems development. From this 
categorisation, the following persuasive techniques were identified as being 
relevant to the PISA, and may support its persuasive abilities:  
1. Reduction: Refers to reducing complex behaviour into simple tasks. 
2. Tunnelling: Guiding users through a process or experience. 
3. Self-monitoring: Refers to a system that keeps track of one‘s own 
performance or status and supports the user in achieving goals. 
4. Praise: A system that offers praise can make one more open to persuasion, 
and is therefore likely to be more effective.  
5. Rewards: Systems that reward target behaviours may have great 
persuasive powers. 
6. Surface credibility: A look and feel that conveys credibility. 
7. Reminders: Reminding users regarding their security status and behaviour. 
8. Liking: A system that is visually attractive to its users has a better chance of 
persuading them. 
9. Social comparison: Users will be more motivated to perform a task or target 
behaviour if they can compare their performance with the performance of 
others. 
The persuasive techniques mentioned above need to be implemented correctly. 
According to Forget et al. (2007), persuasive technology should be carefully 
applied, since there is always a risk of irritating users to the point that they discard 
the system. Furthermore, Berdichevsky and Neuenschwader (1999) stated that 
there are also ethical considerations that should be considered, the most important 
being that the creators of a persuasive technology should never try to persuade 
users of something, when they themselves would not consent to be persuaded by 
it.  
Fogg (2003, pp. 211-240) also highlights this; and describes various ethical 
issues, for example, that computers can affect emotions, but cannot be affected by 
them. Furthermore, he concludes that educating the developers and distributors of 
persuasive technology regarding ethical issues is the key to more ethical 
persuasive technologies. Thus, through the effective implementation of persuasive 
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techniques, the PISA may be able to persuade users to be more security- 
conscious.   
Motivate: The PISA needs to motivate secure behaviour. Users can be motivated 
in various ways. A well-known motivation strategy is to provide a reward or 
incentive. Rewards can be effectively used to cultivate interest, as well as for 
increasing motivation and performance (Cameron & Pierce, 2002, p. 158), and 
they can be tangible or intangible. Rational choice theory, as described in the 
previous chapter, supports this. By providing an incentive, the benefit/cost ratio of 
a behaviour or task increases, which makes the behaviour more attractive to the 
individual. Furthermore, it should be noted that the use of rewards is individual: a 
chocolate may be an incentive to a small child, but not to an adult. 
Motivation can also occur through fear. In Chapter 3, Rogers‘ (1975, 1983) 
protection motivation theory was discussed. The theory describes the use of fear 
appeals to change the behaviour of people. According to this theory, the use of 
fear appeals will be effective if they convince the recipient that: 
1. The problem can have a significant negative effect;  
2. It may affect him/her;   
3. It can be avoided, by following a recommended action; and  
4. The recipient is capable of performing the recommended action to avoid the 
problem. 
Thus, by using fear appeals effectively, an individual can be motivated to perform 
a certain action. Finally, motivation may also benefit from the competitive nature of 
people. According to Cheng (2003), competition and recognition can be used to 
motivate people's behaviours, since most people strive to win in a contest and 
hope to be recognised and validated by others. For example, Weirich and Sasse 
(2001) investigated a scenario, where it was promoted that by using secure 
passwords one competed with others to be better protected, instead of fighting a 
hacker. Thus, in doing so, the hacker would rather attack others who are less 
protected.  
Therefore, by considering motivational aspects, the PISA may be more successful 
in influencing users.  
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Escalate: The PISA needs to be able to escalate bad or inappropriate security 
behaviour. This escalation may occur in two ways: 
1. It may reinforce security principles by repeating them through persuasive 
messages more frequently.  
2. Bringing the particular user to the attention of an information security officer.  
However, before any escalation can take place, the PISA would have provided the 
user with information regarding his/her behaviour, as well as advice on how and 
why s/he needs to change his/her behaviour. Only if this information is constantly 
disregarded by the user, should escalation take place. By reporting a certain user 
to senior security personnel, the issue of users believing that they will not be 
―caught‖, as described in Chapter 2, may be addressed. It should however be 
noted that this reporting would only apply in an organisational context.  
Educate: The PISA should provide the users with information on ways to improve 
their security status. Information should be provided on what influences their 
security status; why it affects the security status; and on how to improve the 
security status. Furthermore, information regarding common threats and how they 
manifest themselves should also be given. Users who are more knowledgeable 
regarding threats and information security will be less likely to make wrong 
decisions. Finally, education may also support the PISA‘s persuasive and 
motivational efforts, by providing the user with a better understanding of 
information security practices.  
Based on the above functions, the PISA will use persuasive principles and 
motivation to influence user behaviour to adopt a more secure behaviour. 
However, users should also be educated regarding information security and 
related threats. This could help users in acquiring the correct mental model 
regarding information security, which would then allow them to make better 
decisions. These functions may be implemented, for example, by a user being 
praised for maintaining a good security status; and over a period of time, 
motivated by comparing his/her security status against that of other users, and 
convinced that his/her password should not only consist of letters. Finally, users 
who continuously exhibit insecure behaviour may need to be reported, so that 
further action can be taken. 
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4.3.2 Characteristics 
Usability and interface design: Usability may be defined as the ease-of-use of a 
specific technology, how effective the technology is in meeting the user‘s needs, 
and the satisfaction of the user with the results obtained by using the technology to 
perform specific tasks (Muñoz-Arteaga, González, Martin, Vanderdonckt, & 
Álvarez-Rodríguez, 2009). As early as 1975, it was pointed out by Saltzer and 
Schroeder (1975), that it is essential to design the human interface for ease-of-
use, in order to promote the effective use and application of security 
countermeasures amongst users.  
In their seminal paper, Whitten and Tygar (1999) have shown how a lack of 
usability leads to security failure in an encryption program. Furthermore, in 
Chapter 2, it was highlighted that a lack of usability makes it more likely that users 
will circumvent security features. Thus, usability and human computer interaction 
are important factors that determine how effective a security system is likely to be.  
A research area that explores human computer interaction (HCI) in computer 
security is security HCI (HCI-S). Security HCI has been defined by Johnston, Eloff 
and Labuschagne (2003, pp. 677-678) as ―the part of a UI which is responsible for 
establishing the common ground between a user and the security features of a 
system. HCI-S is human computer interaction applied in the area of computer 
security‖. Furthermore, they mention that poor usability design in security systems 
or features often creates an aversion amongst users. This results in security being 
ignored and not used. Since the PISA may be regarded as a security feature, it will 
adapt the design criteria proposed by Johnston et al. (2003). These criteria 
facilitate the development of usable interfaces that are used in a security 
environment. They are based on Nielsen‘s (2005) heuristics, that are traditionally 
used for heuristic usability evaluation: 
 Visibility of system status: the user interface (UI) must inform the user on 
the internal state of the system. For example, an icon could visually indicate 
that a security feature is enabled.  
 Aesthetic and minimalist design: the security information provided needs to be 
concise and not overwhelming to the user. Only security information relevant to 
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the user should be displayed. The security UI must be simple and easy to 
use, maintaining a minimalist design. 
 Satisfaction: the security activities must be easy to realise, and should result 
in a pleasant and satisfying experience for the users.  
 Convey features: the UI needs to convey the available security features to the 
user in a clear, concise and effective manner. The use of pictures and icons may 
be of assistance in this regard. 
 Errors: users should be able to understand error messages, as well as be 
able to diagnose and recover from these errors. 
 Learning ability: the UI needs to be user-friendly, and as easy to learn as 
possible. 
According to Johnston et al. (2003), by implementing these criteria, software 
developers can ensure the user friendliness of interfaces in security systems. 
Therefore, by adapting the above usability criteria into the PISA‘s UI, it may be 
ensured that users will find the PISA easy to use and understand. 
Context sensitivity: According to Zurko (2005), security mechanisms that cannot 
be understood cannot be effective. Furthermore, she argues that users need to 
understand how to use the security controls that are directly relevant to their task 
and context. Users can complete a task, but they are likely to make the wrong 
decision if they do not know the security implication that it implies. Therefore, 
Cranor (2008) states that context-sensitive help and decision support may assist 
users in being more secure in their behaviour.  
The PISA will continuously check for changes that affect the security status of a 
user. A detected change and the influence that it has on the user‘s security status 
will be reported through a rapid feedback cycle as follows: 
1. The user performs a security-related action. 
2. The PISA detects a change in the user‘s security context.  
3. An evaluation of the change occurs. 
4. The user is provided with feedback regarding the action that he/she 
performed or intends to perform. 
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This can be considered as just-in-time persuasion. Just-in-time persuasion can be 
very effective, since the feedback is highly related and available at the moment a 
person needs to make a decision (Cheng, 2003). Thus, through context-sensitivity, 
users can be influenced to choose the more secure option, when they make 
decisions regarding certain actions. 
Information: Since the PISA will continuously check for changes that affect the 
security status of a computer user, it will need information to determine whether a 
particular change is positive or negative. This decision-support information may be 
based on an information security baseline for computer users in general, or on a 
policy, such as an organisation‘s computer usage policy. Also, users in different 
roles may have different security requirements. For example, a home user may not 
have to secure his/her computer to the same degree as an investment portfolio 
manager in the finance department. Therefore, the PISA needs to be configurable 
to some extent. 
Persistency: In order to provide the user with continuous feedback, the PISA 
must be ―always on‖. Furthermore, to facilitate context-sensitivity, a user‘s actions 
need to be monitored on a continual basis. Finally, it should not be possible to be 
easily deactivated or switched off by a user, since this would defeat the purpose of 
the PISA.  
Evolving: The ―threat landscape‖ is constantly changing. New threats occur on a 
daily basis, and stealing information has become big business. For the year 2010, 
more than 20 million new strains of malware were identified (Panda Security, 
2010). Furthermore, information thieves are becoming more sophisticated by the 
day; and they have formed groups and alliances to target users. Some of the 
continual changes that can be identified are as follows: 
1. There is a transition from email towards more immediate methods, such as 
instant messaging and Twitter. Instant messaging and social media 
connections will replace email, as the primary distribution method for malicious 
code and links (McAffee, 2010). 
2. There have been an increasing number of cyber-protests or ―hacktivism‖. More 
people voluntarily allow their computer to participate in defacement and denial 
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of service attacks, to demonstrate their political and social views (McAffee, 
2010; Panda Security, 2010). 
3. Attack toolkits, such as Zeus, are becoming more user-friendly and accessible 
to novices (McAffee, 2010; Symantec, 2011). Thus, being a cyber criminal is 
becoming easier. Furthermore, a mobile version of Zeus has also been 
discovered (Lennon, 2010).  
The PISA can, therefore, not remain stagnant; and it has to adapt and evolve in 
tandem with the threats that are out there. It has to keep up with the constant 
changes in the information security environment.   
By using principles of security HCI, it may be ensured that the PISA is user- 
friendly. For example, the visibility principle may be realised in the form of a gauge 
that indicates the security status by using colours, such as red, yellow and green. 
Context-sensitivity will allow the PISA to be persuasive the moment the user 
intends to perform, or has performed, an insecure action. Furthermore, the 
information would enable it to make decisions regarding user behaviour and what 
security level is needed.  
The information may also be regarded as a monitoring configuration; and it should 
be adjustable by an authorised person when the PISA is used in an organisational 
context. For home computer users, the information could be based on an 
information security baseline, which is updated by experts from time to time.  By 
being persistent, the PISA should be able to monitor the user‘s actions on a 
continuous basis, and should ensure that it cannot be easily deactivated. Finally, 
being able to evolve will allow it to keep up with the changing ―threat landscape‖; 
and it may even be a step ahead. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Nowadays, it is essential for organisations and individuals to protect their 
information assets. However, this is a difficult task; and the root cause of security 
failure is often insecure behaviour. For example, a home computer user may be 
unaware of threats, and employees might have forgotten what they learnt in a 
security awareness program. Therefore, the use of a PISA is proposed. A PISA 
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may be beneficial to both organisations and home computer users, by influencing 
individuals to adopt a more secure behaviour on an ongoing basis.  
Furthermore, the PISA could enhance security in a computer environment and 
address some of the deficiencies of the Windows 7 Action Center. However, as 
described in the previous chapter, there are many factors to consider when 
influencing individuals. Thus, a set of objectives and criteria for the PISA have 
been proposed. These criteria describe at a high level, what the PISA should do, 
and what characteristics it should have. Therefore, the criteria describe basic 
principles that can support the primary goal of influencing individuals to behave 
more securely. 
It is important to test the theory in practice. In view of this, some form of a practical 
evaluation of the proposed criteria needs to occur. This may be achieved by 
analysing the proposed criteria through the development and use of a prototype. 
Consequently, in the following chapter a discussion on prototyping and the 
development of a prototype of the PISA will be provided. 
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Chapter 5  
Prototyping the Personal Information 
Security Agent
5.1 Introduction  
In the previous chapter the concept of a personal information security agent 
(PISA) was discussed and the criteria for it were proposed. The criteria were 
divided into functions that include persuading, motivating and educating users, as 
well as characteristics, such as user friendliness, context-sensitivity and 
persistency. Furthermore, it was highlighted that the primary function of these 
criteria is to support the PISA in its goal of influencing users to adopt more secure 
behaviour. However, the proposed criteria have to be evaluated in some way, in 
order to determine whether they are feasible.  
This evaluation of the criteria can be practically achieved by implementing them in 
the form of a prototype. Through the development and use of a prototype, one is 
able to explore the criteria and ultimately apply the theory in practice. Therefore, a 
discussion on prototyping and the development of a PISA prototype is provided in 
this chapter. 
5.2 Why prototyping?  
According to Kelley (2001), prototyping is problem-solving; and one can use it for 
almost anything. It helps one shape ideas and it allows for innovation by opening 
up new possibilities of discovery. Furthermore, a prototype helps one to learn 
something about a problem or its solution (Davis, 1995, p. 40). Therefore, 
prototyping can be used to explore problems and ideas, as well as reach 
conclusions on possible solutions.  
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Prototyping has been applied in a variety of research fields, such as medicine 
(Gorman, Krummel, Webster, Smith, & Hutchens, 2000), e-commerce (Li & 
Horrocks, 2004), healthcare (Ho, Moh, Walker, Hamada, & Su, 2005) and human- 
computer interaction (Klemmer et al., 2000). It has also been used by researchers 
in the information security field. Kruger and Kearney (2006) created a prototype 
tool for assessing information security awareness in companies; and they made 
recommendations based on it.  
Prototyping was also used by Brustoloni and Villamarin-Salomon (2007) to 
investigate the effect ―audited‖ and ―polymorphic‖ dialogs had on security 
decisions. Furthermore, a prototype was created by Furnell et al. (2002) to 
demonstrate how simulated information security scenarios could be used for 
educational, as well as for training purposes, as was already mentioned in the 
previous chapter.  
Finally, in the previous chapter it was also reported how Yeo et al. (2009) used a 
web-based program to investigate the use of persuasive technology to improve 
information security awareness in individuals. Thus, prototyping has been 
successfully used in research to investigate problems and obtain results that can 
support possible solutions. 
5.3 What is prototyping?  
A prototype literally means ―the first form of something‖ (Waite & Hawker, 2009, p. 
738). For example, automotive manufacturers often build prototypes or concept 
vehicles, which are showcased at shows, such as the Frankfurt Auto Show, for the 
first time (Wojdyla, 2011). Prototypes are used in the engineering domain to 
reduce the risk of producing something which is unreliable, unusable or simply 
unsuitable to the potential clients (Davis, 1995, p. 40). Thus, prototyping allows 
one to determine whether something will work in the ―real world‖.  
Prototypes are also used in software development. Davis (1995, p. 40) defines a 
software prototype as ―a partial implementation of a system whose purpose is to 
learn something about the problem being solved or a solution to that problem‖. 
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Software prototypes, therefore, represent the final system to a certain extent; and 
they allow one to gain a better understanding of the subject matter.  
The degree of similarity between a software prototype and the final system is 
referred to as fidelity. High-fidelity software prototypes are very similar to the final 
system, whilst those which are less similar are known as low-fidelity prototypes 
(Walker, Takayama, & Landay, 2002).  
There has been considerable debate regarding the use of high-fidelity versus low-
fidelity prototypes; and which are better to use (Rudd, Stern, & Isensee, 1996). 
The table below summarises this by showing some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of both: 
 
Table 5.1: The advantages and disadvantages of high- and low-fidelity prototypes (Memmel, 
Gundelsweiler, & Reiterer, 2007) 
According to Walker et al. (2002), high-fidelity prototypes are generally created by 
using the same methods as those used for the final product, thereby giving them 
the same look and feel. On the other hand, low-fidelity prototypes are simple and 
Type Advantages Disadvantages 
Low-Fidelity 
Prototype 
 Costs less and quick 
to create 
 Limited usefulness for 
usability tests 
 Evaluate several 
design ideas 
 Navigational and flow 
limitations 
 Communication device  Driven by the facilitator 
 Addresses screen 
layout issues 
 Poor specification 
High-Fidelity 
Prototype 
 Partial to complete 
functionality 
 More time consuming to 
create 
 Interactive and user 
driven 
 Inefficient for proof of 
concept 
 Clearly defines 
navigational scheme 
 Management may think it 
is the real system 
 Use for exploration 
and testing 
 Users blinded by major 
representational flaws 
 Marketing and sales 
tool 
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can be easily developed without spending too much time or money (Sefelin, 
Tscheligi, & Giller, 2003). They are usually developed using pen and paper or any 
other basic material (Rettig, 1994). Therefore, low-fidelity prototypes are also 
known as paper prototypes. 
Walker et al. (2002) have investigated which level of fidelity and media would 
result in the best feedback from users when evaluating a prototype. They tested 
paper and computer-based prototypes in high- and low-fidelity forms. The results 
they obtained showed that there were not many differences between computer 
and paper media or low- and high-fidelities, with regard to the number of issues 
found and the comments they received from users.  
However, they found that users made significantly more comments regarding the 
computer-based prototypes. This reflects the findings of Liu and Khooshabeh 
(2003), who found that interactive computer-based prototypes elicited more 
comments. In addition, computer-based prototypes were preferred by the users 
testing them (Sefelin et al., 2003). Therefore, both high- and low-fidelity prototypes 
have their place; and the choice depends on what one‘s objectives and resources 
are.  
For the PISA prototype, it was decided to use a high-fidelity prototype, because it 
can be automated and used in a real-life context for testing, such as a personal 
computer. Furthermore, high-fidelity prototypes are recommended for exploration 
and testing (Rudd et al., 1996). They offer more realistic interactions (Walker et al., 
2002) and elicit more comments. In addition, by being more interactive, they are 
often favoured by users that test them (Sefelin et al., 2003). Finally, the resources 
and skills to develop a high-fidelity prototype were available. 
5.4 Prototyping Approaches  
There are two main developmental approaches to software prototyping, namely: 
throwaway and evolutionary (Jalote, 2005, p. 113). Throwaway prototyping creates 
a prototype that is used to prove a concept, to explore an idea, or to obtain 
approval for an implementation design or strategy. The prototype does not form 
part of the final system, and is discarded after it has been used. In the evolutionary 
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approach, the prototype is created to evolve into the final system through 
incremental development and by making changes based on feedback from 
evaluations. The prototype is continuously being improved, until it satisfies the 
initial specifications, as well as the customers‘ expectations.  
Prototyping approaches are also classified based on the basis of what the goal is. 
These approaches can be explorative, experimental and evolutionary. They were 
first described by Floyd (1984) and, since then, have been widely accepted 
(Bäumer, Bischofberger, Lichter, & Züllighoven, 1996). A discussion on these 
three approaches follows. 
5.4.1 Experimental prototyping  
This approach aims to determine the suitability and feasibility of a proposed 
solution to a problem (Bäumer et al., 1996; Floyd, 1984).Therefore, an 
experimental prototype is created to determine whether a proposed solution is 
feasible (Plösch, 2004, p. 133) by experimentally using the prototype. 
Furthermore, Plösch (2004, p. 133) states that it can be used to prove that the 
specifications, the architecture of models, or the suggested system components 
are suitable for implementation. Experimental prototypes are throwaway 
prototypes that are discarded after the ―experiment‖ has been completed, and its 
results have been obtained (Conallen, 2003, p. 143). They are, therefore, only 
created for the purpose of the experiment. 
5.4.2 Explorative prototyping  
The goal of explorative prototyping is to identify what needs to be developed. It is 
used to determine what the requirements for a product are, and to obtain a good 
understanding of the problem (Plösch, 2004, p. 133). This approach is usually 
used when the customer does not know what he/she wants, or the developers 
have little experience in the problem domain. Development is usually informal and 
done with minimal effort, since the prototypes are thrown away (Kruchten, 2004, p. 
191). 
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5.4.3 Evolutionary prototyping  
In evolutionary prototyping, the prototype is developed to become the final 
product. Functionality is added incrementally to the prototype, and changes are 
made, based on the user or customer feedback. The prototype, therefore, evolves 
during the developmental process (Conallen, 2003, p. 143). Since the goal of an 
evolutionary prototype is to ―grow‖ into the final product, evolutionary prototyping 
usually follows a more formal design and development process, and testing is 
done more often (Kruchten, 2004, p. 192).  
Thus, evolutionary prototyping is recognised as a software development 
methodology, where the prototypes are iteratively tested and reviewed by 
stakeholders, until they have satisfied all the requirements and specifications 
(Galin, 2004, pp. 122-123).  
The purpose of the PISA prototype is to determine whether the proposed criteria 
are feasible. Furthermore, the criteria may be regarded as the ―specifications‖ for 
the ―system components‖ that should be implemented in a PISA. Therefore, the 
experimental prototyping approach is applicable to the PISA prototype. However, 
the approach can also be regarded as being partly evolutionary, since the 
development of the prototype will have several iterations, where changes will be 
made and functionality added to it. 
5.5 Types of prototypes  
Prototypes come in various forms; and this section will provide a brief overview of 
them. It will describe some of the common forms that are encountered in the 
computer and human computer-interaction domain. 
5.5.1 Paper prototypes  
A paper prototype is a paper representation of the envisaged product or system. It 
is created using paper, pens, cards, sticky notes, and any other material that 
comes in handy (Rettig, 1994). Paper prototyping is a quick, easy and low-cost 
way of designing and developing user interfaces. Snyder (2003, p. 3) argues that 
paper prototyping can be used for brainstorming, designing, creating, testing, and 
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communicating user interfaces. Furthermore, she states that paper prototyping 
can be applied to most human computer-interface designs.  
It enables designers and developers to quickly gain an understanding of several 
layout and interaction possibilities. Sefelin et al. (2003) highlight the fact that paper 
prototyping should be preferred when the prototyping tools do not support what 
needs to be prototyped. For example, when there are designers who lack 
programming skills, or the tests may result in many sketches, which can 
subsequently be discussed by the designers. Therefore, paper prototyping can be 
considered as prototyping in its most basic form, since it can be done by most 
people. 
5.5.2 Storyboards  
Storyboards describe step-by-step how a person would perform a particular task. 
At each step, a "story" is given regarding what the user is doing and why (Newman 
& Landay, 2000). They are not very detailed, and usually focus on navigation 
details of the interface. For example, a storyboard could consist of a number of 
rough sketches and some narration, which details how a user would order a 
product. Therefore, they show how a user interacts with the user interface (UI) to 
go from A to B, in order to achieve C by using a series of sketches. This allows 
developers to evaluate whether the steps required to achieve a certain goal make 
sense to the users. Storyboards can also include features, such as menus, 
dialogue boxes and windows (Maguire, 2001).   
Figure 5.1 shows an example of a storyboard for a touch screen UI. The 
storyboard describes how a user creates a new photo collection. It shows how the 
user locates the photos and then adds them to the new collection. Once the 
photos are added the user can organise the collection by sorting the photos and 
move the collection to a specific place. 
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Figure 5.1: A storyboard for a touch screen user interface (Microsoft, 2011b) 
5.5.3 Computer based prototypes 
Computer-based prototypes are generally software or website prototypes. These 
prototypes are usually high-fidelity; and they convey the look and feel of the 
system. Therefore, users are able to realistically interact with the software/website 
prototypes and ―test drive‖ the envisaged system (Maguire, 2001). This enables 
developers to obtain feedback and make changes, as needed. Computer-based 
prototyping is commonly used for the evolutionary prototyping approach, since 
they can easily evolve into the final system. 
5.5.4 Wizard of Oz 
A user interacts with a computer system, where a hidden developer, known as the 
―wizard‖, acts as the computer (Maguire, 2001). However, wizard-of-oz prototyping 
can also be applied to paper prototyping. Liu and Khooshabeh (2003) used it, 
where the ―wizard‖ makes changes and updates the paper prototype based on the 
user. Therefore, in both cases, the ―wizard‖ processes the requests, together with 
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the inputs from the user, and provides a simulated output. For example, a user can 
test a pen-based UI, which is controlled behind the scenes by the designer (Davis, 
Saponas, Shilman, & Landay, 2007).  
The Wizard of Oz approach is normally suited to exploring design ideas, which are 
difficult to implement, and where using a human ―wizard‖ provides for an easier 
implementation. 
Prototypes can be created in various ways. Paper prototypes are simple, cost-
effective to use, and can be created by almost anyone. An ―evolution‖ of paper 
prototypes is storyboards that combine a series of sketches with text descriptions 
and explanations to describe a scenario. However, both paper prototypes and 
storyboards lack interactivity. Computer-based prototypes allow for more 
interactivity; and they realistically convey implementation ideas. When the 
implementation of an idea is difficult, prototyping can also employ a human to act 
as the computer or processing unit.  
Prototyping therefore occurs in different forms, depending on the resources, skills 
and time constraints. 
5.6 The PISA prototype and its development 
A prototype of the PISA was developed, based on the proposed criteria, as 
described in the previous chapter. A discussion on the development, and how the 
criteria, consisting of functions and characteristics, were implemented follows. 
5.6.1  Development  
An experimental high-fidelity computer-based prototype of a PISA was developed, 
using C# as a programming language and Windows Presentation Foundation 
(WPF) for the front-end design. The development environment used for the 
prototype was Visual Studio 2008, which allows developers to create software and 
web applications. For the storing of data and settings, an extensible mark-up 
language (XML) file was used. This provided light-weight functionality, and allowed 
the prototype to be easily deployed on different computers.  
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The software development of the prototype followed an agile approach. Agile 
software development addresses the challenge of an unpredictable world by 
advocating the following values (Boehm, 2002): 
• Individuals and interactions over processes and tools; 
• Working software over comprehensive documentation; 
• Customer collaboration over contract negotiation; 
• Responding to change over following a plan. 
 
An agile approach is emergent, exploratory, iterative, and it does not follow formal 
rules. This differs from traditional software development approaches, such as 
waterfall, which follow a formal, linear sequence of steps and are rule-driven (Dybå 
and Dingsøyr, 2009). These approaches may be best explained by the following 
analogy (Hayden, as cited in Arendse, 2011):  
When building a house by following the traditional approach, one creates all the 
blueprints and chooses everything – right, down to the last detail. The carpets, the 
taps, and everything one desires, is purchased beforehand; and the house would 
then be built and ready for one to live in. However, an issue that one may face is 
that one may want to make changes and there may not be enough time to make 
these changes. Furthermore, what if one‘s opinion changes and decides the 
carpets should be of a different colour? In this way, money may be wasted as the 
carpets had already been purchased. 
In contrast, with the agile approach, one can create a rough sketch of the home 
one wants. One then first builds the bathroom, then another area and then 
perhaps you add a garage. In this way, one decides what one likes as one goes 
along. Also, any material is purchased only when needed, and then immediately 
used. Agile software development allows one to design, as one builds.  
By following an agile approach, the PISA prototype was built and designed in 
synchronicity. Components, such as the circular indicator dial, were designed, built 
and tested. Once a component had been satisfactorily built, further components 
were identified and added to the basic prototype. 
Chapter 5  - Prototyping the Personal Information Security Agent 
99 
 
For the development of the UI, a usability expert was consulted, who provided 
valuable input. The UI design of the prototype was done with paper prototyping, as 
well as using the UI designer included in Visual Studio 2008. Figure 5.2 shows an 
early paper prototype design of the PISA. 
 
Figure 5.2: A paper prototype of the PISA 
The development process of the UI went through several iterations where changes 
were applied, until a final design was achieved. However, it should be noted that 
further improvements may be possible, but due to time constraints the design 
process ended once an acceptable UI existed. This UI consisted of the following 
components, as indicated by the letters shown in Figure 5.3: 
• A: A message text display area; 
• B: A list of security items that were monitored together with their status – 
with the option to view information regarding each one, or how to solve an 
issue; 
• C: A circular dial that visually indicated the overall security status of the 
user, based on the status of the monitored security items; 
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• D: A Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feed, with the latest security news 
and events; 
• E: A password strength tester with tips on creating strong passwords;  
• F: An indication of the number of days the user behaved securely or 
insecurely, as well as the longest secure period indicated in days; and 
• G: A random picture of a cyber threat, with the option to view information on 
it. 
 
Figure 5.3: A screenshot of the PISA prototype 
The prototype interacted with a user similar to a chat-based program by 
automatically sliding in and out of view from the bottom right-hand corner of the 
taskbar. Therefore, whenever the user‘s attention was required, it would make 
itself visible. 
The following two subsections will discuss how the criteria have been explored 
and implemented in the prototype. This will provide an understanding of the 
functionality of the PISA, and will provide more detail on how it interacted with the 
users. 
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5.6.2 Implementing the functions  
The following functions were implemented: persuade, motivate, educate and 
escalate. A discussion on their implementation follows. 
Persuade: The PISA praised users when their security status improved. It also 
provided guidance on how to resolve a security issue. Furthermore, users were 
periodically reminded to improve their security status. The PISA also kept track of 
a user‘s performance, by recording the number of days the user was 
secure/insecure, as well as the longest period the user had recorded a ―secure‖ 
state. Finally, the UI was developed to be visually attractive. Therefore, persuasive 
techniques, such as praise, self-monitoring, liking and tunnelling were 
implemented.  
Motivate: Whenever the user made a change, such as disabling the firewall, 
which negatively affected his/her security status, the PISA would use a fear appeal 
to motivate the user to rectify the situation. Thus, a message was provided that 
indicated what had caused the change, the effect of the change, and what action 
should be taken. The PISA also displayed the latest security-related news, by 
using a RSS feed. This aimed at making the user more aware of the latest threats 
and security issues being reported – and thus indirectly motivate the user to 
behave more securely.  
Furthermore, by keeping track of the number of secure/insecure days, users were 
also able to compare themselves with other PISA users. Thus, a competitive 
aspect was included in the PISA. 
Educate: Users were provided with information regarding each security item that 
was monitored, how it would affect the security status, and why it was important. 
Furthermore, various random pictures of security threats were displayed, and 
users could view information on each one. Users were also able to type various 
passwords, and through experimentation, determine what creates a strong 
password. The password strength was indicated with a bar that changed colour 
from red (very weak) to green (very strong), as the password was typed. An 
algorithm that considers factors, such as length, the use of upper and lower cases, 
the use of numbers and symbols, amongst others, was used to determine the 
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strength. Tips regarding how to create strong passwords were also given. Finally, 
the PISA provided guidance on how to resolve a security issue, when a monitored 
security item needed attention. Therefore, the PISA included educational elements 
in its design. 
Escalate: The PISA reminded the user more often when his/her overall security 
status, as indicated by the circular dial in the top right, was in the red zone than 
when it was in the green zone. A good security status resulted in few notifications, 
with the prototype being more in the ―background‖, whereas an insecure security 
status would result in more notifications and reminding messages. Therefore, a 
less secure user would receive more reminding messages than a secure user.  
The PISA also created a log file of the user‘s name, computer name, users‘ 
security status score, number of days secure/insecure, as well as the longest 
secure period to date. An email of this log was emailed by the PISA to the 
researcher, from users who had an insecure security status. Therefore, the idea of 
escalation or reporting insecure users, although only applicable in an 
organisational context, was also explored. 
5.6.3  Implementing the characteristics 
Usability and interface design: In Chapter 4, various design criteria for usable 
security interfaces were described. These criteria were implemented as follows: 
 Visibility of system status: The UI used a circular dial, as described in 
section 5.6.1, that visually indicated the user‘s overall security status. In 
addition, the colours red, yellow and green were used for increased 
visibility. For example, notification regarding an improved security status 
would be in green, whereas notifications that alerted the user about his/her 
insecure action were in red.  
 Aesthetic and minimalist design: The design of the UI aimed for simplicity 
and being visually attractive. 
 Satisfaction: Users were provided with easy-to-follow guidance. 
 Convey features: The monitored security items were shown, and all the 
features were contained in a single window. An icon was used to indicate 
the area where information was displayed and pictures were used to display 
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security threats. Furthermore, the password strength was visually indicated 
by a bar that gradually changed colour. 
 Errors: The simple UI design aimed at preventing users from making errors. 
 Learning ability: All information was provided in a single window and tooltips 
were used for various UI elements. 
Therefore, the criteria proposed by Johnston et al. (2003) were utilised in the UI of 
the PISA. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the UI was also designed with the 
help of a usability expert who gave valuable input.  
Persistency: The prototype was designed to automatically start whenever the 
computer was switched on. Furthermore, users were not able to exit or close the 
PISA. However, users could hide the PISA by clicking the ―X‖ icon in the top right- 
hand corner of the UI. Thus, the PISA was ―always on‖ and running in the 
background. 
Context-sensitivity: The prototype monitored the status of various security items. 
These security items included, for example, whether the antivirus program was 
updated, or if the firewall was enabled. Collectively, the security items made up the 
user‘s overall security status that was indicated visually by a dial. Any change in 
the user‘s security status resulted in an immediate notification to the user. 
Information: For the PISA prototype, information on how to respond to various 
security changes was stored in the form of an XML file. This information was 
based on what is considered generally as sound security practice for a computer 
user. Since the information was stored in an XML, file it could be easily changed 
by modifying the file.  
Evolving: This characteristic was not easily implemented. However, one may 
argue that providing a RSS news feed would allow the PISA to be always up to 
date regarding security events. 
Based on the above, one may conclude that the PISA prototype explored most of 
the proposed criteria to some extent. Thus, the PISA prototype can indeed be 
classified as a tool that facilitates the practical evaluation of the proposed criteria, 
consisting of functions and characteristics. 
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5.7  Conclusion 
Prototyping can be successfully applied in research to explore ideas and reach 
conclusions regarding possible solutions to a problem. It has been used 
extensively in various research domains. Depending on one‘s objectives, one can 
follow various prototyping approaches, such as exploratory or evolutionary. 
Furthermore, prototypes can be implemented in different forms. They can be 
paper-based or computer-based, as well as high- or low-fidelity. Therefore, 
prototypes can be considered versatile research tools. 
The development of the PISA prototype followed an experimental and partly 
evolutionary high-fidelity computer-based approach. Various components were 
included in the prototype during the development, in order to explore the proposed 
criteria. Thus, the proposed criteria were instantiated to some extent in the 
prototype.  
Ultimately, the purpose of the prototype is to facilitate the evaluation of the criteria. 
It acts as a tool to test the theory in practice and to determine the feasibility of the 
criteria – it is a medium for evaluating the criteria. Therefore, an evaluation of the 
prototype needs to occur. This prototype evaluation will be the subject of the next 
chapter. The chapter will also discuss the findings of the evaluation. 
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Chapter 6  
Evaluation of the Personal Information 
Security Agent
6.1 Introduction  
A discussion on prototyping and the development of the personal information 
security agent (PISA) prototype was provided in the previous chapter. It was also 
highlighted that prototyping can be effectively used to explore ideas, and to test 
the feasibility of something being developed. Based on this, the PISA prototype 
incorporated elements of the proposed criteria, as described in Chapter 4. It can 
be seen as a medium whereby the criteria can be evaluated.  
This chapter will thus describe the evaluation process of the PISA prototype, which 
followed the technical review process, according to the IEEE 1028 standard for 
software reviews. The standard describes five types of software review, and a brief 
discussion on each will be given. Furthermore, the findings of the review will be 
provided with a focus on the issues found by the reviewers, as well as a 
discussion on the results of the two associated questionnaires. 
6.2  Reviewing software  
The PISA prototype was developed in Visual Studio 2008, and by using a C# as 
programming language. Therefore, it can be regarded as a software artefact and 
review methods that are used for software are applicable. The IEEE 1028 
standard for software reviews (IEEE, 2008) describes various review methods. A 
discussion on these review methods now follows. 
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6.2.1  Management Reviews 
Management reviews assess the documents and processes used in software 
acquisition, development, delivery and maintenance (Pries & Quigley, 2009, pp. 
269-270). Their purpose is to provide management with feedback regarding 
progress, the status of plans and schedules, and to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the management approaches used (IEEE, 2008). For example, a management 
review could evaluate how effectively resources have been allocated to software 
development projects. A management review can, therefore, be regarded as being 
a ―high-level‖ review, since it does not focus on a specific project, neither does it 
focus on the technical details of a project. 
6.2.2  Technical Reviews  
The IEEE 1028 standard defines a technical review as ―a systematic evaluation of 
a software product by a team of qualified personnel that examines the suitability of 
the software product for its intended use, and identifies [any] discrepancies from 
specifications and standards‖ (IEEE, 2008, p. 6). Freedman and Weinberg (1990, 
p. 8) concisely state that the question to be answered by a technical review is: 
―Will this product do the job it‘s supposed to do?‖ Therefore, a technical review 
ensures that the software is fit for use, and suited to the purpose for which it was 
designed. 
6.2.3  Walk-through  
In a walk-through, a person who has comprehensive knowledge of the software 
product goes step-by-step through the software product and its procedures 
(Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, p. 231). This is usually accomplished through an 
interactive presentation. Often, the aim is to educate those who participate in the 
walk-through on the product and its functionality. However, participants can also 
ask questions and make comments about possible errors or other issues.  
Therefore, walk-throughs have a dual purpose: (1) They can be used to familiarise 
participants with what is developed; and (2) They can be used to elicit feedback 
regarding the software product.  
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6.2.4  Inspections  
The objective of an inspection is to detect defects in the software and remove 
them before it is released into production (Aurum, Petersson, & Wohlin, 2002). 
Thus, the emphasis is on corrective action (Galin, 2004, p. 158). Inspections are 
used to identify poor quality in a software product, and the extent to which it 
complies with specifications and standards (Pries & Quigley, 2009, p. 271). They 
are more formal than walk-throughs and, therefore, need to be documented. 
6.2.5  Audits  
An audit is done to check whether the software complies with certain rules, 
guidelines, regulations and standards (IEEE, 2008). It is done to ensure that the 
software has a certain level of quality, and that it performs as expected. The 
auditors should preferably not be part of the organisation developing the software. 
Therefore, audits are sometimes conducted by an independent external company 
(Pries & Quigley, 2009, p. 274). 
Aurum et al. (2002) point out that the terminology used for the various software 
reviews is often vague, which results in confusion. Authors also use different 
names to refer to the same review; for example, Galin (2004, p. 152) refers to 
technical reviews as ―formal design reviews‖. Furthermore, there is no universal 
agreement on what a software inspection is, and on how it differs from other 
software reviews (Aurum et al., 2002).  
Thus, Galin (2004, p. 160) states that organisations often modify and adapt the 
software review methods to suit their development strategies and team structures. 
6.3  Reviewing the PISA Prototype  
The PISA prototype was reviewed following a technical review process. Based on 
the IEEE 1028 standard‘s definition, a technical review is used to investigate 
whether the software artefact would be suitable for its intended use (IEEE, 2008). 
Thus, it can be used to evaluate whether the PISA prototype and the criteria it 
explores are suited for influencing users to be more security conscious. The IEEE 
1028 standard describes seven review procedures for a technical review, namely: 
Chapter 6  -  Evaluation of the Personal Information Security Agent 
108 
 
management preparation, planning the review, overview of review procedures, 
overview of the software product, preparation, examination and rework/follow-up 
(IEEE, 2008).  
These procedures were adapted into the three main phases of: planning, 
preparation and examination, for the review the PISA prototype. The overview of 
the review and the overview of the software product procedures were incorporated 
into the preparation phase. Both the management preparation and the 
rework/follow-up procedures were irrelevant to the PISA review. There was no 
management that had to provide resources, such as funding and facilities, or to 
ensure that the review complied with laws, contracts and policies.  
Furthermore, there was no intention of developing the PISA prototype into a final 
product, as is usually the case in software development. However, the analysis of 
the review findings may be regarded as the rework/follow-up procedure. 
Therefore, in this section, a discussion on the three main phases of the PISA 
review and what was accomplished during each phase will be described. 
6.3.1 The Planning Phase  
In the planning phase, the recruitment of the review team occurred, as well as the 
assignment of roles. Based the IEEE 1028 standard, the following roles need to be 
established for a technical review (IEEE, 2008): 
1. Decision-maker – The one for whom the technical review is conducted; 
2. Review leader – The one who is responsible for conducting the review; 
3. Recorder – The one who documents any issues found, decisions and 
recommendations made by the review team; 
4. Technical reviewer(s) – The one who reviews and evaluates the software 
product. 
Thus, the recruited individuals who participated in the review were assigned to the 
above roles. The size of a review team is not fixed; and opinions differ on what the 
optimal number is (Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, p. 19; Sauer, Jeffery, Land, & 
Yetton, 2000). However, most recommend the use of three to seven reviewers 
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(Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, pp. 20-21; Gilb & Graham, 1993, p. 159; Madachy, 
Little, & Fan, 1993).  
In view of this, the review team consisted of one doctoral student, six Master‘s 
students, and one person who is not a student. Most of the participants were 
recruited from students active in the information security field. After the individual 
roles were assigned, the review team consisted of six technical reviewers, of 
which one was a recorder as well, a review leader and the decision-maker. 
The review leader is an important team member, as he/she is responsible for 
conducting the review. Therefore, as part of the planning phase, some informal 
meetings with the review leader were held. During these meetings, the review 
leader was educated on the technical review process, as well as the various duties 
he/she had to fulfil. Furthermore, the various documents and guidelines for the 
review were discussed.  
Most of the documents and guidelines were created during the planning phase. 
However, the minutes of the meetings were created after the respective meetings 
were held and a review summary report was created only at the end of the 
examination phase. The content of these documents was to a large extent based 
on the work of Freedman and Weinberg (1990), as well as that of Gilb and 
Graham (1993). Table 6.1 provides an overview of the various documents created 
during the planning phase. 
Once these documents were created, the majority of them were distributed via 
email to the review team members, in order to familiarise them with the content. 
This was done, so that reviewers could come back with questions during the 
meeting, which was held during the preparation phase. 
The planning phase also included the identification of a suitable venue for the 
―kick-off‖ and final logging meeting. Furthermore, the tentative scheduling for the 
meetings and reservation of a projector was done. Once all the documents, the 
scheduling of meetings, and the review leader had a good understanding of the 
process, the planning phase was completed.  
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Document Description 
Review Master Plan Provided an overview of the review process. 
It included the review objectives and strategy, 
meeting dates as well as a list of the 
participants and documents. 
Review Leader Guideline 
 
A checklist for the review leader. The 
checklist provided guidance on what to do 
before, during and after the review as well as 
what expected of him/her at meetings. 
Reviewer Guideline The document gave guidance to the 
reviewers on what to do during the review 
process. Furthermore, it included instructions 
for installing the PISA prototype.  
Recorder Guideline A brief guideline for the recorder/scribe. 
Review Issue Log 
 
Document given to reviewers to record issues 
they experienced by categorising them as 
major, minor, improvement and question. 
Proposed PISA objectives and criteria 
 
This document provided reviewers with some 
insight into PISA. 
PISA Overview 
 
A screenshot of the PISA with the 
descriptions of the various components 
Review Overview 
 
Described the various software reviews. 
Current PISA Issue List 
 
Listed any issues that were noted during the 
development. 
Table 6.1: Documents of the review 
A selection of these documents can be found in Appendix B. 
6.3.2 The Preparation Phase 
The objective of the preparation phase was to ensure that the technical reviewers 
had a good understanding of the review process, and what their responsibilities 
are. Thus, a ―kick-off‖ meeting was held.  During the meeting, the review process 
and the review documents were briefly discussed, and the reviewers were asked if 
they had any questions or concerns. Additional documents to those emailed, such 
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as the review issue log and a screenshot of the prototype describing the various 
components, were given.  
Furthermore, the meeting time for the logging meeting, that followed the review, 
was also agreed upon. The preparation phase, therefore, ensured that everyone 
knew what he/she had to do, and was prepared for the review. 
6.3.3  The Examination Phase  
An installer for the PISA prototype was distributed to each technical reviewer via 
email. Instructions regarding the installation of the prototype were provided in the 
reviewer guideline. The reviewers examined and used the prototype for one week, 
recording problematic issues, possible improvements and questions, in an issue 
log that was supplied to each of them. Once the individual reviewing had been 
completed after a week, a group review was done, in the form of a final logging 
meeting.  
For the logging meeting, each reviewer brought his/her issue log along, containing 
the issues that were noted. Reviewers contributed and discussed their issues in a 
round-robin way, while the recorder publicly recorded them. The reviewers were 
asked, in rotation, to state their issues – by starting with the most important ones.  
 
Furthermore, Freedman and Weinberg (1990, pp. 125-127) state that by publicly 
recording issues, it can be ensured that important points are not missed, and that 
a consensus is reached amongst the reviewers. After the completion of the logging 
meeting, reviewers completed two online questionnaires on the PISA prototype. 
One of the questionnaires focused on the aspects of the prototype in general, and 
the other on its usability. Finally, a technical review report was created, 
summarising the issues, the improvements and the questions that were recorded.  
 
The completion of the examination phase was also the completion of the review 
process. After all the reviewers had completed the two online questionnaires, the 
analysis of the recorded issues and the questionnaire responses started. The next 
section will, therefore, discuss the construction of the questionnaires, the results 
that were obtained, and the most important issues found during the review. 
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6.4 The Findings of the Review  
The reviewers recorded issues in an issue log; and they also completed two online 
questionnaires, focusing on the various elements of the prototype and its usability. 
Questionnaire A asked reviewers about the elements of the prototype and their 
experience in general. Questionnaire B was used to determine the usability of the 
prototype. The two questionnaires can be found in Appendix C. Both 
questionnaires were created using the Google Docs form creation tool (Google, 
n.d.) and links to the online questionnaires were distributed via email. A discussion 
on the questionnaires and the recorded issues follows. 
6.4.1  Questionnaire A  
Most questions in Questionnaire A used a 5-point Likert scale, which was labelled 
from ―Strongly disagree‖ to ―Strongly agree‖. To keep the respondents‘ attention 
and focus the questions were asked in both, the positive and in the negative form. 
The results of Questionnaire A are summarised in Table 6.2, according to the 
criteria to which they relate, with the percentages indicated as follows: A% is for 
―Strongly agree‖ and ―Agree‖, N% is for ―Neither agree nor disagree‖, and D% is 
for ―Disagree‖ and ―Strongly Disagree‖. 
In addition to the questions in Table 6.2, there were also some open-ended 
questions in Questionnaire A. These included questions regarding additional 
security items that required monitoring, items that could increase the PISA‘s 
persuasive, motivational and educational capability, as well as the timing of 
notifications.  
For these questions, the most significant responses will be discussed in section 
6.4.2 and 6.4.3 that follow Table 6.2. These two sections will also discuss the 
results of Questionnaire A. 
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    Functions A% N% D% 
To 
Persuade 
Q1 The notification messages given by the PISA did not persuade me 0% 50% 50% 
Q2 The security related "news items" made me more aware of the need 
for information security 
33% 50% 17% 
  
Q3 Keeping track of the number of days I am insecure is discouraging to 
me 
0% 50% 50% 
  
Q4 The PISA reminded me of "security items" that are not secured and 
need my attention 
83% 17% 0% 
  Q5 The PISA did not praise me when I improved my "security status" 0% 50% 50% 
  Q6 The PISA influenced me towards a more secure behavior 83% 17% 0% 
  Q7 The PISA is more persuasive than the Action Center in Windows 7
1
 83% 0% 0% 
To 
Motivate 
Q8 The security related "news items" motivated me to be more secure 
by keeping me up to date with latest events   
17% 50% 33% 
  
Q9 The information regarding the "security items" that are monitored 
helped me understand why they are important 
83% 17% 0% 
  
Q10 The PISA allowed me to set a goal for myself by keeping track of the 
number of days I am secure or insecure  
33% 33% 33% 
  
Q11 If I know the "security status" of a friend is better than mine, it would 
motivate me to be as secure or even more secure 
67% 17% 17% 
  Q12 The PISA is more motivational than the Action Center in Windows 7
1
 67% 17% 0% 
To Educate 
Q13 The PISA enabled me to create strong passwords 83% 0% 17% 
Q14 The password tips were helpful 100% 0% 0% 
  
Q15 The PISA provided me with guidance on how to improve my "security 
status" 
100% 0% 0% 
  
Q16 The information regarding the "cyber threats" increased my security 
awareness 
2
 
50% 33% 0% 
  Q17 The PISA increased my security awareness 67% 17% 17% 
  Q18 The PISA is more educational than the Action Center in Windows 7
1
 67% 17% 0% 
To 
Escalate 
Q19 In an organisational environment the PISA should report me to a 
supervisor if I am constantly insecure 
83% 17% 0% 
    Characteristics A% N% D% 
Usability  
Q20 The PISA provided me with an easily understandable "at a glance" 
overview of my "security status" 
83% 17% 0% 
and  Q21 The password strength is displayed effectively 83% 17% 0% 
Interface Q22 The notifications given by the PISA confused me 17% 17% 66% 
  
Q23 Using images for the "cyber threats" increased the chance of me 
reading about them 
83% 17% 0% 
  Q24 The PISA does not provide sufficient help 0% 17% 83% 
  
Q25 I was not able to follow the instructions given when I clicked on "Fix 
this" 
3
 
0% 0% 83% 
  Q26 The PISA should be configurable to some extent 100% 0% 0% 
  Q27 The notifications given by the PISA irritated me 67% 0% 33% 
  Q28 The screen layout of the PISA is visually attractive  67% 0% 33% 
  
Q29 The colours red, yellow and green effectively convey the meaning of 
notification messages and status 
83% 17% 0% 
Context  
Q30 When my "security status" changed the PISA provided me with 
immediate feedback regarding what caused the change 
50% 33% 17% 
Sensitivity 
Q31 
When my "security status" deteriorated the PISA notified me and 
advised me on what to do 
50% 33% 17% 
Information Q32 
The PISA monitors "security items" that are relevant to an average 
computer user 
83% 17% 0% 
Persistency Q33 I should be able to switch off the PISA whenever I want to 33% 33% 33% 
Evolving Q34 
There is no need to update or adapt the PISA when new "cyber 
threats" occur 
17% 17% 66% 
  
 
1 
One reviewer indicated he/she had no experience in using the 
Action Center 
   
  
 
2
 One reviewer indicated that he/she did not read the information 
regarding cyber threats             
     
 
3
 One reviewer indicated that he/she did not use Windows 7 
       All percentages are rounded to the closest percent.       
Table 6.2: Summary of the results from Questionnaire A 
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6.4.2 Questions regarding the functions  
Most reviewers (83%) agreed that the PISA did influence them towards more 
secure behaviour. The reminders, praise and the persuasiveness of the messages 
appear to have assisted in this regard. Furthermore, tracking the number of 
insecure days was not seen as discouraging. Of the reviewers, 67% indicated that 
they did read some of the security news. However, the reviewers found that the 
RSS news feed was rather ineffectual in increasing their awareness. It also failed 
to motivate the reviewers. Consequently, it may be more effective to provide some 
statistics on cyber fraud, breaches and the increasing number of cyber threats, as 
50% of the reviewers indicated that this would make the PISA more motivational in 
an open-ended question.  
However, 33% indicated that there is no need to make the PISA more 
motivational.  
Providing reasons why a security item is important did motivate most of the 
reviewers; and 67% of the reviewers also agreed that social comparison or 
comparing one‘s performance with that of another would be motivational to them. 
Simply displaying the number of days a user is secure/insecure was found to be 
not very effective, and reviewers indicated that a progress bar would be a better 
choice for indicating progress towards a goal. 
 The majority of the reviewers (83%) found that the password strength tester and 
the related tips allowed them to create strong passwords. Figure 6.1 shows a 
password being tested. However, most reviewers indicated that there should be 
more security tips on other issues. Furthermore, the need for information on other 
security threats was also indicated. The information on cyber threats increased the 
security awareness of some reviewers, but reviewers pointed out that there was 
again a lack of information on how one should protect oneself from these cyber 
threats.  
All the reviewers agreed that the PISA provided them with guidance to improve 
their security status. Most reviewers also agreed that an escalation feature should 
be present, and that some form of reporting on insecure users should occur in an 
organisational context. Finally, the majority of the reviewers found the prototype to 
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be more persuasive, motivational and educational than the Action Center in 
Windows 7. 
 
Figure 6.1: A password’s strength being tested in the PISA 
From the above discussion, one may conclude that the PISA prototype did to 
some extent influence its users to be more security conscious. This permits one to 
infer that the proposed criteria and strategies, such as using persuasive 
techniques, have some validity. However, the success of the criteria depends on 
how effectively the criteria are implemented in practice. Thus, a framework for 
implementing the criteria is needed.  
6.4.3  Questions regarding the characteristics  
Visually, the security status and password strength were displayed in an effective 
way, by using a circular dial and an indicator bar. Most reviewers also agreed that 
the prototype was visually attractive, and that the use of images and colour had a 
positive effect. However, some of the reviewers would have liked a smaller window 
size. Furthermore, the notifications and instructions were well understood by most 
of the reviewers, and no extra help appears to have been needed. Thus, the 
components of the PISA prototype may be considered user-friendly. This was also 
confirmed by Questionnaire B. Certainly, this user-friendliness has supported the 
PISA in its ability to influence users.  
However, 67% of the reviewers found the notifications of the PISA irritating, and 
most  were of the opinion that it interrupted them too often. Thus, most reviewers 
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(67%) would have preferred a longer time period between notifications. Figure 6.1 
shows an example of a notification message given by the PISA. This notification 
issue was further investigated in questions on the time period between 
notifications – depending on the user‘s overall security status (Red – very 
insecure, Green – secure). The following was indicated by reviewers, as being the 
preferred time period: 
• Red status:  5 minutes or less (33%), 15 minutes (33%), 3 hours or 
more (33%) 
• Yellow status: 30 minutes (50%), 1 hour (17%), 3 hours or more (33%) 
• Green status: 3 hours or more (100%) 
It is interesting to note that the reviewers‘ opinions differ largely for the red status; 
and one may conclude that what is irritating to one person, may not necessarily be 
irritating to another. However, a period of 15 minutes or less is favoured. This 
corresponds with the escalation function of notifying users more frequently, 
especially when they are insecure.  In an organisational environment, a security 
administrator should have the ability to configure and fine-tune these settings. For 
a home-computer user, the PISA could track mouse and keyboard input, to avoid 
interrupting the users. 
 
Figure 6.2: A reminder notification given to the reviewer regarding his/her security status 
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Reviewers mostly agreed that the basic security items monitored were relevant to 
a computer user. However, visits to social media websites, removable storage 
devices and data back-ups were also seen as important additional items to be 
monitored. Thus, it should be possible to configure the security items of the PISA.  
The monitoring of security items, such as the status of the firewall, by the PISA 
was considered context-sensitive by most of the reviewers, although there may be 
room for some improvement. An example of a context-sensitive notification given 
when the user improved his/her firewall status is shown in Figure 6.2. 
Furthermore, reviewers were inconclusive on the persistency characteristic, and 
whether they should be able to disable the PISA, or not. Finally, 66% of the 
reviewers supported the idea of adapting the PISA, as new threats occur. 
 
Figure 6.3: Context-sensitive notification given when the user improved his/her security status by 
enabling the firewall 
It follows that the proposed characteristics, such as usability and context-
sensitivity, aim to support and assist the PISA in its functions. Although some 
characteristics, such as, evolving were difficult to evaluate, there is evidence that 
they are relevant and support the PISA‘s functions. 
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6.4.4  Questionnaire B  
In order to evaluate the overall usability of the PISA prototype, reviewers 
completed Questionnaire B. There are various existing questionnaires, which are 
used in the usability and human computer interaction domain, to test usability 
(Perlman, 2009; Tullis & Albert, 2008, pp. 138-142), such as the Computer System 
Usability Questionnaire (CSUQ) and the System Usability Scale (SUS). From 
these questionnaires the SUS was chosen.  
The SUS was developed by John Brooke (1996); and it consists of ten statements. 
These statements are worded positively and negatively, and respondents rate their 
level of agreement on a 5-point Likert scale marked from ―Strongly disagree‖ to 
―Strongly agree‖ (Tullis & Albert, 2008, p. 138). The SUS was favoured because of 
its simplicity, as well as its prominent use. For example, Sefelin et al. (2003) have 
used it in their study of differences between paper-based and computer-based 
prototypes.  
Furthermore, Tullis and Stetson (2004) found the SUS to be most reliable across 
different sample sizes. Therefore, Questionnaire B consisted of a SUS, which 
every reviewer completed. 
Based on the individual SUS results, an overall SUS score was calculated, 
according to Tullis and Albert (2008, p. 139). This overall SUS score for the PISA 
was calculated to be 81.25%, which, according to Tullis and Albert (2008, p. 149), 
is reasonably good. Therefore, the prototype was found to be user-friendly by the 
reviewers. In fact, this must have assisted its ability to influence users, and one 
may conclude that a good usability score is essential in achieving this. This also 
supports some of the findings of Questionnaire A. 
6.4.5  Recorded Issues  
During the examination phase, each reviewer completed an issue log that 
contained the major issues, minor issues, improvement suggestions and any 
questions, which had been identified during the review of the prototype. All issues 
were collaboratively discussed during the group meeting, and then publicly 
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recorded in an issue summary list. A discussion on the most significant issues 
follows. 
The issues found and logged by reviewers included: 
 The instability of the prototype;  
 The frequency of notifications annoying the reviewer;  
 Not detecting some security changes that a reviewer had made;  
 Slowness in starting up, after installation, and  
 That some of the antivirus software may regard the PISA as malware.  
Most of these are of a technical nature; and they are, therefore, less relevant to 
this discussion. Some issues, such as the frequency of notifications, were also 
highlighted in the Questionnaire A, where 67% were irritated by the notifications 
and 33% were not. The frequency of notification is very important, since the PISA 
should not annoy its users. Therefore, this issue should be carefully addressed. 
The antivirus software may have regarded the PISA as malware, because it is 
continuously running in the background and monitoring security items. Indeed, this 
has to be addressed, as users need to trust the system. Thus, during installation, 
the PISA should be added to the ―allowed programs list‖ of any installed antivirus 
software.  
Some reviewers indicated that they would have liked to be able to manually run 
the PISA by being able to start/stop or enable/disable it. This is likely to be the 
result of the PISA interrupting the reviewers too often. Thus, one can argue that for 
the persistency aspect to be feasible, the notification periods need to be fine-
tuned. Furthermore, for home computer users it may be necessary to allow more 
flexibility, since some might not require any security at all.  
A good example here would be a user who is disconnected from the Internet and 
uses his/her computer only for entertainment and gaming purposes. However, in 
an organisational environment, users should generally not be able to stop or 
disable the PISA. Rather, it should be a built-in feature similar to that of the Action 
Center.  
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The improvements reviewers logged included some lay-out suggestions, as well 
as using a smaller display window. The possibility of having a small status 
indicator and notification window, with the option to expand this into a larger 
window with more detail, was discussed. One reviewer suggested that the size of 
the window could be linked to the security status of the user. For a ―less-secure‖ 
user, the window could be larger than for a ―secure‖ user. The display of the 
security status could also be in the form of a Windows Gadget that could be 
placed on the desktop, similar to the Windows clock.   
Another recommended improvement was to have individual content customisation, 
based on the level of the user‘s security knowledge. This suggests the need to 
determine how knowledgeable the user is in terms of security. A possibility here 
would be to ask the user to complete a short quiz, as soon as the PISA has been 
installed, or a new user logs on for the first time. Depending on the score that the 
user achieved for the quiz, the PISA could configure the displayed security items, 
security tips, cyber threats, news items, messages and any other information 
given.  
Furthermore, in an organisational environment, an information security officer or 
administrator should be able to configure the security settings and the contents of 
the PISA. Reviewers also would have liked to change the ―look and feel‖ of the 
PISA. For example, one reviewer said that he would have liked the PISA to fade in 
or out, instead of merely sliding in or out of view. Therefore, to make the PISA 
more appealing and personalised to users, various style themes and 
customisation options could be provided. Some additional security items to be 
monitored were also mentioned. These included removable storage devices, 
social website usage, those who had logged in – and when – and back-ups of the 
important data.  
Finally, the need to provide more security tips and information on other cyber 
threats, as well as how to protect oneself from them, was highlighted.  
The reviewers recorded several issues and made some suggestions for 
improvement. This provided some insights and helped with the overall evaluation 
of the PISA prototype. Furthermore, the two questionnaires investigated the 
implementation of the criteria in the PISA prototype. The findings of the PISA 
Chapter 6  -  Evaluation of the Personal Information Security Agent 
121 
 
review can therefore be used to make recommendations for the development of 
such a PISA. 
6.5 Envisaged practical implementation of the PISA 
In an organisational context, the PISA could be implemented by means of a 
server/client approach. Thus, there would be a server or back-end side that allows 
for configuration and the monitoring of clients. For example, the backend could 
provide the manager with a dashboard that provides feedback on the ―behaviour‖ 
of the clients, and their overall security status. In addition, the manager dashboard 
could allow one to specify what information content should be provided to 
individual clients and the level of information security that is required. In this way, 
specific ―weak knowledge‖ areas may be identified and targeted. 
Each client would have a client dashboard, similar to the PISA prototype currently 
discussed in this chapter. This would promote sound security practices, and would 
attempt to influence individuals through a variety of persuasive strategies.  
In all probability, the PISA would also be relevant to home computer users. In this 
case, the PISA could internally monitor the user, and adjust itself. Furthermore, the 
PISA could follow a generally accepted baseline of security practices and 
requirements established for home computer users. 
Another possibility for the PISA in the home environment would be to have a 
cloud-based back-end. This backend could be collaboratively maintained by a 
group of security professionals. These individuals would ensure that the 
information content provided by the PISAs to individual home users is always up to 
date and relevant. 
Future research may well investigate these scenarios, and take them further. 
6.6  Conclusion 
The PISA prototype was reviewed and evaluated by means of a technical review 
process. This process incorporated the procedures described by the IEEE 1028 
standard into three phases: planning, preparation and examination. Planning 
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included the recruiting of reviewers, the creation of documents, and the 
familiarising of the review leader with the process. During preparation, a kick-off 
meeting was held to make sure that the reviewers had a good understanding of 
what they were required to do. The final phase of the review process was the 
examination of the PISA prototype, where reviewers had to use the prototype for a 
week. Thus, by following a technical review process to review the prototype, an 
indirect evaluation of the explored criteria had occurred. 
The findings suggest that the principles described by the criteria have merit, and 
they could indeed be used in a PISA, to positively influence individuals. However, 
the effectiveness of the criteria is to a large extent dependent on how the 
implementation occurs. Therefore, some guidance on how the criteria should be 
implemented is required. This can be provided in the form of a framework for the 
development of a PISA. Such a framework could highlight issues that should be 
considered for implementation.  
The next chapter, therefore, discusses a framework for the development of a 
PISA. Furthermore, it will revisit the proposed criteria and consider the findings of 
the PISA review and their impact. 
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Chapter 7  
A Framework for the development of a 
Personal Information Security Agent
7.1 Introduction  
The evaluation of the personal information security agent (PISA) prototype, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, highlighted several issues which should be 
addressed. One of the key issues, for example, was that reviewers were irritated 
by the notifications. Other issues included the lack of feedback regarding progress 
towards a goal, trustworthiness and lack of customisability. Furthermore, the 
evaluation of the PISA prototype also provided some insight into ―what works‖ and 
how the proposed criteria, described in Chapter 4, can be effectively implemented.  
These proposed criteria consisted of the functions: persuade, motivate, educate 
and escalate, as well as the characteristics of usability and interface design, 
context-sensitivity, information, persistency and evolving. 
In this chapter, a discussion is provided on how the evaluation of the PISA 
prototype impacts the proposed criteria. Based on this discussion, a framework for 
the development of a typical PISA is proposed. This framework describes various 
factors that should be considered; and it makes recommendations for the 
implementation of the revised criteria. 
7.2 Revising the proposed criteria  
The following two sections discuss the additions and changes to the proposed 
criteria, as they were described in Chapter 4. These modifications are based on 
the insight gained through the evaluation of the PISA prototype, which was 
described in detail in the previous chapter. 
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7.2.1  Revising the functions of the PISA  
One of the issues recorded was that the PISA was considered to be malware by 
some antivirus programs. Obviously, this would negatively influence the 
trustworthiness of the PISA. Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa (2009) see 
trustworthiness as a design principle required to support the credibility of 
persuasive systems. Furthermore, although the PISA prototype was visually 
attractive, reviewers would have liked to customise the ―look and feel‖ of it. The 
personalisation principle, as described by (Oinas-Kukkonen & Harjumaa, 2009) is 
therefore, also relevant. In view of this, the principles of trustworthiness and 
personalisation will be added to the persuading function of the PISA.  
Reviewers did not find the RSS news feed very effective; and they also indicated 
the need for additional security tips. Therefore, the information content is an 
important aspect, which should be carefully considered. Furthermore, reviewers 
indicted content customisation, based on the user‘s security knowledge, as an 
important improvement. This could be regarded as tailoring, which is a persuasive 
strategy, where different information is provided to different user groups (Fogg, 
2003, pp. 37-38; Oinas-Kukkonen & Harjumaa, 2009).  
Content customisation would, therefore, support the PISA‘s persuasive capability 
and should be included in the educational function of the PISA.  
Goals can be used to focus users‘ attention on achieving something; and these 
could support the motivational function. However, there should be feedback on 
progress as well.  Reviewers found that the prototype did not provide this. 
Therefore, the implementation of goals and showing progress should be 
considered and possibly integrated into the motivational function of the PISA. 
7.2.2  Revising the characteristics of the PISA  
The interface of a software artefact is a determining factor of its usability. Design 
aspects of an interface are, therefore, closely related to its usability. However, 
there is a distinction in that usability is a broader term, whereas the interface is 
more specific, referring to interface components, such as: the screen layout, size 
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of buttons, use of icons and menu structure. In view of this, it was decided to split 
the proposed usability and interface design characteristic. 
Usability, or the ease of use, is an important characteristic. A key issue found by 
reviewers was the frequency of notifications, which were found to be irritating. 
Thus, special attention should be given to time periods between notifications. 
Furthermore, the PISA‘s window size for notifications should be considered, since 
it impacts on the intrusiveness of notifications. Therefore, the PISA‘s usability 
characteristic should address user interaction and make some recommendations 
for this. 
The persistency characteristic stated that the PISA should always be switched on. 
Findings suggest that this would only be feasible if users are not irritated by the 
PISA. Thus, a flexible approach is needed that allows for the fine tuning of 
notification periods. This should therefore be considered to allow for persistency.  
The information characteristic stated that the PISA should base its decisions on 
user behaviour, and what should be monitored, on an information security baseline 
or an organisation‘s computer usage policy. Therefore, it should have information 
to evaluate users‘ behaviour. However, in order to customise information content 
to the users‘ requirements, the PISA should also have some information on the 
users‘ knowledge with regard to information security.  
This would also therefore need to be considered. 
Consequently, some additions to both the functions and the characteristics will be 
made. Furthermore, the evaluation of the prototype highlighted several 
implementation issues. All of these contributed to the revised criteria, which are 
the basis of the PISA framework, as is discussed in the subsequent section. 
7.3  A Framework for developing a Personal 
Information Security Agent  
Based on the above discussion, and the findings in the previous chapter, this 
section will describe the proposed PISA framework. The framework provides an 
overview of the criteria that should be considered for the development of a PISA. 
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Figure 7.1 shows the PISA framework. From this, one can see that the PISA is the 
―middleman‖ between the computer and the user.  
 
Figure 7.1: The PISA framework 
The four functions: persuade, motivate, educate and escalate together have the 
aim of positively influencing the security behaviour of the user. These functions are 
enabled by the characteristics of the PISA, and together they make up the 
framework. A description of the functions and supporting characteristics follows. It 
will highlight the factors to consider, and make some recommendations for 
implementation. These recommendations mostly stem from the insight gained 
through the evaluation of the prototype, as was discussed in the previous chapter. 
7.3.1 The Functions 
Motivate 
Factors to consider: Users may have conflicting goals and trade-off information 
security. What risk perception do users have regarding a threat? And what is their 
ability to understand the potentially negative consequences? In what way can 
incentives and disincentives be provided? 
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Recommendations: Provide users with information on the security items that are 
monitored and why they are important. Users should also be aware of the potential 
consequences of not having them enabled or active. An RSS news feed should 
provide a combination of security news, statistics on security breaches, online 
frauds and the increasing number of cyber threats, to inform users. This should 
help to convince users that information security is definitely important. 
Fear appeals should be used to motivate users if they ignore the recommended 
security practices. Johnston and Warkentin (2010) investigated the effectiveness 
of fear appeals in changing information security behaviour. Their findings support 
the use of fear appeals, as an effective means of influencing users to perform the 
recommended security actions. However, messages may have different outcomes, 
based on the user‘s perception of the threat.  
Therefore, users should be made aware of the risks and threats involved in not 
following recommended security practices (Siponen, 2000). The fear appeals 
should thus indicate the seriousness of the threat, the negative effect the threat 
could have on the user, and likelihood of this; how it can be avoided, and what 
action should be taken. This reflects the recommendations of the protection 
motivation theory, as discussed in Chapter 3. However, the findings of Anderson 
and Agarwal (2010) suggest that messages should also indicate the positive effect 
of following the recommended action. 
Users should be able to achieve certain security goals and receive feedback on 
their progress. This is strongly supported by the goal-setting theory (Locke & 
Latham, 2002), which describes how goals influence the performance and 
motivation of individuals. The theory is regarded as one of the most applicable and 
useful theories of employee motivation in organisational psychology (Miner, 2003). 
This was discussed in Chapter 3. Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa (2009) also 
recommend that a persuasive system should enable a user to make incremental 
progress towards the target behaviour.  
This may be achieved in the form of a progress bar, which was also suggested by 
some of the reviewers as an improvement. The progress bar should show the 
progress towards becoming a secure user, and once secure, further goals could 
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be in the form of how long the user has maintained a secure system – for 
example, being secure for 30 or 60 or 100 days.    
In an organisational environment, users who achieve certain security goals could 
receive a reward. Recent research done by Bulgurcu et al. (2010), as well as 
Herath and Rao (2009) suggests that rewards can be successfully used to 
promote compliance and secure behaviour. For home computer users a virtual 
reward could be given. Many websites implement this; for example, ―Ebay.com‖ 
and ―Bidorbuy.co.za‖ use stars that change in colour or size as the user‘s 
reputation increases. Therefore, a user who has been secure for 30 days could 
receive a bronze star; at 60 days, a silver star; and at 100 days, a gold star.  
Persuade 
Factors to consider: Visual attractiveness of the interface, user‘s personal 
characteristics and user recognition.  
Recommendations: Users should be praised whenever their security status has 
improved, reached a goal, or they have completed a task successfully. This helps 
in building the self-efficacy of the user. According to the social cognitive theory, 
people with high levels of self-efficacy are more likely to perform and persist in the 
target behaviour (Bandura, 1982). Rhee, Kim and Ryu (2009) found that self-
efficacy had a significant impact on the security behaviour of individuals. 
Therefore, security messages should encourage users to follow the recommended 
action, by indicating that they should well be able to perform it (Ng et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, reminders should be given regarding security issues that need 
attention; and notifications should also encourage users to achieve their next 
security goal. 
Users should trust the PISA and the notifications that it gives. It should, therefore, 
be ensured that the PISA is recognised as an authentic program by other security 
software. Furthermore, the trustworthiness can be increased by displaying a logo 
to show third-party endorsement.   
Tasks should be easy to realise; and users should receive step-by-step guidance 
on how to configure security items and improve their security status. This would 
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reduce the cost of performing security tasks; and thus users are more likely to 
complete them. Therefore, reduction and tunnelling should be utilised by the PISA.  
The ―look and feel‖ of the PISA should be customisable by users, since this would 
make it more personalised and likeable to them. This could be implemented by 
giving the user the option to choose from various styling themes, and providing a 
variety of customisation options. Personalisation is a design principle for 
persuasive systems (Oinas-Kukkonen & Harjumaa, 2009); and it therefore, aids in 
persuasion. Furthermore, increased likeability would assist in the PISA‘s ability to 
influence individuals (Cialdini, 2001, pp. 144-177). 
In an organisational context, users should be made aware of the fact that the PISA 
will report any continuous insecure behaviour. This aids persuasion, as Brustoloni 
and Villamarin-Salomon (2007) have found. Users make better security decisions 
when they know that they are being audited. Persuasion can also benefit if such 
users are publicly recognised for their good performance (Oinas-Kukkonen & 
Harjumaa, 2009). This could be implemented in the form of a leader board, which 
indicates the top employees of the month.  
However, this would only be applicable in an organisational context.  
Educate 
Factors to consider: What knowledge does the user have on information security? 
What is the mental model of the user?  
Recommendations: Educate users on the security items that affect their overall 
security status. Users should be made aware of the security items on their 
computer, what they are and why they are important. For each monitored security 
item, step-by-step guidance should be provided on how to configure it. 
Furthermore, information should be provided on a variety of security threats that 
exist. This information should include: a description of what the threat is, strategies 
to protect against the threat, and the risks involved in ignoring the threat.  
In addition to this, various security tips should be given. This could be 
implemented as a daily security tip, or simply randomly displaying a tip on the 
dashboard. Education should be interactive whenever possible, for example, by 
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providing a password strength tester that allows users to see the strength of their 
password, as they type and learn through experimentation.  
Users‘ security knowledge often differs. Therefore, the PISA should customise the 
information content it provides, based on the user‘s needs. The PISA could use a 
quiz to evaluate the user‘s security knowledge, and based on the achieved score, 
adjust the information it provides. Furthermore, Asgharpour, Liu and Camp (2007) 
support this by arguing that the communication of security risks should match the 
mental model of the computer user. Bravo-Lillo, Cranor, Downs and Komanduri 
(2011) also found that the security behaviour differed between novices and 
advanced users.  
For a novice user, more detailed information would normally be required than for 
advanced users, who may find it unnecessary. Similarly, the RSS feed could cover 
more advanced security topics for knowledgeable users. Based on this, the 
information provided by the PISA should be tailored, according to the users‘ 
degree of knowledge. 
Escalate 
Factors to consider: The context of the user – is it an organisational or home 
computer user? How is insecure behaviour escalated?   
Recommendations: In an organisational environment, the PISA should track the 
user‘s overall security status and report any ongoing insecure behaviour. This may 
be implemented by logging the user information in a log file, which is then sent via 
email to an information security officer. Furthermore, users should be made aware 
that such reporting can occur. Herath and Rao (2009) found that if users believed 
they could easily be caught, this increased the chance of them following sound 
security practices.   
For home computer users, the PISA can increase the frequency of persuading 
notifications. For example, for a very insecure security status, the time period 
between notifications could be 15 minutes or less; while for a secure status, it 
could be as long as three hours, or more, as suggested by some reviewers.    
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7.3.2 The Characteristics 
Usability 
Factors to consider: Frequency of notifications, and whether the user is performing 
a task, wording of notifications, ease-of-use and simplicity. 
Recommendations: The genius scientist, inventor and artist, Leonardo da Vinci, is 
attributed to have said: ―Simplification is the ultimate sophistication‖. Therefore, 
tasks should be simplified, and made easy to execute. The PISA should be easy 
and straightforward to use, without the need to ask for help. Security notifications 
should be concise, and should avoid the use of jargon (Bravo-Lillo et al., 2011). 
Users should be able to easily understand them. Icons and pictures should be 
used to facilitate understanding and convey meaning.  
Furthermore, it is important that users are not irritated by the notifications. Oinas-
Kukkonen and Harjumaa (2009) support this by stating that persuasive systems 
should avoid interrupting users, while they are performing their tasks. Therefore, 
the PISA should be aware when the user is busy, and does not want to be 
distracted. This may be achieved by tracking keyboard input and mouse 
movement.  
In addition, for organisational users, the authorised person responsible for 
information security should be able to configure the notification time periods. 
Home computer users should be able to indicate when the notifications occur too 
frequently. The PISA could then automatically increase the time periods between 
notifications. However, users should not be able to turn off the notifications 
completely. Finally, the notifications should automatically hide themselves again. 
Interface 
Factors to consider: The size of the dashboard window and its visual 
attractiveness. Interface layout and the use of icons, images and colours to convey 
meaning. How the overall security status and the progress towards a goal are 
indicated. 
Recommendations: The overall security status should be visible at a glance. A 
possible implementation of this would be to integrate a circular dial that indicates 
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the status into the desktop, similar to a Windows Gadget, such as the clock.  
Furthermore, an indication of the user‘s progress towards becoming a secure user 
should also be provided.  
The layout of the PISA dashboard should be clear and simple. Users should easily 
have an overview of the items that are on the dashboard. There should also be 
sufficient white space between the individual interface components. Furthermore, 
images should be used to attract the user‘s attention to the cyber threats and 
security tips. The colours: red, yellow and green should be effectively used during 
notifications, for indicating the overall security status, as well as the status of 
security items. 
The window size for notifications should be small, since this is less intrusive. 
Therefore, a small notification window, with the option to view more information on 
the dashboard window, should be used. Furthermore, West (2008) recommends 
that security notifications should be easily distinguishable from other notifications – 
the use of colour could assist in this regard. 
Persistency 
Factors to consider: The context of the user – Is it a home user or an 
organisational computer user? 
Recommendations: The PISA should always be active and monitor the status of 
security items. An organisational user should not be able to make changes to what 
is monitored, or be able to disable the PISA. Configurations should only be made 
by the person who is responsible for information security in the organisation. In 
order to facilitate persistency for home computer users, flexibility to customise the 
frequency of notifications should be provided. However, as already mentioned, a 
user should not be able to completely turn off all notifications or the PISA itself.  
Information 
Factors to consider: Is it a home user or an organisational user? What baseline is 
used for evaluating the user‘s security state? What factors should be monitored on 
the computer? 
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Recommendations: The PISA should have information on the degree of secure 
behaviour that is required, and what is considered good or bad behaviour. 
Furthermore, the PISA should also know what security items should be monitored. 
In an organisational context, a policy, such as the computer usage policy, may 
define such information. For home users, the information should consist of what is 
generally accepted by a panel of security experts as a requirement for being a 
secure home computer user – a baseline for home computer users. However, the 
following items should be monitored for most users: firewall, antivirus, 
antimalware, windows updates, secure screensaver, removable storage devices, 
use of social media and backups. Collectively, the monitoring of these items could 
be referred to as the security status of the computer.  
This security status should be tracked by the PISA. 
The PISA should have information on the knowledge a user has with regard to 
information security. This could help to determine the mental model a user has of 
security, which, according to Wash (2010), influences the security decisions 
individuals make. Furthermore, the information is needed for content 
customisation. As mentioned, this information could be obtained by asking the 
user to complete a security quiz during first-time use.  
The information from the quiz could then indicate the user‘s status with regard to 
information security – novice, intermediate or expert. 
Context-sensitivity  
Factors to consider: Was the change positive or negative? What actions is the 
user performing? 
Recommendations: The PISA should monitor a variety of security items. Any 
changes that affect the overall security status should result in immediate feedback 
to the user that clearly describes what has changed. Praise the user if a positive 
change has occurred. If the change is negative, such as disabling the firewall, a 
fear appeal should be made, by indicating what caused the change, the risk 
involved, and giving guidance on how to proceed to mitigate the risk.  
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However, context-sensitivity should also provide decision support to the user when 
a particular action may be harmful to system security.  
Evolving 
Factors to consider: Rapid changes in technology and the emergence of new 
security threats. 
Recommendations: Although this characteristic was not explored in the prototype, 
there was some evidence that the PISA should adapt to changes in the 
information security environment. One cannot deny that technology is advancing 
at a rapid pace, and that this may result in new challenges to information security. 
Similarly, Valentine (2006) states that the field of information security is always 
evolving, since new threats, techniques, countermeasures, and philosophies 
appear on a daily basis. Thus, cyber criminals will certainly find new ways to target 
users, as changes occur and technology advances.  
This characteristic, therefore, ensures that the PISA ―evolves‖ in tandem with new 
technologies, emerging security threats and changes in the information security 
field. A simple way whereby the characteristic could be implemented is by 
updating the information on cyber threats, as well as security tips, from time to 
time.  
This section has described a framework that provided recommendations and 
guidelines for the development of a PISA. The framework also described the 
criteria to be considered and how these should be implemented. The criteria 
presented in the framework have been evaluated to some extent, and findings 
suggest that a PISA, based on these criteria, would be effective in influencing 
users to adopt more secure behaviour. Thus, the framework provides for 
developing a software artefact, to influence individuals to be more secure in their 
behaviour. 
7.4  Conclusion 
An evaluation of the PISA prototype allowed for a revision of the proposed criteria, 
as they were described in Chapter 4. Based on this, some additions and 
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adaptations to the criteria were made. For example, that a user should be able to 
personalise the ―look and feel‖ of the PISA. These changes, and the insight gained 
through the evaluation have led to the proposed framework for the development of 
a PISA. The framework describes the criteria that aim to promote the PISA in its 
objective of influencing users to be more security conscious. It detailed the factors 
to consider; and it has made various recommendations for the criteria, and how to 
implement them. Therefore, the framework aims to be of assistance in the 
development of a PISA. 
The framework is by no means exhaustive; and future research is likely to improve 
on it. However, the framework may be considered a ―starting platform‖ that can be 
used by developers who intend to create a PISA or related software artefacts. It 
provides a summarised view, based on theory and practice, of the functions and 
characteristics that should be present in a software artefact, which aims to 
influence users to be more security conscious in their behaviour. 
A conclusion to the research and its findings will be provided in the chapter that 
follows. This last chapter will provide a summary of the chapters, as well as review 
the original research objectives by assessing to what extent they have been 
achieved. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion
8.1 Introduction  
The research project has investigated the use of a personal information security 
agent (PISA) that provides personalised feedback and security information to 
users, with the aim of positively influencing users' security behaviour. In the 
previous chapter, a framework for developing such a PISA was proposed. The 
framework described the functions and characteristics that should be considered 
and made various recommendations. It was, furthermore, argued that the 
framework could assist developers in creating a PISA or something similar.  
A summary of the research will be provided in this chapter by highlighting the main 
message from each of the chapters in this dissertation. Furthermore, a discussion 
on the research objectives and how they have been met will be the focus of 
section 8.3. Finally, the chapter will conclude by indicating some future research 
possibilities. 
8.2  Summary of chapters  
Chapter 1 briefly introduced the research field and discussed the importance of 
protecting information. It was argued that information security is vital to support 
business continuity in organisations. However, the success of information security 
in organisations depends on the information security awareness and resultant 
behaviour of every individual in the organisation. The insecure behaviour of 
individuals was consequently identified as one of the main problems faced by 
information security.  
Based on this, a problem was derived that led to the research questions and 
objectives. The chapter concluded by describing the research process and 
providing an overview of the chapters in the dissertation. 
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 An introduction to information security was provided in Chapter 2, as well as a 
discussion on important related concepts, such as confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. It described rapid technological advancement as being one of the 
challenges faced by information security in today‘s information age. Furthermore, 
this was seen as a contributing factor to the insecure behaviour of people. The 
chapter focused on the human element as a significant threat to information 
security. Thus, a discussion on the reasons for insecure behaviour, and how it is 
usually addressed, was provided. Finally, a brief overview of information security 
management was given, by discussing risk management and the three main 
categories of controls: management, operational and technological.  
Therefore, the aim of the chapter was to provide an understanding of information 
security and one of its main challenges, the insecure behaviour of people. 
Information security was described as a human challenge in Chapter 2, and the 
need to influence individuals to be more security conscious in their behaviour was 
highlighted. This led to the question of how human behaviour is influenced. Thus, 
in Chapter 3 a theoretical perspective on human behaviour was given. It described 
fundamental factors that influence behaviour, such as authority and reciprocity.  
Furthermore, behavioural theories, such as the theory of planned behaviour and 
the Social Cognitive Theory were discussed. This provided some insight into what 
drives human behaviour. Some of the key ―drivers‖ of human behaviour were 
identified, such as self-efficacy, normative beliefs, as well as perceived benefits 
and costs. It was concluded that these drivers need to be considered when 
attempting to influence behaviour. However, behaviour can also be affected by 
persuasion.  
The chapter therefore introduced the field of persuasive technology, by discussing 
strategies and principles that can be used to persuade individuals. One may 
conclude that the chapter provided a theoretical foundation for influencing human 
behaviour, and how computing technology can be used in this regard.  
The concept of a PISA was put forward in the Chapter 4; and the need for it was 
argued, based on the evidence provided. The objectives of the PISA were 
discussed, and its main aim of influencing individuals to be more security 
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conscious, was highlighted. Based on this and supporting theory, a set of criteria 
were proposed comprising functions and characteristics. The chapter therefore 
provided a better understanding of the PISA by discussing its objectives and 
criteria.  
Once the proposed criteria had been established, they were practically 
implemented in a prototype. Chapter 5, therefore, focused on the development of 
the PISA prototype. The concept of prototyping was introduced by discussing 
three main prototyping approaches and describing four possibilities of 
implementation. Furthermore, the use of prototyping was motivated by describing 
it as a useful research tool. Finally, the chapter discussed the development of the 
PISA prototype by indicating how the proposed criteria in Chapter 4 were 
implemented. Thus, an overview of prototyping, as well as the development of the 
PISA prototype was given.  
The PISA prototype was used to evaluate the proposed criteria. In Chapter 6, a 
discussion on the evaluation process of the PISA prototype was thus provided. 
The chapter briefly described the five different software reviews that are part of the 
IEEE 1028 standard for software reviews. From these five software reviews, the 
technical software review was chosen, since it was the most applicable. A 
discussion on how the technical review process was conducted for the PISA 
prototype was provided, by describing the planning, preparation and examination 
phases of the review.  
The review of the prototype led to several findings, which were then subsequently 
discussed. These findings suggested that a PISA can be used to positively 
influence individuals to adopt more secure behaviour. However, there was also 
much room for improvement.    
Finally, Chapter 7 presented the proposed framework for developing a PISA, 
which was the main objective of the research. Furthermore, the chapter revisited 
the proposed criteria of Chapter 4 and discussed some possible modifications to 
these criteria, based on the findings in Chapter 6. The presented framework 
highlighted several factors that need to be considered, and made 
recommendations, based on practical findings, as well as the supporting literature, 
for developing a PISA.  
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Finally, the chapter concluded that the proposed framework should be considered 
as a ―starting platform‖, which could be of aid to developers who intend to create a 
PISA or related software artefacts. 
8.3 Revisiting research objectives  
In Chapter 1, three research objectives, consisting of one primary objective and 
two secondary objectives were stated. This section revisits these objectives and 
discusses how they were achieved.  
The primary objective of the research was as follows: 
 
 To propose a framework for developing a PISA, which aims to enhance and 
positively influence users‘ security behaviour. 
Based on this, two secondary objectives for the research were identified. These 
needed to be addressed first, since they facilitated the achievement of the primary 
objective. The two secondary objectives were as follows: 
 
 To determine the factors that should be considered when attempting to 
positively influence users‘ security behaviour;  
 To establish the criteria that should be included in the design of a PISA. 
The first secondary objective was achieved by means of the literature review. 
Chapter 3 looked at human behaviour from a theoretical point of view, by 
discussing some behavioural theories and principles that influence behaviour. 
Based on this, various factors, such as self-efficacy, perceived benefits/costs, and 
normative beliefs were identified. Thus, the theory was used to determine factors 
that could be used to positively influence users‘ security behaviour.  
The second secondary objective was addressed: both theoretically and practically. 
Firstly, in Chapter 2 a literature review was used to identify some of the causes of 
insecure behaviour, such as a lack of usability and a negative attitude. This 
therefore, provided some insight into why security principles were not applied or 
followed, and what still needed to be addressed. Furthermore, in Chapter 3 the 
field of persuasive technology was investigated. This provided for a variety of 
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strategies, which could be used to persuade individuals through computer 
technology. Thus, by drawing on the literature, some theoretical criteria for the 
PISA were established. These proposed criteria were the focus of a research 
paper entitled: Criteria for a Personal Information Security Agent, which was 
presented at the 10th European Conference on Information Warfare and Security 
(ECIW 2010). The paper is included as Appendix D.    
Secondly, a PISA prototype was created to test the features in practice. The 
evaluation of this prototype led to the modification of the proposed criteria and an 
identification of additional design principles. Finally, the factors established by the 
first secondary objectives were also considered in the criteria.  
By achieving the two secondary objectives, it was possible to propose a 
framework for developing a PISA. This framework was presented in Chapter 7. In 
order to disseminate the research findings, a journal paper, called: A Framework 
for a Personal Information Security Agent that presented the framework has been 
submitted to the Journal of INFORMATION: An International Interdisciplinary 
Journal, and was accepted for publication. The paper is attached as Appendix E.  
Since the underlying secondary objectives have been satisfactorily met, it may be 
concluded that the primary objective has been met. 
8.4  Future work  
Future research could focus on implementing the framework, in order to develop a 
fully functional PISA. The testing of such a PISA in an organisation may lead to 
further insights. These could then be added to the development framework. 
Furthermore, research could compare the use of a PISA with an information 
security awareness program. For example, the employees of an organisation 
could be split into three groups: one using a PISA, one participating in the 
information security awareness program, and another group remaining as it is.  
Further research could investigate additional functions and characteristics of the 
PISA. However, research could also investigate how some of the 
recommendations can be achieved. For example, as per section 7.3.1 the PISA 
should tailor its information content to the user‘s knowledge to be more effective in 
Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
141 
 
educating the user. Thus, research could determine how the mental model – or the 
knowledge a user has with regard to information security can be evaluated in a 
concise and effective manner. Another possibility would be to consider the use of 
artificial intelligence for the evolving characteristic. 
8.5  Conclusion 
One of the main challenges information security faces is the insecure behaviour of 
people. Indeed, people are commonly referred to as the ―weakest link‖ in 
information security. Organisations have also realised this; and many would like to 
positively influence their employees to be more security conscious in their 
behaviour. Therefore, security awareness programs are often launched. However, 
there is evidence that these programs are not always effective. Therefore, this 
research has investigated an alternative approach, in the form of a PISA.  
The goal of the PISA was to influence individuals to adopt more secure behaviour. 
In view of this, the research investigated how a PISA should be designed to 
accomplish this goal. Based on the literature, criteria for a PISA were established 
and then evaluated via a prototype. The findings of the research, as well as those 
of the supporting literature led to the proposal of a framework for the development 
of a PISA.  
This framework highlights factors to consider; and it makes some 
recommendations for future development. It is, therefore, believed that the 
framework should assist future developers in developing a PISA, or other related 
security software artefacts. The use of such a PISA could then help to address the 
insecure behaviour of individuals. 
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Appendices
Appendix A – The Windows Action Center Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was done to investigate how effective the Action Center is in 
increasing information security awareness. It was given to ten postgraduate 
students and staff members active in the information security field. 
Appendix B – The Review Documents 
A selection of the review documents created for the technical software review of 
the prototype. It includes the following: 
 Review Master Plan 
 Review Overview 
 Review Leader Guideline 
 Reviewer Guideline 
 Recorder Guideline 
 Reviewer Checklist 
 Kickoff Meeting Minutes 
 Logging Meeting Minutes 
 Review Issue Summary List 
 Review Summary Report 
Appendix C – The Personal Information Security Agent Questionnaires 
There are two questionnaires in this appendix. Questionnaire A focused on the 
PISA‘s criteria and how they were implemented in the prototype. Questionnaire B 
is the system usability scale (SUS) used to determine the overall usability of the 
prototype. Both questionnaires were completed by the reviewers of the PISA 
prototype. 
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Appendix D – Research Paper: Criteria for a Personal Information Security 
Agent 
The conference paper entitled ―Criteria for a Personal Information Security Agent‖ 
that was presented at the 10th European Conference on Information Warfare and 
Security (ECIW 2010) in Tallinn, July 2010, Estonia. 
Appendix E – Research Paper: A Framework for a Personal Information 
Security Agent  
The journal paper entitled ―A Framework for a Personal Information Security 
Agent‖ that was submitted to the Journal of INFORMATION: An International 
Interdisciplinary Journal, and is currently under review. 
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Appendix A 
A.1 The Windows Action Center Questionnaire 
The Windows Action Center Questionnaire was given to ten postgraduate students 
and staff members active in the information security field. It consists of ten 
questions. 
 
The choices for Question 1 were: 
 A place where you can view the latest changes that you made to the 
computer. 
 A Windows component that provides users with the ability to view the status 
of computer security settings and services. 
 A Windows component that monitors your actions. 
 An add-on that enhances Windows security.  
 An add-on that increases the graphics capabilities of Windows. 
 No idea. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Correct
Incorrect
No idea
Question 1
No of responses
The Action Center in Windows 7 is:
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Every Day or More      
2-4 times a Week     
Once a Week    
Once a Month     
Never
Question 4
No of responses
How often do you view Action Center messages by clicking on the flag in the 
notification area?
 
 
 
 
0 2 4 6
Every Day or More      
2-4 times a Week     
Once a Week    
Once a Month     
Never
No idea
Question 2
No ResponsesHow often do you view settings in the Action Center?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
No idea
No answer
Question 3
No of responsesSettings in the Action Center are easy to configure and understand:
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Always
Frequently
Sometimes
Occasionally 
Never
Question 5
No of ResponsesHow often do you take action on Action Center messages?  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Question 6
No of ResponsesSecurity messages relating to the Action Center can be easily ignored
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Always
Frequently
Sometimes
Occasionally 
Never
Question 7
No of ResponsesHow often do you ignore Action Center messages? 
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Yes
No
Don’t know
Question 8
No of responsesHave you ever turned off messages regarding an Action Center item? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Strongly agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Question 9
No of responsesDetermining your overall security status in Windows 7 is difficult
0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5
Always
Frequently
Sometimes
Occasionally 
Never
Question 10
No of responses
How often does Windows 7 influence you towards a more secure behaviour?
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Appendix B 
This appendix includes a selection of the review documents. 
B.1 Review Master Plan 
Review Product:  Prototype of a Personal Information Security Agent 
Review Leader:   
Kenny Jansson    Email: abc@live.nmmu.ac.za  Mobile: 0800000000 
Product Author:   
Ewald Stieger Email: abc@live.nmmu.ac.za  Mobile: 0800000000 
 
Review Objective: 
The objective is to review the Personal Information Security Agent (PISA) based 
on a set of proposed criteria. Major and minor issues need to be determined and 
possible improvements suggested. A major issue is something that has a critical 
impact on the functionality of the PISA. For example, when the close button is 
clicked and the window does not close. A minor issue would be something that 
does not have a critical impact on functionality. For example, a spelling mistake in 
a message that is given. 
 
Review Strategy: 
The review will follow the form of a technical software review according to the 
IEEE Standard 1028 for software reviews. The review process will be according to 
the following steps: 
 
1. Reviewers will attend a Kickoff meeting where instructions and review 
documentation is given. A short overview of the prototype will also be given 
by the product author. Each reviewer will receive an installation file for the 
software prototype to be reviewed. The file will be emailed to facilitate easy 
distribution.  
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2. Reviewers will then evaluate the software prototype for one week based on 
proposed criteria. This evaluation will include going through a checklist, 
making notes regarding issues experienced in an issue log and completing 
two online questionnaires.  
 
3. A logging meeting will be held at the end of the review period where 
reviewers will give their comments and report on the issues found. During 
the meeting a recorder will publicly record the findings of the review team. 
Conclusions of the review team will be summarised in a technical review 
summary report.  
 
Meetings: 
 
Kickoff:  
Date: 17 March 2011 Location: Tea Room Start Time: 10:30 End 
Time: 11:00    
(Depending on availability of reviewers) 
 
Logging:  
Date: 24 March 2011 Location: Tea Room Start Time: 12:00 End 
Time: 13:00     
(Depending on availability of reviewers) 
 
Review Documents: 
Installer for the software prototype (emailed as Zip file) 
General review overview 
Guideline for review leader, reviewer and recorder/scribe 
A review issue log, checklist and questionnaire 
Proposed criteria of the Personal Security Agent 
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Participants: 
The following participants make up the review team: 
Name Email Mobile  
    
Job Mashapa 
Melanie Viljoen 
Paul van de Haar 
Prosecuter Maninjwa 
Jacques Fouche  
abc@nmmu.ac.za 
abc@nmmu.ac.za 
abc@live.nmmu.ac.za    
abc@live.nmmu.ac.za 
abc@live.nmmu.ac.za  
 
Woudi von Solms abc@gmail.com   
    
 
Prof. Rossouw von Solms and Ewald Stieger will participate in the review 
meetings. 
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B.2 Review Overview 
The following software review types are recognised by the IEEE 1028 
standard: 
1. Management reviews 
2. Technical reviews 
3. Inspections 
4. Walk-throughs 
5. Audits 
For the purpose of reviewing the prototype (software product), the technical 
review type will be followed as closely as possible with the inclusion of some 
software inspection principles. Below are definitions for a software product and 
technical review. 
DEFINITIONS: 
Software product: (A) A complete set of computer programs, procedures, and 
associated documentation and data. (B) One or more of the individual items in (A) 
(IEEE, 2008).  
 
Technical review: A systematic evaluation of a software product by a team of 
qualified personnel that examines the suitability of the software product for its 
intended use and identifies discrepancies from specifications and standards. 
NOTE: Technical reviews may also provide recommendations of alternatives and 
examination of various alternatives (IEEE, 2008). 
 
A review is (Freedman & Weinberg, 1990): A way of using the diversity and 
power of a group of people to: 
1. Point out needed improvements in a product of a single person or team. 
2. Confirm those parts of a product in which improvement is either not desired 
or not needed – that the parts are correct. 
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Planning Logging Meeting Individual checking 
3. Achieve technical work of more uniform, or at least more predictable, quality 
than can be achieved without reviews, in order to make technical work more 
manageable. Basically, achieve a better software product. 
Number of reviewers:  Not fixed, but usually 2-7 reviewers (Freedman & 
Weinberg, 1990). 
Review Phases: 
1. Planning: The review leader selects source documentation, checklists, 
people, roles, etc. Also, determines meeting places and times (Gilb & 
Graham, 1993). 
2. Kickoff meeting: Present an overview of the review procedures for the 
review team. Any necessary instructions are given and documents 
distributed. 
3. Individual checking: Reviewers evaluate product (two-stage review 
process: first individual checking and then group checking taking place at 
logging meeting (Gilb & Graham 1993). The objective is to identify major 
and minor issues as well as improvements. 
4. Logging meeting: Discuss issues found.  
5. Exit – report results of review: Create review summary report. 
                         
 
What is needed for the review? 
Input to the technical review shall include the following: 
 
1. A statement of objectives for the technical review [included in the master 
plan] 
2. The software product being examined [the prototype] 
Kickoff Meeting 
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3. Current anomalies or issues list for the software product [will be given at 
Kickoff] 
4. Documented review procedures [the master plan] 
 
Input to the technical review should also include the following (IEEE, 2008): 
 
1. Relevant review reports. [any previous technical review summary report] 
2. Any regulations, standards, guidelines, plans, specifications, and 
procedures against which the software product is to be examined. [the 
proposed criteria] 
3. Review support material like forms, checklists, rules, and anomaly 
categorisation. [review checklist, two questionnaires and issue log] 
  
 
Roles for review participants: 
The following roles shall be established for the technical review (IEEE 2008): 
1. Decision maker (person for whom the technical review is conducted) 
2. Review leader (responsible for the review) 
3. Recorder/Scribe (documents anomalies, action items, decisions, and 
recommendations made by the review team) 
4. Technical reviewer (reviews and evaluates the software product) 
REFERENCES 
Gilb, T., & Graham, D. (1993). Software inspection. Wokingham, UK: Addison-
Wesley. 
Freedman, D. P., & Weinberg, M. (1990). Handbook of walkthroughs, inspections, 
and technical reviews. New York: Dorset House Publishing Co. 
IEEE. (2008). IEEE Standard for Software Reviews and Audits. IEEE STD 1028-
2008, 1-52. doi:10.1109/IEEESTD.2008.4601584 
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B.3 Review Leader Guideline 
The job of the review leader is to obtain a good review.  
Source: Most of the content of this guideline was taken from Freedman and 
Weinberg (1990), as well as Gilb and Graham (1993). 
Review leader checklist: 
Before review: 
 Identify the review team. 
 Is the product ready for review? 
 Are all relevant materials in your possession? 
 Have all relevant materials been distributed on time? 
 Have reviewers confirmed their acceptance of the review schedule? 
 Has the conference/meeting room been scheduled? 
 Schedule and announce the meeting place – meeting location and times will 
be in master plan. 
 Distribute review material by email – master plan, reviewer guideline, 
recorder guideline review overview. 
 Have arrangements been made for necessary physical equipment? 
(Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, p. 114). 
 Make sure participants agree to timings and location (Gilb & Graham, 
1993). 
 Add a notice on the tea room door regarding meeting. 
 
At Kickoff meeting: 
 
1. Introduce each person (Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, p. 105). 
2. Distribute printed review material:  
a. Reviewer guideline 
b. Reviewer checklist 
c. Prototype [this will be a Zip file with an installer for the prototype that 
you can email after the meeting] 
d. Reviewer issue log 
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e. Reviewer questionnaire 
3. Get team to agree on review objective (Gilb & Graham, 1993). [given in 
master plan]  
4. Get team to agree on review strategy (Gilb & Graham, 1993). [how issues 
should be logged – minor, major, improvement, etc., going over the 
checklist, completing the questionnaire]  
5. Describe form of the review [technical review] and what is expected from 
each reviewer – identify issues, complete issue log, go through checklist, 
complete the online questionnaires. 
6. Answer any questions regarding review. 
7. Make sure reviewers are prepared. 
 
During the review: 
 
 Are all participants well prepared? 
 Is there agreement on the review objectives? 
 Are all participants contributing? 
 Is the review well paced? 
 Has everyone been heard? 
 Is interest waning? 
(Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, p. 114) 
 Be available if any participant needs help (Gilb & Graham, 1993). 
 Make sure rules and procedures are followed (Gilb & Graham, 1993). 
 
At the Logging/Final meeting: 
 
1. Take one point from each person in rotation. Everyone gives their most 
important point in each rotation (Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, pp. 100-
101). 
2. Review leader should insist that each participant has at least one positive 
and one negative remark – so that there is some feedback and also to 
ensure that not only positive or negative comments are given (Freedman & 
Weinberg, 1990, p. 102). 
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3. Remind team of kickoff objectives and strategy (Gilb & Graham, 1993). 
4. Ensure that the meeting does not drift into irrelevant subjects by reminding 
reviewers of the purpose of the meeting (Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, p.  
97). 
5. At conclusion of the meeting the review leader will call upon the recorder for 
a brief review of all the conclusions of the review group. This ensures that 
the group has reached a definite conclusion (Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, 
p. 126). 
 
After review: 
 
 Was review successful? 
 Did it reach a workable conclusion? 
 Was anybody responsible, if the review was not successful? 
 Are all participants satisfied with the outcome? 
 What can be done to make next review better? 
 Has the technical review summary report been created? 
 (Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, p. 114-115) 
 
REFERENCES 
Gilb, T., & Graham, D. (1993). Software inspection. Wokingham, UK: Addison-
Wesley. 
Freedman, D. P., & Weinberg, M. (1990). Handbook of walkthroughs, inspections, 
and technical reviews. New York: Dorset House Publishing Co. 
IEEE. (2008). IEEE Standard for Software Reviews and Audits. IEEE STD 1028-
2008, 1-52. doi:10.1109/IEEESTD.2008.4601584 
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B.4 Reviewer Guideline 
Source: Most of the content of this guideline was taken from Freedman and 
Weinberg (1990), as well as Gilb and Graham (1993). 
 
General rules for reviewers: 
1. Be prepared – inform the review leader if you are unprepared so that he can 
reschedule; 
2. Be willing to associate – be nice to your fellow person; you are reviewing 
the product not the person; 
3. Watch your language – choose you words carefully; 
4. At least one positive and one negative comment at the logging meeting – 
ensures each participant will have some input and protects against extreme 
personality tendencies (only positive or negative comments); 
5. Raise issues, don‘t resolve them – do not go into the technical details of 
possible solutions; 
6. Record all issues in public – ensures statements are accurately recorded; 
7. Clear up any confusion – all participants should understand the process and 
all the issues. 
 
Before review: 
 Check that you received the master plan, reviewer guideline and review 
overview; 
 Check that you are able to attend the review meetings as indicated in the 
master plan; 
 Confirm your participation to the review leader. 
 
At the Kickoff meeting: 
 Make sure you have all the documents 
 Ask for clarification if you do not understand something 
 Make sure you understand the review process 
 Make a commitment to spending the necessary review time 
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 Make any suggestions you like 
 
During the review: 
 Install the prototype [follow instructions further below] 
 Try to identify as many issues as possible 
 If you run into any problems consult with the review leader or product author 
 Go through the review checklist 
 Complete issue log – make a note of all the issues you find 
 Classify issues as major, minor, question or  improvement 
 You do not have to write a perfectly presentable log – you may write any 
notes you like 
 Play your role to the full 
 
Before the Logging meeting: 
 Complete the issue log for the PISA  
 Complete the two online questionnaires – links will be emailed  
 
At the Logging meeting: 
 Contribute your issues in a concise manner 
 Speak clearly, so everyone can hear you 
 Direct your remarks to the recorder/scribe 
 Make sure the recorder/scribe is following you 
 Do not discuss irrelevant subjects 
 Do not attack or belittle anyone 
 Enjoy yourself! Joking and laughter are permitted and encouraged. 
 
(Summary from Gilb and Graham, 1993) 
 
Installation of the prototype: 
Please email the product author, Ewald Stieger, at: abc@live.nmmu.ac.za should 
you have any problems. 
1. You should have received an email with an attached Zip file 
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2. Save the Zip file to your desktop 
3. Extract the Zip file  
4. Run the installer 
5. Go through the wizard steps of the installer 
6. After you installed the PISA, restart your computer 
7. After the restart, the PISA should start by itself and should slide into view at 
the bottom right of your screen 
8. You can also view the PISA by clicking its icon in the notification area: 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Gilb, T., & Graham, D. (1993). Software inspection. Wokingham, UK: Addison-
Wesley. 
Freedman, D. P., & Weinberg, M. (1990). Handbook of walkthroughs, inspections, 
and technical reviews. New York: Dorset House Publishing Co. 
IEEE. (2008). IEEE Standard for Software Reviews and Audits. IEEE STD 1028-
2008, 1-52. doi:10.1109/IEEESTD.2008.4601584 
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B.5 Recorder Guideline 
Source: Most of the content of this guideline was taken from Freedman and 
Weinberg (1990) as well as Gilb and Graham (1993). 
The recorder should be good at writing comments and notes quickly. The recorder 
documents all anomalies [issues], action items [things to do], decisions, and 
recommendations made by the review team. His/her primary function is to provide 
information for an accurate report of the review (Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, p. 
125). The recorder should be able to type/write fast. There can be more than one 
recorder – participants may take turns (Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, p. 132). 
The recorder writes short notes on a flip chart in full view of all participants – 
capturing the essence of each issue.  The public character of a flip chart is 
important, since a recorder that writes private notes is likely to miss several points 
that are made in too rapid succession of the review (Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, 
p. 126) - a notebook and projector for this instead of a flip chart. At conclusion of 
the meeting the review leader will call upon the recorder for a brief review of all the 
conclusions of the review group. This ensures that the group has reached a 
definite conclusion. Once the recorder is certain of the accuracy of the notes, a 
final copy must be produced (Freedman & Weinberg, 1990, p. 126). 
 
Tips for the recorder (Gilb & Graham, 1993): 
 Make sure what your writing is visible; 
 Note down only what is needed; 
 Do not let the reviewers go too fast; 
 If you are not sure about something, ask for clarification; 
 If you are exhausted, pass the pen on to someone else; 
 Report your own issues last – let another person note them down. 
REFERENCES 
Gilb, T., & Graham, D. (1993). Software inspection. Wokingham, UK: Addison-
Wesley. 
Freedman, D. P., & Weinberg, M. (1990). Handbook of walkthroughs, inspections, 
and technical reviews. New York: Dorset House Publishing Co.  
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B.6 PISA Reviewer Checklist 
This is a checklist to assist in the identification of issues and possible 
improvements – it is supposed to ―get you going‖. 
Note: In order to review the prototype fully, you may need to temporarily decrease 
your security status. This may be done by disabling any of the monitored security 
items. For example, by turning the firewall off, not updating windows immediately 
or disabling password protection on your screensaver. Please do enable the 
turned off items again. 
CHECKLIST: 
Is the screen layout clear and easy to understand? 
Is the navigation and layout consistent? 
Is the size of PISA window too big or too small? 
Are appropriate colours used? 
Is the use of colours consistent? 
Are the messages displayed readable and the font used appropriate? 
Are instructions in the messages easy to follow? 
Is the use of jargon avoided? 
Is the appropriate language used? 
Are some of the messages persuasive? 
Are the icons or pictures used relevant and an aid to understanding? 
Consider the following time periods and whether they are appropriate: 
- How long the PISA window remains open 
- Time used to slide in and out of view 
- Time between notifications 
Are the time periods too short or too long? 
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Would the time periods frustrate a user? 
Is the security status shown appropriately? 
Is the security status updated correctly? 
Is prompt and relevant feedback given when the security status changes? 
When a password is typed, is the password strength indicated correctly? 
Are the tips regarding passwords easy to understand? 
Is the displayed news relevant? 
Does the news have a motivational or persuasive aspect to it? 
Is sufficient information given to improve your security status? 
Are the cyber threats displayed relevant to a computer user? 
Is the information given regarding cyber threats and security items educational? 
Are there any important cyber threats missing? 
The prototype keeps track of a user‘s behaviour (days secure/insecure) - will this 
encourage or discourage a user to be more secure? 
Are the security items displayed relevant to a general computer user? 
Are any important security items missing? 
Is the information given regarding security items correct? 
The proposed functions for the PISA are as follows (refer to the ―Proposed PISA 
Criteria and Objectives‖ document for more detail): 
1. To persuade 
2. To motivate  
3. To educate 
4. To escalate 
Are any of the above functions present in the prototype and to what extend? 
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The proposed characteristics for the PISA are as follows (refer to the ―Proposed 
PISA Criteria and Objectives‖ document for more detail): 
1. Usability and interface design –   easy to use and learn 
2. Context sensitivity – provide relevant and immediate feedback when status 
changes 
3. Information – be able to evaluate a user‘s security state 
4. Persistency – always on  
5. Evolving – adapt to changes and new security threats 
Are any of the above characteristics present in the prototype and to what extend? 
Could a novice computer user easily use the PISA? 
Would an average computer user want to use the PISA? 
Is there anything that is unnecessary or not needed in the PISA? 
Is there any help functionality needed or missing? 
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B.7 Kickoff Meeting Minutes 
Meeting date: 17.3.2011          
Time: 10:30 – 11:00 
Objective of meeting: 
Provide reviewers with a brief overview of the review process and distribute review 
material. Answer any questions the reviewers may have.  
Meeting was attended by: 
Prof. Rossouw von Solms 
Melanie Viljoen 
Paul van de Haar 
Prosecuter Maninjwa 
Jacques Fouche  
Woudi von Solms 
Kenny Jansson (Review Leader) 
Ewald Stieger 
Absent: Job Mashapa was not able to attend the rescheduled meeting. Therefore, 
instructions were given to him separately before the meeting. 
 
Meeting items: 
1. Review material was distributed 
2. A screenshot of the detailing the components of the prototype was given to 
each reviewer 
3. Review objective and strategy was discussed 
4. Review objective and strategy was agreed upon 
5. Reviewers were asked if they had any questions regarding the review 
6. Logging meeting date and time was agreed on 
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B.8 Logging Meeting Minutes 
Meeting date: 24.3.2011         
Time: 12.00 – 13:00 
Objective of meeting: 
Perform a group evaluation of the personal security agent. Each reviewer brought 
their issue log with the issues he/she identified. The issues were discussed in a 
round robin way and each reviewer gave one issue at a time. Major issue were 
first, then minor issues and finally improvements. All issues were logged publicly 
by the recorder/scribe in a review issue summary list.  
Meeting was attended by: 
Prof. Rossouw von Solms (partly) 
Melanie Viljoen 
Paul van de Haar 
Prosecuter Maninjwa 
Jacques Fouche  
Woudi von Solms 
Kenny Jansson (Review Leader) 
Job Mashapa  
Ewald Stieger 
Meeting items: 
1. Kenny Jansson started the meeting welcoming everyone and reminding 
everyone of the objective of the meeting 
2. Kenny Jansson appointed Melanie Viljoen as scribe for the meeting 
3. Reviewers discussed and described issues found in round-robin way 
4. All distinct issues were publicly recorded by the scribe 
5. Recorded issues were reviewed and finalised by the reviewers 
6. Ewald Stieger thanked everyone for their time and participation 
7. Meeting was closed 
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B.9 PISA Issue Summary List 
Recorded at Logging Meeting          
Date: 24.3.2011 
Recorder: Melanie Viljoen 
Major Issues:  
1. Crash program by keeping open while making changes to something being 
monitored – changed screensaver settings while open. 
2. No prompt for restart when installed. 
3. Continuous popup error when installed on trial version of windows without 
internet connection. 
4. Frequency and period of popup annoying. 
5. Didn‘t pick up switched off anti-virus – therefore rev meter not changed. 
6. Didn‘t change status when anti-virus installed – therefore rev meter not 
changed. 
7. Antivirus detected malware straight after installed – PISA possibly seen as 
malware. 
8. Nowhere to exit program. 
9. Takes long to start-up after installed. 
10. Clicking ‗more info‘ on Trojan crashed program. 
Minor Issues: 
1. Screensaver description not correct – it should say ―need password 
protected screensaver to improve security‖. 
2. Password strength feature bugged – repeated characters make it weaker, 
therefore very long passwords become weaker. 
3. Number of days insecure not counted if not restarted. 
4. RSS feeds not updated when not restarted. 
5. Podslurping repeats more often than other cyber threats. 
6. No way to reopen program after crash – have to restart pc. 
7. Antispyware and antivirus messages the same. 
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Improvements: 
1. Says weak password when no password typed in – either no comment or 
say no password. Message and bar so prominent that makes it appear as if 
system is insecure if password you are testing is not secure. 
2. Have smaller window that summarises info and can click on to open the 
detailed window. 
3. Want program to fade when it closes. 
4. Allow customisation of relevant info for specific user at specific time. 
5. Password strength tip in window instead of open internet. 
6. Too much info on screen – too clustered. Only display security critical 
issues and provide users with control over what they want to view. 
7. Option to choose popup interval and change other settings available to 
administrators only. 
8. RSS feed not always relevant – develop user profile to determine type of 
feed. 
9. GUI improvements – bit bulky. 
10. Protect yourself section when describing cyber threat. 
11. Regular security tips. 
12. Cyber threat notification – make it more obvious that it‘s just info and not 
warning. 
13. Make cyber threat image a clickable. 
14. Windows gadgets – make rev meter a gadget on desktop. 
15. Right click option on icon in taskbar to display menu and more detailed 
tooltip. 
16. Don‘t say ‗fix this‘ – sounds as if clicking on this link will solve problem. 
17. More cyber threats such as social engineering and identity theft. 
18. Monitor log-on information of user and pc. 
19. Rev meter a bit smaller or progression bar or gadget or relevant image 
similar to cyber threat icons. 
20. Only list antispyware and antivirus once – have update and installation 
under one heading. 
21. Size of window determined by how secure user is. 
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Positive feedback 
1. Like icons for cyber threats. 
2. Everything on reviewer checklist positive besides points mentioned above. 
3. Very good – intuitive, interface easy to use, increases awareness, 
messages easy to understand. 
4. Like rev meter. 
5. Does motivate user. 
6. Teaches people how to solve problems. Even if users have to work 
somewhere else they have gained knowledge by using this system. 
7. Uninstalls well. 
8. Like that it forces users to be aware of security. 
Questions: 
1. Does it evolve to changing security threats? 
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B.10 Review Summary Report 
Review start date:  17 March 2011  
Review end date:  24 March 2011  
Review product: Software prototype of the Personal Information Security Agent 
(PISA) 
Product author: Ewald Stieger 
Review leader: Kenny Jansson 
 
Brief description:  
The prototype explores proposed criteria with the aim of influencing users towards 
a more secure behaviour. Reviewers were asked to evaluate the prototype based 
on the proposed criteria as well as a checklist. Each reviewer was provided with 
an installation for the prototype and had to use it for one week as well as a variety 
of supporting review documents. Issues found were logged in an issue log. At the 
final logging meeting the issues found by the reviewers were summarised and 
recorded.  
 
Documents and materials were used for the review: 
 Review Overview 
 Review Master Plan 
 Review Leader Guideline  
 Reviewer Guideline 
 Recorder Guideline 
 Reviewer Checklist 
 Current PISA Issue List 
 Review Issue Log 
 PISA Window Overview 
 Proposed PISA objectives and criteria 
 The PISA prototype 
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Summary of issues found: 
The major issues found included instability of the prototype, frequency of 
notifications annoying the reviewer, not detecting some security changes that a 
reviewer made, slow to start up after install and that antivirus software may regard 
the PISA as malware. Most of these are of technical nature. However, the 
frequency of notification should not annoy users and has to be fine tuned.  
The antivirus software may have regarded the PISA as malware because it 
continuously running in the background and monitoring security items. Certainly, 
this has to be addressed as users need to trust the system. Some reviewers would 
have liked to be able to exit and start the PISA manually. There are reasons for 
and against this. Users should not simply be able to turn off the PISA, since it 
would defeat its purpose. However, for home computer users some flexibility may 
be required. 
An important minor issue was that the RSS news feed and the number of days the 
user was secure or insecure were not correctly updated. This was because the 
updates only occurred when the computer was restarted or switched on. However, 
some reviewers had their computers always on, causing the PISA to never update.  
Other issues included some mistakes in the messages of the PISA and the 
password strength not always correctly indicated. Finally, the cyber threats were 
not displayed completely random, causing some to be repeated more often than 
others.  
The improvements reviewers logged included some layout suggestions as well as 
using a smaller window. The possibility of having a small status indicator window 
with the option to expand into a larger window with more detail was discussed. 
One reviewer suggested that the size of the window could be linked to the security 
status of the user. For a less secure user the window could be larger than for a 
secure user. The security status dial could also be in the form of a Windows 
Gadget that can be placed on the desktop, similar to the Windows clock. 
 Another improvement recommended was to have individual content customisation 
based on the user‘s security knowledge. This suggests the need to determine how 
knowledgeable the user is in terms of security. A possibility here would be to ask 
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the user to complete a short quiz as soon as the PISA has been installed. 
Depending on the score the user achieved for the quiz, the PISA can configure the 
displayed security items, security tips, cyber threats, news items, messages and 
the information that is given. Furthermore, in an organisational environment an 
information security officer or administrator should be able to configure security 
settings of the PISA.  
Reviewers also would have liked to change ―look and feel‖ of the PISA. For 
example, one reviewer said that he would have liked the PISA fade in or out 
instead of sliding in or out. Therefore, to make the PISA more appealing to users, 
various style themes could be provided. A better indication of progressing towards 
a goal, such as a progress bar, was also suggested. This may be combined with 
the existing idea of monitoring the days a user is secure or insecure. 
The need for more information regarding how one should protect oneself from 
cyber threats as well as more security tips and cyber threat items was also 
identified. An additional security item pointed out was the monitoring who logged 
on to the computer and when. However, additional security items were also 
indicated in the Questionnaire A. 
Review Participants: 
Kenny Jansson was appointed as review leader and Prof. Rossouw von Solms as 
well as Ewald Stieger was an attendee at the Kickoff and Logging meetings. 
Furthermore, the following participants made up the review team: 
 
Name Email Signature  
    
Job Mashapa 
Melanie Viljoen 
Paul van de Haar 
Prosecuter Maninjwa 
Jacques Fouche  
abc@nmmu.ac.za 
abc@nmmu.ac.za 
abc@live.nmmu.ac.za 
abc@live.nmmu.ac.za 
abc@live.nmmu.ac.za  
 
Woudi von Solms abc@gmail.com   
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Appendix C 
C.1 Questionnaire A: The PISA Questionnaire 
Please Note: In some questions the respondents could select more than one checkbox, so the 
percentages may add up to more than 100%. 
1. The PISA provided me with an easily understandable "at a glance" overview of my 
"security status" 
 
Strongly agree 
 
3 50% 
Agree 
 
2 33% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
2. Did you read any security related news? 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
4 67% 
No, I just scrolled through the news items, reading the headline of each one 
 
2 33% 
No, I was not connected to the internet 
 
0 0% 
No 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
194 
 
3. The security related "news items" motivated me to be more secure by keeping me up to 
date with latest events 
 
Strongly agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
1 17% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
3 50% 
Disagree 
 
2 33% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
4. The security related "news items" made me more aware of the need for information 
security 
 
 
Strongly agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
2 33% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
3 50% 
Disagree 
 
1 17% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
5. The PISA enabled me to create strong passwords 
 
 
 
 
Strongly agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
5 83% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
0 0% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
1 17% 
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6. The password tips were helpful 
 
 
 
7. I changed my password to a more secure one after testing its strength 
 
Yes 
 
0 0% 
No, but I still intend to change 
it 
 
0 0% 
No, my password is strong 
 
5 83% 
No 
 
1 17% 
 
 
 
 
8. The password strength is displayed effectively 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly agree 
 
1 17% 
Agree 
 
5 83% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
0 0% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly agree 
 
1 17% 
Agree 
 
4 67% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
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9. The notification messages given by the PISA did not persuade me 
 
  
 
Strongly agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
0 0% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
3 50% 
Disagree 
 
3 50% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
10. The PISA provided me with guidance on how to improve my "security status" 
 
Strongly agree 
 
2 33% 
Agree 
 
4 67% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
0 0% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
11. The notifications given by the PISA confused me 
 
Strongly agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
1 17% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
2 33% 
Strongly disagree 
 
2 33% 
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12. The information regarding the "security items" that are monitored helped me understand 
why they are important 
 
Strongly agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
5 83% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
13. Keeping track of the number of days I am insecure is discouraging to me 
  
Strongly agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
0 0% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
3 50% 
Disagree 
 
3 50% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
14. The PISA reminded me of "security items" that are not secured and need my attention 
 
Strongly agree 
 
4 67% 
Agree 
 
1 17% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
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15. The PISA allowed me to set a goal for myself by keeping track of the number of days I 
am secure or insecure  
 
Strongly agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
2 33% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
2 33% 
Disagree 
 
2 33% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
16. If I know the "security status" of a friend is better than mine, it would motivate me to be 
as secure or even more secure 
 
Strongly agree 
 
1 17% 
Agree 
 
3 50% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
1 17% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
17. The information regarding the "cyber threats" increased my security awareness 
 
Strongly agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
3 50% 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
 
2 33% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
I did not read about any 
of the cyber threats 
 
1 17% 
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18. Using images for the "cyber threats" increased the chance of me reading about them 
 
Strongly agree 
 
3 50% 
Agree 
 
2 33% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
 
19. The PISA did not praise me when I improved my 
"security status" 
 
 
 
 
 
20. When my "security status" changed the PISA provided me with immediate feedback 
regarding what caused the change 
 
Strongly Agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
3 50% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
2 33% 
Disagree 
 
1 17% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
 
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
Strongly Agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
0 0% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
3 50% 
Disagree 
 
2 33% 
Strongly disagree 
 
1 17% 
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21. When my "security status" deteriorated the PISA notified me and advised me on what to 
do 
 
Strongly Agree 
 
1 17% 
Agree 
 
2 33% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
2 33% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
1 17% 
 
 
 
 
22. The PISA does not provide sufficient help 
 
23. I was not able to follow the instructions given when I clicked on "Fix this" 
 
Strongly Agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
0 0% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
0 0% 
Disagree 
 
3 50% 
Strongly disagree 
 
2 33% 
I did not use Windows 7 
 
1 17% 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
0 0% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
5 83% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
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24. The PISA influenced me towards a more secure behaviour 
 
Strongly agree 
 
1 17% 
Agree 
 
4 67% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
 
25. The PISA should be configurable to some extent 
 
 
 
26. The PISA increased my security awareness 
 
Strongly agree 
 
1 17% 
Agree 
 
3 50% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
1 17% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly agree 
 
2 33% 
Agree 
 
4 67% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
0 0% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
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27. The notifications given by the PISA irritated me 
 
 
 
 
 
28. I should be able to switch off the PISA whenever I want to 
 
 
 
29. The PISA interrupted me too often 
  
Strongly Agree 
 
3 50% 
Agree 
 
2 33% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
0 0% 
Disagree 
 
1 17% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree 
 
1 17% 
Agree 
 
3 50% 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
 
0 0% 
Disagree 
 
2 33% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly Agree 
 
2 33% 
Agree 
 
0 0% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
2 33% 
Disagree 
 
1 17% 
Strongly disagree 
 
1 17% 
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30. In an organisational environment the PISA should report me to a supervisor if I am 
constantly insecure 
 
Strongly Agree 
 
3 50% 
Agree 
 
2 33% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
 
 
31. Did you uninstall the PISA because it interrupted you too often? 
 
 
Yes 
 
3 50% 
No 
 
3 50% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32. Did you notice that the time period between notifications is dependent on your security 
status? 
 
Yes 
 
1 17% 
No 
 
5 83% 
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33. The screen layout of the PISA is visually attractive  
 
 
 
 
 
34. The colours red, yellow and green effectively convey the meaning of notification 
messages and status 
 
Strongly agree 
 
3 50% 
Agree 
 
2 33% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
 
35. The window of the PISA should be 
 
Significantly smaller 
 
2 33% 
Smaller 
 
3 50% 
Remain as is 
 
1 17% 
Larger 
 
0 0% 
Significantly larger 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly agree 
 
1 17% 
Agree 
 
3 50% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
0 0% 
Disagree 
 
2 33% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
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36. The PISA monitors "security items" that are relevant to an average computer user 
 
Strongly agree 
 
1 17% 
Agree 
 
4 67% 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
 
 
37. There is no need to update or adapt the PISA when 
new "cyber threats" occur 
 
 
 
38. What additional "security items" do you feel should be monitored by the PISA? 
 
 
 
Number of social websites that are visited 
 
3 50% 
Removable storage devices that are connected and disconnected 
 
4 67% 
Backups of data 
 
2 33% 
None 
 
1 17% 
Other 
 
1 17% 
Strongly agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
1 17% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
2 33% 
Strongly disagree 
 
2 33% 
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39. How motivational would you say the PISA is? 
 
 
Not 
motivational 
at all  
Very 
motivational 
 
1 -  Not motivational at all 0 0% 
2 
 
0 0% 
3 
 
0 0% 
4 
 
2 33% 
5 
 
2 33% 
6 
 
2 33% 
7 -  Very motivational 0 0% 
 
 
 
 
 
40. The PISA is more motivational than the Action Center in Windows 7 
 
 
 
Strongly agree 
 
1 17% 
Agree 
 
3 50% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
I have no experience in using Action Center 
 
1 17% 
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41. How would you make the PISA more motivational? 
 
 
Provide some statistics on online fraud and breaches 
 
3 50% 
Provide some form of reward for secure behaviour 
 
1 17% 
"Scare" the user more often when he is not secure 
 
1 17% 
There is no need to make it more motivational 
 
2 33% 
Other 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
42. How persuasive would you say the PISA is? 
 
 
Not 
persuasive 
at all  
Very 
persuasive 
 
1 -  Not persuasive at all 0 0% 
2 
 
0 0% 
3 
 
0 0% 
4 
 
2 33% 
5 
 
2 33% 
6 
 
2 33% 
7 -  Very persuasive 0 0% 
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43. The PISA is more persuasive than the Action Center in Windows 7 
 
 
Strongly agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
5 83% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
0 0% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
I have no experience in using Action Center 
 
1 17% 
 
44. How would you make the PISA more persuasive? 
 
 
Provide the user with feedback more often 
 
0 0% 
Allow the user to view his progress towards a goal 
 
4 67% 
Tell the user that he/she is being monitored 
 
3 50% 
Praise the user more often when his/her status is secure 
 
3 50% 
There is no need to make it more persuasive 
 
1 17% 
Other 
 
0 0% 
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45. How educational would you say the PISA is? 
 
 
Not 
educational 
at all  
Very 
educational 
 
1 -  Not educational at all 0 0% 
2 
 
0 0% 
3 
 
0 0% 
4 
 
1 17% 
5 
 
3 50% 
6 
 
2 33% 
7 -  Very educational 0 0% 
 
 
 
46. The PISA is more educational than the Action Center in Windows 7 
 
 
Strongly agree 
 
0 0% 
Agree 
 
4 67% 
Neither agree nor disagree 
 
1 17% 
Disagree 
 
0 0% 
Strongly disagree 
 
0 0% 
I have no experience in using Action Center 
 
1 17% 
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47. How would you make the PISA more educational? 
 
 
Provide more security tips 
 
3 50% 
Provide more information on other cyber threats 
 
3 50% 
Provide more security news 
 
1 17% 
There is no need to make it more educational 
 
2 33% 
Other 
 
0 0% 
 
 
 
 
48. The time period between notifications should be 
 
Significantly shorter 
 
0 0% 
Shorter 
 
1 17% 
Remain as is 
 
1 17% 
Longer 
 
0 0% 
Significantly longer 
 
4 67% 
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49. The time period between notifications is dependent on the user's "security status". In 
the prototype a dial is used to indicate the status. Please indicate what you feel is the 
correct time period between notifications: - RED STATUS 
 
5 min or less 
 
2 33% 
15 min 
 
2 33% 
30 min 
 
0 0% 
1 hour 
 
0 0% 
3 hours or more 
 
2 33% 
 
 
50. The time period between notifications is dependent on the user's "security status". In 
the prototype a dial is used to indicate the status. Please indicate what you feel is the 
correct time period between notifications: - YELLOW STATUS 
 
5 min or less 
 
0 0% 
15 min 
 
0 0% 
30 min 
 
3 50% 
1 hour 
 
1 17% 
3 hours or more 
 
2 33% 
 
 
51. The time period between notifications is dependent on the user's "security status". In 
the prototype a dial is used to indicate the status. Please indicate what you feel is the 
correct time period between notifications: - GREEN STATUS 
 
5 min or less 
 
0 0% 
15 min 
 
0 0% 
30 min 
 
0 0% 
1 hour 
 
0 0% 
3 hours or more 
 
6 100% 
 
 
52. Any final comments? 
Well done, easy to understand, great interface, educational, great job. 
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C.2 Questionnaire B: The PISA System 
Usability Scale 
The system usability scale was developed by John Brooke (1996). 
1. I think that I would like to use this system frequently 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1 -  Strongly Disagree 0 0% 
2 
 
0 0% 
3 
 
3 50% 
4 
 
3 50% 
5 -  Strongly Agree 0 0% 
 
 
 
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1 -  Strongly Disagree 6 100% 
2 
 
0 0% 
3 
 
0 0% 
4 
 
0 0% 
5 -  Strongly Agree 0 0% 
 
 
3. I thought the system was easy to use 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1 -  Strongly Disagree 0 0% 
2 
 
0 0% 
3 
 
1 17% 
4 
 
2 33% 
5 -  Strongly Agree 3 50% 
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4. I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this system 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1 -  Strongly Disagree 6 100% 
2 
 
0 0% 
3 
 
0 0% 
4 
 
0 0% 
5 -  Strongly Agree 0 0% 
 
 
 
5. I found the various functions of the system were well integrated 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1 -  Strongly Disagree 0 0% 
2 
 
1 17% 
3 
 
2 33% 
4 
 
2 33% 
5 -  Strongly Agree 1 17% 
 
 
 
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in the system 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1 -  Strongly Disagree 1 17% 
2 
 
3 50% 
3 
 
1 17% 
4 
 
1 17% 
5 -  Strongly Agree 0 0% 
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7. I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1 -  Strongly Disagree 0 0% 
2 
 
0 0% 
3 
 
0 0% 
4 
 
2 33% 
5 -  Strongly Agree 4 67% 
 
 
 
 
8. I found the system very cumbersome to use 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1 -  Strongly Disagree 3 50% 
2 
 
1 17% 
3 
 
1 17% 
4 
 
1 17% 
5 -  Strongly Agree 0 0% 
 
 
 
 
9. I felt very confident using the system 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1 -  Strongly Disagree 0 0% 
2 
 
0 0% 
3 
 
2 33% 
4 
 
0 0% 
5 -  Strongly Agree 4 67% 
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10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1 -  Strongly Disagree 4 67% 
2 
 
1 17% 
3 
 
1 17% 
4 
 
0 0% 
5 -  Strongly Agree 0 0% 
 
 
 
  
System Usability Scale (SUS) Score: 
―Each item‘s score contribution will range from 0 to 4. For item 1,3,5,7 and 9, the 
score contribution is the scale position minus 1. For items 2,4,6,8 and 10, the 
contribution is 5 minus the scale position. Multiply the sum of scores by 2.5 to 
obtain the overall SUS score.‖ (Tullis & Albert, 2008, p. 139) According, to Tullis 
and Albert (2008, p. 149) a score under 60% is considered relatively poor and 
anything over 80% is pretty good. 
Q1:  3x2 + 3x3    =15 
Q2: 6x4    =24 
Q3:  1x2 + 2x3 + 3x4  =20 
Q4:  6x4    =24 
Q5:  1x1 + 2x2 + 2x3 + 1x4 =15 
Q6:  1x4 + 3x3 + 1x2 + 1x1 =16 
Q7:  2x3 + 4x4    =22 
Q8:  3x4 + 1x3 + 1x2 + 1x1 =18 
Q9:  2x2 + 4x4   =20 
Q10: 4x4 + 1x3 + 1x2  =21  
Total:     195  
195/6 = 32.5 x 2.5 = 81.25 % 
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Based on the above result 81.25 percent, one can conclude that the PISA was 
found to be user-friendly. 
References: 
Brooke, J. (1996). SUS: A quick and dirty usability scale. In P. W. Jordan, B. 
Thomas, B. A. Weerdmeester, & I. L. McClelland (Eds.), Usability evaluation in 
industry (pp. 189-194). London: Taylor & Francis. 
Tullis, T. and Albert, B. (2008). Measuring the user experience: collecting, 
analyzing, and presenting usability metrics. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. 
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Appendix D 
D.1 Research Paper: Criteria for a Personal 
Information Security Agent 
The conference paper presented at the 10th European Conference on Information 
Warfare and Security (ECIW 2010) in Tallinn, July 2010, Estonia:
Criteria for a Personal Information Security 
Agent  
Ewald Stieger, Rossouw von Solms 
Institute for ICT Advancement, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth, South 
Africa 
s20631237@nmmu.ac.za 
Rossouw.VonSolms@nmmu.ac.za 
 
Abstract: Today‘s economy depends on the secure flow of information within and across 
organizations and information security is an issue of vital importance. Information security ensures 
business continuity and minimizes business damage by preventing and reducing the impact of 
security incidents. However, information security efforts are certainly not as effective as one would 
have wished for. A commonly accepted reason for this is the insecure behaviour of people. This 
insecure behaviour is often due to a lack of knowledge, awareness, education and training. In order 
to address this, many organisations provide security education, training and awareness programs 
to their employees. However, these programs often do not achieve a persistent change towards 
secure behaviour. The various reasons that contribute to the failure of security education, training 
and awareness programs and cause the trend towards insecure behaviour are briefly discussed. It 
follows that changing the behaviour of people is an inherently difficult task that requires the 
consideration of many factors. Similarly, a tool that intends to address insecure behaviour needs to 
consider various technological elements that may contribute in its ability to influence behaviour. 
The aim of this paper is to propose the principles of a personal information security agent and 
explore a set of objectives and criteria that may contribute to its success in influencing and 
reminding individuals towards a more secure behaviour. The criteria stem from various domains 
such as persuasive technology and human computer interaction. Persuasive technology has been 
applied in various domains to shape, reinforce or change people‘s behaviour. We describe related 
work that has been done using persuasive technology, and build on it. The proposed criteria 
consists of functions such as ―To motivate‖ and characteristics such as ―Context sensitivity‖. To put 
the theory into practice, a prototype of a personal security agent has been developed that 
implements some of the criteria. Based on this, a discussion on the development and 
implementation of the prototype and its potential benefits has been included. The prototype was 
developed to test the proposed criteria in a practical experiment that will form part of future 
research.  
 
Keywords: Information security, information security awareness, persuasive technology, human 
computer interaction, human behaviour. 
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1. Introduction  
Information security remains to be a major problem, in particular the human issue. The famous 
hacker Kevin Mitnick (Poulsen 2000) testified before the [US] congress saying that ―... the human 
side of computer security is easily exploited and constantly overlooked. Companies spend millions 
of dollars on firewalls, encryption and secure access devices, and it‘s money wasted, because 
none of these measures address the weakest link in the security chain.‖  
 The Ponemon Institute (2009) surveyed 967 end-users of corporate information technologies 
and found that there is an increasing trend in insecure behaviour amongst participants. For 
example, between 2007 and 2009 there was a 4% increase in the switching off of security-related 
software such as anti-virus. Threats also exhibit a similar increasing trend. The Sophos security 
threat report (Sophos 2011) measured a 10% increase in spam reports, a 13% increase in phishing 
and a 4% increase in malware between December 2009 and December 2010. Organisations also 
face threats, such as data leakage, from individuals who are not employees. These ―external 
insiders‖ are introduced through trading partners or by outsourcing business processes. Most 
organisations address this by adding security clauses to their contracts and policies, but enforcing 
them remains a difficult task. This is often due to the fast pace of business or a lack of resources 
(Johnson and Goetz 2007). Furthermore, policies tend to be ignored. In the survey done by the 
Ponemon Institute (2009) 57% of respondents agreed that data security policies are largely ignored 
by employees and management. It is therefore essential that users of information (end-users) are 
made aware of threats and the risks that can be associated with them. The traditional way of 
achieving this is through security education, training and awareness (SETA) programs which are 
typically offered by organisations. However, these programs are often not as successful as 
envisaged. The following reasons that contribute to this are: 
 
 The programs are too generic and target too large an audience (Austen and Stewart 2008; 
Valentine 2006). 
 Individuals attending the programs may believe the information given is not relevant to them 
(Valentine 2006). 
 Individuals forget the message that was given during the program (Albrechtsen 2007). 
 Computer users have conflicting goals and relegate security to second place (Sasse, Brostoff 
and Weirich 2001; Whitten and Tygar 1999). 
 Computer users believe that there is no personal danger and they are not the target 
(Beautement and Sasse 2009; Weirich and Sasse 2001; West 2008). 
 Computer users believe that hackers will always find a way in, even if one is behaving securely 
(Weirich and Sasse 2001).  
 Users who behave in a secure way are seen as ‗paranoid‘ or ‗pedantic‘, and even untrustworthy 
by their colleagues (Sasse, Brostoff and Weirich 2001). 
 Users may have a poor mental model of security due to a lack of knowledge or the complexity of 
security systems (Adams and Sasse 1999; Chiasson, van Oorschot and Biddle 2006). 
 
 In view of the above, this paper proposes an additional approach using a personal (information) 
security agent. A personal security agent may be able to address some of the shortcomings of 
SETA programs by being context sensitive and providing individual feedback to the user. As a 
dashboard of a motor vehicle provides the driver with a range of important information at a glance a 
personal security agent could provide the user with a range of security information at a glance as 
well as relevant and immediate feedback. Security related information in Windows 7 is provided in 
the form of the Action Center. Some of the items monitored by the Action Center include virus 
protection, spyware protection, user account control, and windows updates. The Action Center 
monitors these security items and notifies users when changes occur. Upon clicking on the Action 
Center‘s flag icon in the notification area a list of issues to be addressed by the user is displayed.  
However, unless the user clicks the flag icon he will not be reminded again of pending issues after 
a notification has been displayed. Also, due to improved customisability in Windows 7, a user can 
turn off these messages. This allows the user to become ignorant of relevant security issues. The 
Action Center also lacks an indication of the overall security status. Anti-virus software provides 
more specific security information that relates to viruses.  Users are notified if threats are detected 
or when new virus definition updates are available. However, anti-virus software is only one 
component of security on a computer. The personal security agent will have a more holistic 
approach including components such as security education as well. Therefore, the task of the 
personal security agent will be to provide individual and personal feedback regarding the overall 
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security status and influence towards secure behaviour as well as reinforcing it. The use of 
persuasive techniques may help to achieve this task. Persuasive technologies, or captology, were 
first proposed during CHI 1997, an ACM conference on human factors in computing systems (Fogg 
1998). According to Fogg (2003), persuasive technology is defined as ―interactive computing 
systems designed to change people‘s attitudes and behaviours‖. Weirich and Sasse (2001) have 
the opinion that users cannot be forced to behave in a proper fashion, but an effort to persuade 
them to do so has to be made.  
 The rest of the paper, which will attempt to implement the aspects discussed above, is 
structured as follows. First, a brief discussion on related work is provided. Secondly, a list of 
objectives for a personal security agent is provided. Thirdly, an overview of the proposed criteria, 
which is divided into functions and characteristics, is provided. Finally, a prototype is presented and 
some concluding remarks regarding future research are given.    
 
2. Related work 
Persuasive technology has been applied successfully to domains such as health, safety and 
marketing.  It was used to persuade people to consume less water at taps (Arroyo, Bonanni and 
Selker 2005), encourage physical activity (Consolvo et al. 2009) and healthy living (Del Valle and 
Opalach 2005), as well as influencing people to buy more at supermarkets (Cosley et al. 2003). 
Recent research done by Yeo, Rahim and Ren (2009) also applied persuasive principles in the 
field of information security. Their research tested the effectiveness of a web-based program in 
order to change the attitudes of end users towards information security awareness. The program 
used two persuasive strategies, ―tunnelling‖ and ―influencing through language‖, and focussed on 
e-mail management, password management and virus protection. It was found that the program 
was able to positively change the attitudes of participating students towards information security 
aware behaviour. However, the program does not provide any feedback regarding the user‘s 
current security context nor does it perform any user activity monitoring.  
 Further research done by Forget, Chiasson and Biddle (2007) proposed a persuasive 
authentication framework. The framework is based on the following persuasive principles: 
 
1. The Personalisation Principle: providing customised information offers a more personal 
experience, which could be more persuasive than generic information. 
2. The Simplification Principle: tasks should be made as simple as possible. 
3. The Monitoring Principle: when aware that they are being observed, users are more likely to 
perform the desired behaviour. 
4. The Conditioning Principle:  using various forms of reinforcement to help shape the desired 
behaviour or convert existing behaviours into habits. 
5. The Social Interaction Principle: users are more likely to be persuaded by a system that 
appears to share similar attitudes, traits, and personality. 
 
 The persuasive authentication framework was developed to be an effective tool in educating 
users to create more secure passwords and therefore does not consider other security issues. 
However, Forget, Chiasson and Biddle (2007) are of the opinion that their framework can also be 
utilised to educate users about security certificates, phishing, encryption, malware, and many other 
security issues. 
 
3. Objectives 
By taking the above into account, one can conclude that the main goal of the personal security 
agent is to influence users towards a more secure behaviour. In order to achieve this, the personal 
security agent should: 
 
 Provide the user an indication of his/her security status.  
 Be context sensitive by monitoring user actions and alerting the user immediately when a 
performed action has negatively influenced his/her security status. 
 Enable, influence and persuade the user to improve his/her security status.  
 Be easy to use and not frustrate the user.  
 Not easily be disabled.  
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 Be configurable to some extent because users may have different security needs. 
 Be able to report certain users that continuously do not follow security practices. 
 Educate the user regarding relevant security items 
 
4. Criteria of a personal security agent 
This section will propose a set of criteria that may enable the personal security agent to achieve the 
above objectives. The criteria have been divided into functions and characteristics for a personal 
security agent. 
4.1 Functions  
This section will discuss the most important functions of the proposed personal security agent. 
 
4.1.1 To persuade 
Fogg (1998) has synthesised various definitions to define persuasion as ―an attempt to shape, 
reinforce, or change behaviors, feelings, or thoughts about an issue, object, or action.‖ Therefore, 
the personal security agent will persuade users towards more secure behaviour. Research done by 
Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa (2009) has led them to develop a framework for designing and 
evaluating persuasive systems. The framework describes various persuasive techniques of which 
the following are relevant to the personal security agent and can support its persuasive abilities: 
 
 Reduction: Refers to reducing complex behaviour into simple tasks. 
 Tunnelling: Guiding users through a process or experience. 
 Self-monitoring: Refers to a system that keeps track of one‘s own performance or status and 
supports the user in achieving goals. 
 Praise: By offering praise, a system can make users more open to persuasion. 
 Rewards: Systems that reward target behaviours may have great persuasive powers. 
 Surface credibility: A look and feel that conveys credibility 
 Reminders: Reminding users regarding their security status and behaviour 
 Liking: A system that is visually attractive for its users is likely to be more persuasive. 
 Social comparison: System users will have a greater motivation to perform the target behaviour 
if they can compare their performance with the performance of others. 
 
 In addition to the above, the conditioning and monitoring principle described in section 2 may 
provide additional support. According to Forget, Chiasson and Biddle (2007) persuasive technology 
must be applied with great care, because there is always a risk of annoying users to the point that 
they rebel against the system. Furthermore, Berdichevsky and Neuenschwader (1999) state that 
there are also ethical considerations that should be considered, the most important  being that the 
creators of a persuasive technology should never try to persuade users of something when they 
would not consent to be persuaded of it.   
 
4.1.2 To motivate 
The personal security agent needs to motivate secure behaviour. Users can be motivated in 
various ways. A well known motivation strategy is to provide a reward or incentive. Rewards can be 
used as effective means for cultivating interest and increasing motivation and performance 
(Cameron and Pierce 2002) and can be tangible or intangible. Furthermore, the use of rewards is 
individual: what may work as reinforcement for one person may not work for another person. 
However, motivation can also occur through fear. Rogers‘ protection motivation theory (Rogers 
1983) concerns itself with the use of fear appeals to change the behaviour of people. It states that 
fear appeals will be effective if they convince the recipient that: 
   
 the problem is serious;  
 it may affect him/her;   
 it can be avoided by taking appropriate action; and  
 the recipient is capable of performing the necessary behaviour required to avoid the problem. 
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 Motivation may also benefit from the competitive nature of people. According to Cheng (2004) 
competition and recognition can be used to motivate people's behaviours since most people desire 
to win in contests and hope to obtain the glory as a kind of validation from others.   
 
4.1.3 To escalate 
The personal security agent needs to be able to escalate bad or inappropriate security behaviour. 
This escalation may occur in two ways: 
 
1. It may reinforce security principles by repeating them through persuasive messages more 
often.  
2. Bringing the particular user to the attention of an information security officer.  
 
 However, before any escalation will take place, the personal security agent will have provided 
the user with information regarding his/her behaviour as well as advice on how and why he/she 
needs to change behaviour. Only if this information is constantly disregarded by the user, 
escalation should take place. 
 
4.1.4 To educate 
The personal security agent will provide the users with information on ways to improve their 
security status. Information will be provided on what influences their security status, why it affects 
the security status, and how to improve the security status. Information regarding common threats 
and how they manifest themselves should also be given. Users that are more knowledgeable 
regarding threats and information security will be less likely to make wrong decisions. 
 
 Based on the above functions, the personal security agent will use persuasive principles, 
motivation and education to influence user behaviour. For example, a user may be praised for 
maintaining a good security status, motivated by comparing his/her security status to that of other 
users and educated that his/her password should not only consist of letters. Also, users that exhibit 
continuous insecure behaviour may need to be reported so that further action can be taken.  
4.2 Characteristics 
This section describes the possible characteristics of the personal security agent. 
 
4.2.1 Usability and interface design 
Usability may be defined as the ease of use of a specific technology, how effective the technology 
is in meeting the user‘s needs and the satisfaction of the user with the results obtained by using the 
technology to perform specific tasks (Johnson 2006). A research area that explores human 
computer interaction (HCI) in computer security is security HCI (HCI-S). Security HCI has been 
defined by Johnston, Eloff and Labuschagne (2003) as ―the part of a UI which is responsible for 
establishing the common ground between a user and the security features of a system. HCI-S is 
human computer interaction applied in the area of computer security‖. Furthermore, they mention 
that poor usability design in security systems or features often creates an aversion amongst users. 
This results in security being ignored and not used. Since the personal security agent may be 
regarded as a security feature, it will adapt the design criteria proposed by Johnston, Eloff and 
Labuschagne (2003). These criteria facilitate developing usable interfaces that are used in a 
security environment and are based on Nielsen‘s (2005) heuristics traditionally used for heuristic 
evaluation: 
 
 Visibility of system status: The user interface (UI) must inform the user about the internal state 
of the system, for example a message could indicate that a security feature is active.  
 Aesthetic and minimalist design: Only security information relevant to the user should be 
displayed. The security UI must be simple and easy to use, maintaining a minimalist design. 
 Satisfaction: The security activities must be easy to realize and understand.  
 Convey features: The UI needs to convey the available security features to the user clearly and 
appropriately; a good way to do it is by using figures or pictures. 
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 Learning ability: The UI needs to be as non-threatening and easy to learn as possible. 
 
4.2.2 Context sensitivity  
According to Zurko (2005), security mechanisms that cannot be understood cannot be effective. 
Users need to understand how to use the security controls that are directly relevant to their task 
and context. Users can complete a task but are likely to make the wrong decision if they do not 
know the security implication that it has. The personal security agent will continuously check for 
changes that affect the security status of a user. A detected change and the influence that it has on 
the user‘s security status will be reported through a rapid feedback cycle: 
1. User performs an security related action 
2. Personal security agent detects change in the user‘s security context  
3. An evaluation of the change occurs 
4. User is provided with feedback regarding the action that he/she performed 
 This can be considered as just-in-time persuasion. Just-in-time persuasion can be very 
effective, since the feedback is highly related and available at just the moment people make a 
decision (Cheng 2004).  
 
4.2.3 Information  
Since the personal security agent will continuously check for changes that affect the security status 
of a computer user, it will need information to determine whether a particular change is positive or 
negative. This decision support information may be based on an information security baseline for 
computer users in general or a policy such as an organization‘s computer usage policy. Also, users 
in different roles may have different security requirements. For example, a home user may not 
have to secure his/her computer to the same degree as an investment portfolio manager in the 
finance department. Therefore, the personal security agent needs to be configurable to some 
extent. 
 
4.2.4 Persistency 
In order to provide the user with continuous feedback the personal security agent must be ―always 
on‖. It should also not be easily deactivated or switched off by a user since this would defeat its 
purpose.  
 
4.2.5 Evolving 
The ―threat landscape‖ is constantly changing. New threats occur on a daily basis and stealing 
information has become big business. For the year 2010 more than 20 million new strains of 
malware were identified (PandaLabs, 2010). Furthermore, information thieves are becoming more 
sophisticated by the day and have formed groups and alliances to target users. Some of the 
changes that can be identified are as follows: 
 
 There is a transition from email towards more immediate methods such as instant messaging 
and Twitter. Instant messaging and social media connections will replace email as primary 
distribution method for malicious code and links (McAfee, 2011). 
 There is an increasing amount of cyber-protests or ―hacktivism‖. More people voluntarily allow 
their computer to participate in defacement and denial of service attacks to demonstrate their 
political and social views (McAfee, 2011; PandaLabs 2010). 
 Attack toolkits, such as Zeus, are becoming more user-friendly and accessible to novices 
(McAfee, 2011; Symantec, 2010). In addition to this a mobile version of Zeus has been 
discovered (Lennon, 2010).  
 
 The personal security agent can therefore not remain stagnant and has to adapt and evolve in 
tandem with the threats that are out there.  
 
 By using principles of security HCI, it may be ensured that the personal security agent is user 
friendly. For example, the visibility principle may be realised in the form of a gauge that indicates 
the security status using colours such as red, yellow and green. Context sensitivity will allow the 
personal security agent to be persuasive the moment the user performs an insecure action. 
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Furthermore, the information will enable it to make decisions regarding user behaviour. The 
information may be regarded as a monitoring configuration and should be adjustable by an 
authorised person. By being persistent the personal security agent will be able to monitor the user‘s 
actions and will ensure that it cannot be deactivated easily. Finally, being able to evolve will allow it 
to keep up with the changing ―threat landscape‖ and to be a step ahead. 
 This section discussed the functions and characteristics of the proposed personal security 
agent. The functions defined what the personal security agent should be able to do and the 
characteristics defined the attributes of it. The criteria, consisting of functions and characteristics, 
can be studied through the development of a prototype. The next section provides a discussion on 
such a prototype.  
 
5. Developments 
Taking all the criteria discussed above into account, a prototype of a personal security agent has 
been developed using C# as a programming language and Windows Presentation Foundation 
(WPF) for the front end design. Figure 1 below shows a screenshot of the prototype.  
 
 
Figure 1: A prototype of a personal security agent 
 The prototype interacts similar to a chat based program by automatically sliding in and out of 
view from the bottom right of the taskbar. It is designed to persuade the user more often when 
his/her overall security status, as indicated by the dial in the top right, is in the red zone than when 
it is in the green zone. Furthermore, if a change in the security status occurs the user will be 
notified of the change and its cause. The overall security status is determined from the various 
status items indicated below status detail. These items include for example, whether the antivirus 
program is updated or the firewall is enabled. For each item the user can obtain additional 
information regarding why it is important and how to fix it. The status items may differ based on the 
user‘s context as discussed in section 4.2.3.  
 Latest security related news is displayed by using a Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feed. 
This allows the user to be aware of the latest threats and security issues out there. The news may 
also motivate the user to behave more securely. An educational aspect is added in the form of 
random cyber-threats being displayed and allowing the user to view information regarding them. 
Additionally, the construction of strong passwords may be considered one of the cornerstones of 
information security. This prompted the idea to add a password strength tester to the prototype. 
The tester indicates the strength with a bar that changes colour from red (very weak) to green (very 
strong) as the password is typed. The password strength is determined using an algorithm the 
considers factors such as length, use of upper and lower case, use of numbers and symbols 
amongst others. Finally, the prototype also keeps track of the number of days the user is secure or 
insecure as well as the longest secure period.  
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6. Benefits 
For companies and individuals there are many negative consequences such as negative publicity, 
competitive disadvantage, identity theft, loss of information and customer confidence, as well as 
financial loss that can be associated with insecure user behaviour. Therefore, a personal security 
agent that positively influences users towards more secure behavior would be beneficial. 
Furthermore, a Gartner analyst report estimated that in less than a decade, organizations will 
typically deal with 30 times more information than they do today (Johnson 2006). This suggests an 
increase in related security breaches and a need to find solutions for insecure behavior. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Influencing users towards secure behaviour is a difficult task and this is often the reason why 
information security is not as successful as it could be. Threats follow an increasing trend and a 
new approach to combating insecure behaviour needs to be found. This paper therefore has 
proposed the approach of using a personal security agent. An ―interactive security dashboard‖ that 
persuades users to be more secure. For the personal security agent a set of criteria were proposed 
consisting of functions and characteristics that may enable it to achieve its goal. The criteria are not 
set in stone and need to be tested. Therefore, to apply the theory in practice a prototype has been 
developed to test some of the proposed criteria. Future research will include testing the prototype 
to obtain feedback regarding proposed criteria, which may then be revised accordingly. In addition, 
the results may indicate an effective strategy that a personal security agent can follow in order to 
influence a user towards more secure behaviour. Finally, the outcome of the research will be a 
framework that can be used to develop personal security agents. This framework may then be 
used to develop personal security agents that influence users towards more secure behaviour and 
assists them in securing their systems. 
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Abstract 
We are at war, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Our enemy is sophisticated and has developed various 
ways of attack. They are cyber criminals with the aim of obtaining our sensitive and valuable information. 
Their weapons include phishing emails, malware, attack toolkits and rogue software. Are we protected and 
are our defences strong enough?  Recent events indicate that we are not. Organizations and individuals are 
struggling to keep up with the onslaught. It is commonly accepted that humans are the weakest link and the 
cause of many security breaches. Therefore, it is essential that individuals need to become aware, 
knowledgeable, and educated regarding these related threats. They also need to be motivated and influenced 
to behave and act more securely. This paper discusses the idea of a personal information security agent 
(PISA) that assists in achieving this and presents a framework for the development of such an agent. The 
framework considers various aspects and makes recommendations with regard to persuading users to a more 
security-conscious behaviour. It specifies a set of criteria that have been established through a technical 
review of a functional software prototype as described by the IEEE 1028 Standard for Software Reviews. 
These criteria include functions, such as to educate users; and additionally, supporting characteristics, such as 
usability and context sensitivity. This research therefore investigated the criteria that should be considered in 
the development of a PISA and if such an agent has the potential to influence users. Findings suggest that a 
PISA based on these criteria is a plausible alternative for influencing computer users towards more secure 
behaviour.  . 
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1. Introduction 
 
  A quarter of a century ago Mason [1], had already stated that we live in an information age; and 
this author identified the need to consider and comprehend important ethical issues, such as the 
privacy and accuracy associated with information. Today, this is even truer, as information 
technology has become hugely pervasive in our lives [2]. We shop, bank and communicate via the 
Internet and using our mobile phones. These are many times more powerful than the average 
computer was in 1986. Similarly, organizations increasingly connect and interact via the Internet 
[3, 4].  
Due to the rapid adoption of this new technology, more information is stored and transmitted 
through various mediums than ever before. This is one of the reasons why information security is 
becoming increasingly important. However, information is also a valuable asset; and according to 
Von Solms and Von Solms [5], it “has become the lifeblood of modern organizations and core to 
most business processes”. Consequently, it is essential for organisations that their employees help 
to protect the information on which they depend.  
Furthermore, a loss or leakage of information can lead to huge financial losses, as well as 
negative publicity [2]. Recent events have shown that large organisations and governments still 
struggle to protect their valuable information. Conde Nast, a publishing giant, was tricked by an 
email scam, and transferred close to £5 million into a fraudulent account during a six-month period 
[6]. Well-known Sony had its PlayStation Network hacked – thereby, leading to the compromise of 
vital information, such as names, email addresses and credit card details of its 70 million customers 
[7]. A few days later Sony was hacked again; but this time it was the Sony Online Entertainment 
division and 20000 credit card and bank account numbers were compromised [8]. In the UK, the 
Ministry of Defence admitted that secrets of its nuclear submarines were made public on the 
Internet [9]. Events such as these are frequently related to the insecure behaviour of humans. 
Indeed, insecure behaviour and actions of users comprise one of the most often cited reasons for 
information security failure. For example, Bruce Schneier [10], a well-known security expert, states 
that, “People often represent the weakest link in the security chain and are chronically responsible 
for the failure of security systems.” For this reason, every employee of an organisation needs to be 
educated, trained and made aware of aspects regarding information security and its related threats. 
Organisations commonly use information security awareness programs to achieve this. However, 
there is evidence that these programs are not always effective. Some of the reasons include that 
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individuals easily forget the message that was given during the awareness program [11] or believe 
that it is not applicable to them [12] and that hackers will, in any case, circumvent any security 
measures [13]. Additionally, these programs are often too generic and aim at an audience that is too 
diverse [12, 14]. Therefore, finding alternative approaches to influence employees positively on 
being more secure in their behaviour is imperative. However, not only employees of organisations, 
but also home computer users, for the same reasons, should be made aware of the basic principles 
of information security. Home computer users are generally left to their own devices when it comes 
to information security. When one buys a new computer it does not come with an “instruction 
manual” for information security and the associated threats. Therefore, home computer users tend 
to be unaware of information security and the related behaviour required for themselves and their 
valuable information resources. This leads to home users being increasingly targeted by cyber 
criminals, since their computers are more vulnerable than those behind strong organisational 
firewalls [15]. The “weapons” used by cyber criminals include phishing emails, social engineering, 
botnets, malware, rogue software and spoof websites – aiming at stealing user information. Attacks 
with these weapons normally lead to identity theft, with resultant financial and data loss. For these 
reasons, an approach in the form of a personal information security agent (PISA) and a framework 
for the development of such will be presented in this paper.  
 
The paper briefly describes the concept, as well as the objectives and criteria that were proposed 
for the agent. Additionally, the development and evaluation of a prototype is described. Finally, a 
discussion on the findings, together with a developmental framework for such an agent, is 
provided. The ultimate objective of this paper is to prove that such a PISA can be created easily, 
and can prove to be worthwhile in protecting individuals against all types of cyber threats. 
 
2. Background and related work 
 
2.1 Information Security in Windows 
  Today, most computer users (88.91%) are using a Microsoft Windows based operating system 
[16]. The latest version is the Windows 7 operation system, which has many improved security 
features compared with earlier editions. All editions of Windows 7 come with the Action Center, 
which is a central place where a user can view and configure security and maintenance settings. 
The Action Center monitors security items, such as antivirus updates, firewall status, user- account 
control and windows updates. It is integrated into the notification area in the form of a flag icon. 
Upon clicking the flag, one is presented with a list of Action Center messages regarding issues. 
However, computer users may easily ignore such Action Center messages, or not even be aware of 
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them. To investigate this problem, a small questionnaire on the Action Center was presented to a 
focus group of ten individuals consisting of postgraduate students and staff members in the 
information security field.  When asked how often they clicked on the flag icon to view these 
issues, seven responded: “Never”; one responded: “Once a week”; and two responded: “2-4 times a 
week”. Furthermore, six respondents indicated that they “Never” respond to any Action Center 
messages; two indicated “Occasionally”; whilst, “Sometimes” and “Frequently” received one 
response each. Another question asked how often they would ignore such a message. Three 
respondents indicated: “Always”; six responded: “Frequently”; and one said: “Occasionally”. 
These results suggest that the Action Center is not very effective in influencing computer users. 
One possible reason that may contribute to this is that it does not provide any immediate feedback. 
For example, when one turns the Windows 7 firewall off, no message is given regarding this 
potentially dangerous action. Certainly, a computer user should immediately receive an indication 
that this course of action is not recommended, and that the system is now more vulnerable to 
threats. Furthermore, there are no reminders given regarding any pending security issues. A user 
can also turn off any messages related to an Action Center security item. Therefore, users can 
easily become ignorant and unaware of security issues in a Windows-based environment. 
   
A PISA aims to address the shortcomings of information security awareness programs and those 
of the Action Center. The PISA can be thought of as a personal “information security dashboard” 
that provides a computer user with security related information. By providing personal information 
feedback immediately on a user’s actions – and the overall security status – it can attempt to 
influence users to become more secure in their behaviour, as well as to reinforce such behaviour.  
However, there are many aspects that affect and influence the security behaviour of individuals. 
Some of the more well-known theories that might provide insight in this regard will be discussed 
subsequently. 
 
2.2 Theories on human behaviour 
  A common theory used to explain human behaviour is the theory of planned behaviour (TPB). 
This theory states that an individual’s behaviour is driven by one’s attitude to the behaviour, the 
subjective norms, and the perceived behavioural control [17]. Attitude refers to one’s positive or 
negative feeling to the behaviour and the opinions that friends or influential people have are the 
subjective norms [18]. The subjective norms may be regarded as a form of peer pressure – where 
one’s peers influence one’s decisions. Behavioural control is whether or not one believes that one 
has the ability to perform the particular action [17].  Therefore, according to TPB, if an individual 
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feels positively about the behaviour, believes his/her friends support the behaviour, and that he/she 
is able to perform the behaviour, then behaviour will probably occur.  
Self-efficacy is an important aspect, which is closely related to the perceived behavioural control 
aspect of TPB. The self-efficacy theory forms part of the more general social cognitive theory [19]; 
and it contends that self-efficacy is an important determinant of behaviour [20]. Rhee, Kim and 
Ryu [21] define self-efficacy in information security (SEIS) as: “a belief in one’s capability to 
protect information and information systems from unauthorized disclosure, modification, loss, 
destruction, and lack of availability”. Their research investigated the influence of self-efficacy on 
end-users’ security behaviour. They found that individuals with high SEIS used more security 
applications and features. In addition, those with high SEIS performed security related actions, 
such as making backups, more often than those who had low levels of SEIS. This indicates the 
need to cultivate a high degree of self-efficacy regarding information security tasks, in particular 
amongst novice computer users. The degree of self-efficacy is determined from the successes of 
previous experiences in performing the task, vicarious experience, which refers to observing others 
completing the task successfully, social persuasion by others, as well as the emotional and 
psychological state [19, 22]. 
Another behavioural aspect is that users tend to trade off information security for work that they 
need to complete, or other goals [23, 24]. If the task at hand is perceived as being more important 
than a recommended security action, the user will most likely ignore the security action. 
Furthermore, security is often regarded as a necessary evil that is only there to keep us from getting 
the job done quickly [25]. Consequently, computer users often have a wrong or incomplete mental 
model regarding security [13, 24, 26].  
A mental model represents the way a user thinks about something [15]. Cognitive scientists 
contend that mental models are based on factors, such as perception, imagination, knowledge, 
experience and expectations [27].  Mental models guide our behaviour; they determine how we 
think about an issue; and additionally, they influence our understanding of matters at hand [28]. 
Therefore, they can be used to help us understand why users make certain security decisions. Wash 
[15] investigated the folk models of home computer users and their effect on the security decisions 
that users made. Folk models are mental models that are inaccurate in the real world; and they, 
therefore, lead to incorrect decisions [29]. He found that depending on the mental model, users 
would make different decisions. For example, respondents who believed that viruses are buggy 
software also believed it is not necessary to run anti-virus software. 
 
These behavioural factors need to be considered in any technology that attempts to persuade users 
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to adopt a more secure behaviour. A research field that concerns itself with the use of computer 
technology to persuade users is called Captology. This subject will be discussed in the next section. 
 
2.3 Technology that persuades 
  The concept of persuasive technology, or Captology, was first introduced during CHI 1997, at an 
ACM conference on human factors in computing systems [30]. According to Fogg [31], persuasive 
technology may be defined as “interactive computing systems designed to change people’s 
attitudes and behaviours”. The principles of persuasive technology, such as reduction and tailoring, 
are therefore directly relevant to the PISA. As pointed out by Weirich and Sasse [13], one cannot 
force users to behave securely; however, an attempt to persuade them should be made. Persuasive 
technology has been applied successfully to domains, such as health, safety and marketing.  It was 
used to persuade people to reduce their water consumption at taps [32], encourage physical activity 
[33] and healthy living [34], as well as influencing people to buy more at supermarkets [35]. 
Furthermore, some studies have also investigated persuasive technology in the information security 
field. These are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1. Studies of persuasive technology in information security. 
Study Description Results 
Yeo, Rahim 
and Ren [36] 
The research investigated the 
effectiveness of a web-based 
program in changing the attitudes of 
end-users to information security 
awareness by using two persuasive 
strategies, namely: “tunnelling” and 
“influencing through language”.  E-
mail management, password 
management and virus protection 
were focused on. 
The program was able to positively 
change the attitudes of 
participating students towards 
information security aware 
behaviour. 
Forget, 
Chiasson and 
Biddle [37] 
Proposed a persuasive 
authentication framework consisting 
of five principles which are based 
on persuasive strategies such as 
reduction and tailoring. The 
framework was created as a tool for 
educating users to create stronger 
passwords. 
The application of the framework 
showed potential in being an 
effective tool in educating users 
about passwords. Furthermore, the 
researchers suggest that the 
framework can be used to educate 
users about other issues such as 
phishing and encryption as well. 
Cranor [38] 
Developed the human-in-the-loop 
(HITL) security framework that 
provides an understanding of the 
factors that influence the resulting 
user behaviour of a security 
communication. 
The HITL framework could 
support the creation of       
effective persuasive security 
communications. However, the 
framework’s usefulness still needs 
to be validated. 
 
The studies in Table 1 suggest that persuasive technology can be effectively used in the 
information security domain to influence individuals. Therefore, persuasive strategies may support 
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the PISA in its abilities. Furthermore, in developing a PISA to assist and persuade users to behave 
more securely and to take correct and secure actions, the described theories in section 2.2 need to 
be considered and taken into account as well. 
 
3. Research design 
 
  The aim of this research project was to investigate the elements that need to be considered for a 
technological software artefact to influence users towards secure behaviour. However, influencing 
behaviour is a difficult task, which is dependent on many factors. For this reason, a literature 
review regarding information security, human behaviour and persuasive technology was carried 
out. The literature review led to the proposal of a set of criteria and objectives to be used when 
developing a PISA. An evaluation of these criteria was achieved through the development of a 
software prototype of such a PISA. This prototype practically explored the criteria and allowed for 
conclusions to be drawn regarding these criteria. It also allowed for the identification of 
implementation strategies and possible recommendations. To evaluate the aspects related the 
prototype, a technical software review process, according to the IEEE 1028 Standard for Software 
Reviews, was followed. This included assembling a review team, providing review documentation 
and material to reviewers, conducting review meetings, the examination of the prototype by the 
reviewers, as well as completing review questionnaires. Two review questionnaires were presented, 
one regarding the prototype and the criteria, and another on the overall usability of the prototype. 
Based on this, a re-evaluation of criteria was done. This provided the basis for a developmental 
framework that will be discussed in a later section, called Discussion: The PISA framework. A 
more detailed discussion on the review process of the prototype is provided later in the paper. 
 
4. The PISA prototype: objectives and proposed criteria 
 
  The objectives and criteria for the PISA have been proposed by Stieger and Von Solms [39] in 
an earlier paper, and will be discussed briefly here again. Since the main goal of the PISA is to 
influence users towards a more secure behaviour, the following objectives were proposed: 
 
• Provide the user an indication of his/her personal information security status.  
• Be context sensitive by monitoring user actions and alerting the user immediately 
when a performed action has negatively influenced his/her security status. 
• Enable, influence and persuade the user to improve his/her security status.  
• Be easy to use, and not frustrate the user.  
• It should not easily be disabled.  
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• Be configurable, to some extent, because users may have different security needs. 
• Be able to report certain users who do not consistently follow the security practices. 
• Educate the user regarding relevant security issues. 
 
Based on these objectives, as well as the related literature, the following criteria were established 
for the PISA. These criteria consist of functions and characteristics: 
 
Functions 
To Persuade – persuasion may be defined as “an attempt to shape, reinforce, or change behaviours, 
feelings, or thoughts about an issue, object, or action” [30]. Various techniques exist that facilitate 
persuasion. These include guiding users through a process, enabling one to view one’s own 
performance, praising a user when he/she has completed a task successfully, and making a task 
simpler [40]. 
 
To Motivate – users need to be motivated towards secure behaviour. A well-known motivation 
strategy is to provide a reward. Rewards can be used successfully to cultivate interest, increase 
motivation and performance [41]. However, Cameron and Pierce [41] also state that the use of 
rewards is dependent on the individual person: a reward that is motivational to one person may not 
be motivational to another. Motivation can also occur through fear. Rogers’ [42] protection 
motivation theory (PMT) concerns itself with the use of fear appeals to influence and change the 
behaviour of people. A fear appeal is “a persuasive message with the intent to motivate individuals 
to comply with a recommended course of action through the arousal of fear associated with a 
threat” [43].  PMT states that fear appeals will be effective if they convince the recipient that [13]: 
 
• The problem is serious;  
• It may affect him/her;   
• It can be avoided by taking the appropriate action; and  
• The recipient is capable of performing the necessary behaviour required to avoid the 
problem. 
 
Motivation may also benefit from the competitive nature of people. Competition and recognition 
can be used to motivate people's behaviours, since most people desire to win in contests and hope 
to obtain the credit for any work they have done [44]. This is referred to as the social persuasion 
technique. It allows individuals to compare their performance with that of others [40]. 
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To Escalate - The PISA needs to be able to escalate inappropriate security behaviour. The form of 
such escalation depends on the user’s context. In an organisational context, the escalation can be in 
the form of bringing the particular user to the attention of an information security officer. For a 
home computer user such escalation can be achieved through reinforcing security principles – by 
more frequently repeating them through persuasive messages. In both cases, the users need to be 
made increasingly aware of the risks and possible negative consequences of not following security 
practices.  
 
To Educate - The PISA needs to provide users with information regarding their security status. 
Information can be provided on what influences their security status, why it affects the security 
status, and how to improve the security status. Users also need to be provided with information 
regarding common threats, and how they manifest themselves. Therefore, by increasing the users’ 
knowledge regarding threats and information security, they will be less likely to make wrong 
decisions. 
 
Based on the above functions, the PISA uses persuasive principles, motivation and education to 
influence user behaviour in a positive sense. For example, a user may be praised for maintaining a 
good security status, motivated by comparing his/her security status to that of other users, and 
educated that his/her password should not only consist of letters. Also, users who continuously 
show insecure behaviour may need to be reported, so that further action can be taken. However, to 
support the functions of the PISA, characteristics were proposed as well. These are briefly 
described below. 
 
Characteristics 
Usability and interface design - Usability refers to the ease of use, how effective the technology is 
in meeting the user’s needs, and how satisfied the user is when performing certain tasks [45]. 
Security HCI (HCI-S) is a research area that explores human computer interaction (HCI) in 
computer security. It has been defined by Johnston, Eloff and Labuschagne [46] as being “the part 
of a UI which is responsible for establishing the common ground between a user and the security 
features of a system. HCI-S is human computer interaction applied in the area of computer 
security”. Furthermore, they state that poor usability design in security systems or features often 
creates an aversion amongst users. This results in security being frequently ignored, and sometimes 
not used. Therefore, Johnston, Eloff and Labuschagne [46] proposed design criteria to facilitate the 
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development of usable interfaces that are used in a security environment. These are based on 
Nielsen’s [47] heuristics – traditionally used for heuristic evaluation: 
 
• Visibility of system status: The user interface (UI) must indicate to the user the 
security state of the system. For example, an icon could visually indicate that a security 
feature is enabled.  
• Aesthetic and minimalist design: The security information provided needs to be 
concise and not overwhelming to the user. Only relevant information should be 
displayed in a simple and visually attractive manner. 
• Errors: Error messages regarding security functions should provide sufficient 
information so that users can recover from them.  
• Satisfaction: The security activities must be easy to perform and result in a pleasant 
and satisfying experience for the users.  
• Convey features: The UI needs to convey the available security features to the user in a 
clear, concise and effective manner. The use of pictures and icons may be of assistance 
in this regard. 
• Learning ability: The UI needs to be user-friendly, and as easy to learn as possible. 
 
According to Johnston, Eloff and Labuschagne [46], implementing these criteria should lead to a 
more usable security system. 
 
Context sensitivity - According to Zurko [48], security mechanisms that cannot be understood 
cannot be effective. Therefore, Zurko [48] contends that users need to understand how to use the 
security mechanisms and controls that are directly relevant to their task and context. Users can 
complete a task, but are likely to make the wrong decision, if they do not know the security 
implications that accompany such an action. By being context sensitive the PISA can continuously 
check for changes that affect the security status of a user. Any detected changes and the influence 
that it has on the user’s security status may be reported through a rapid feedback cycle: 
• User performs a security related action. 
• The PISA detects a change in the user’s security context.  
• An evaluation of the change occurs. 
• User is provided with feedback regarding the action that he/she has performed. 
 
This can be considered as “just-in-time” persuasion. Just-in-time persuasion can be very effective, 
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since the feedback is highly relevant and available at the very moment people make a decision [44].  
 
Information - The PISA monitors changes that affect the security status of a computer user. It will, 
therefore, need information to determine whether a particular change is positive or negative. This 
decision-support information may be based on an information security baseline for computer users 
in general, or a policy such as an organization’s computer usage policy. Also, users in different 
roles may have different security requirements. For example, a home user may not have to secure 
his/her computer to the same degree as an investment portfolio manager in the finance department. 
Therefore, the PISA needs to be configurable to some extent. 
 
Persistency - In order to provide the user with continuous feedback, the PISA must be “always on”. 
It should also not be easily deactivated or switched off by a user, since this would defeat its 
purpose.  
 
Evolving - The “threat landscape” is constantly changing. New threats occur on a daily basis, and 
stealing information has become big business. In the year 2010, more than 20 million new strains 
of malware were identified [49]. Furthermore, information thieves are becoming more 
sophisticated by the day and have formed groups and alliances to target users. The PISA can 
therefore not remain stagnant; and it has to adapt and evolve in tandem with the threats that are out 
there. 
 
The proposed functions and the characteristics described above aim at influencing the user 
towards more secure behaviour. However, some form of evaluation is needed for the criteria 
proposed. The next section will discuss the development and evaluation of a software prototype to 
explore these criteria. 
 
5. Development and evaluation of the prototype 
 
  In order to evaluate the proposed criteria for the PISA, a functional software prototype was 
created. A software prototype can be defined as “a partial implementation of a system whose 
purpose is to learn something about the problem being solved or a solution to that problem” [50]. 
According to Kelley [51], prototyping is problem solving and one can use it for almost anything. It 
helps one shape ideas, and allows for innovation, by opening up new possibilities of discovery.  
 
The development of the prototype was done in the C# programming language and by using 
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Windows Presentation Foundation (WFP) for the user interface. The user interface consisted of the 
following components: 
 
• A dial that visually indicated the overall security status; 
• A list of security items that were monitored together with their status – with the option to 
view information regarding each one; 
• A message display area; 
• A Really Simple Syndication (RSS) feed, with the latest security news and events; 
• A random picture of a cyber threat, with the option to view information about it; 
• A password strength tester with tips on creating strong passwords; and 
• An indication of the number of days the user behaved securely or insecurely, as well as the 
longest secure period indicated in days.  
 
Interaction with the user occurred by automatically sliding in and out of view from the task bar in 
the bottom right-hand corner. The prototype monitored security items such as: anti-virus updates, 
firewall status and password protection on the screensaver. Any changes to these security items 
resulted in an immediate notification to the user and affected his/her overall security status. If a 
positive change occurred, the user would be praised, but if it was a negative change, the user would 
be informed why his/her security status has deteriorated – and would be asked to rectify the 
situation. Guidance was then given on how to do this. However, the prototype also periodically 
notified the user regarding his/her security status. The time period between these notifications 
depended on the overall security status – on how secure or insecure the user was. A good security 
status resulted in few notifications with the prototype being more in the “background”, whereas a 
bad security status would result in more notifications and persuading messages. 
 
The evaluation of the prototype followed the IEEE Standard for Software Reviews [52]. This 
standard defines and describes procedures for five types of software reviews and audits: 
management reviews, inspections, technical reviews, walk-throughs and audits. There is some 
overlap between these review types. For example, an organisation can conduct an inspection which 
may be similar to the process of a walk-through or a technical review [53]. However, the IEEE 
Standard for Software Reviews [52] states that the purpose of a management review is to monitor 
progress, to determine the status of plans and schedules, or to evaluate the effectiveness of 
management approaches.  The purpose of technical reviews and walk-throughs is to evaluate the 
software product and for an inspection to detect and identify defects in the software – but not to 
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evaluate it. Furthermore, an audit is done to evaluate conformity to a regulation, a standard or a 
guideline. The walk-through differs in that it is conducted by the producer of the software product, 
who is guiding the reviewers step-by-step through the procedures of the product. It requires less 
preparation from participants and often has a more educational purpose [54]. A technical review is 
defined as “a systematic evaluation of a software product by a team of qualified personnel that 
examines the suitability of the software product for its intended use and identifies discrepancies 
from specifications and standards” [52]. In addition, it mentions that a technical review can provide 
recommendations of alternatives, as well as examine various alternatives. Freedman and Weinberg 
[54] concisely state that the question to be answered by a technical review is: “Will this product do 
the job it’s supposed to do?” Therefore, it was decided to follow the technical review process for 
the evaluation of the prototype. In order to conduct the technical review, the following roles were 
established as required by the IEEE Standard for Software Reviews [52]: 
 
1. Decision maker  –  one  for whom the technical review is conducted; 
2. Review leader  – the one who is responsible for conducting the review; 
3. Recorder – one who documents any issues found, decisions and 
recommendations made by the review team; 
4. Technical reviewer – one who reviews and evaluates the software product. 
 
To conduct the review, a review team was recruited. For a review team, there is no fixed size [54, 
55] and the recommendations vary. However, most recommendations range from three to seven 
reviewers as being the optimal number [54, 56, 57]. The review team consisted of one doctoral 
student, six Master’s students, and one person who was not a student. Most of the students were 
studying in the information security field. Roles were assigned to each team member – resulting in 
six technical reviewers, of which one was a recorder as well, a review leader and the decision 
maker. The review team then followed the technical review process consisting of the following 
main phases [52]: 
 
1. Planning. During this phase, the recruitment of the review team and the 
assignment of roles occurred. Various documents were created and distributed to 
team members, such as a review master plan, an overview of the review process, 
guidelines for the various roles, the proposed criteria and objectives, as well as 
checklists. The planning for the two review meetings, a kick-off meeting and a 
logging meeting were all done as well. 
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2. Preparation. For preparing the technical reviewers, a kick-off meeting was held. 
During the meeting, the review process was briefly discussed and the reviewers 
were asked if they had any questions or concerns. Additional documents, such as 
the review issue log and a screenshot of the prototype describing the various 
components were given. Furthermore, the meeting time for the logging meeting 
was also established.   
3. Examination. An installer for the prototype was distributed to each technical 
reviewer. The reviewers examined and used the prototype for one week, logging 
major and minor issues, possible improvements and questions in an issue log. 
Once the individual reviewing had been completed, a group review was done in 
the form of a logging meeting. For the logging meeting, each reviewer brought 
his/her issue log along, containing the issues that were found. Reviewers 
contributed and discussed their issues in a round-robin way, while the recorder 
publicly recorded them. After the completion of the logging meeting, reviewers 
completed two online questionnaires on the prototype. One regarding the 
prototype in general and another focusing on its usability. Finally, a technical 
review report was created, summarizing the issues, improvements and questions.  
 
By completing the examination phase, the review process was completed. The results were then 
analysed. These will be discussed in the next section. 
 
6. Analysis of issues and questionnaire responses 
 
  During the examination phase, each reviewer completed an issue log that contained the major 
issues, minor issues, improvement suggestions and questions which had been identified during the 
review of the prototype. All issues were collaboratively discussed during the group meeting, and 
then recorded in an issue summary list. In addition to the recording of issues, reviewers also 
completed two online questionnaires, which focused on the various elements explored in the 
prototype and their usability.  
 
     Most questions used a 5-point Likert scale that was labelled from “Strongly disagree” to 
“Strongly agree”. However, there were some open-ended questions as well. These included 
questions regarding additional security items that required monitoring, items that could increase the 
PISA’s persuasive, motivational and educational capability, as well as the timing of notifications. 
For these questions, the most significant responses will be discussed. Questions were asked in the 
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positive and in the negative form. This was done to keep the respondents’ attention and focus. 
   
The results of the questionnaire are shown in Table 2, with the percentages summarised as follows:  
A% is for both “Strongly agree” and “Agree”, N% is for “Neither agree nor disagree”, and D% is 
for “Disagree” and “Strongly Disagree”. The questions in Table 2 are arranged according to the 
criteria to which they relate – in order to provide a better overview. Most reviewers (83%) agreed 
that the PISA did influence them towards more secure behaviour. Both reminders and praise appear 
to have assisted in this regard. However, reviewers found that the news feed was rather ineffective 
in increasing awareness. It also failed to motivate the reviewers. Consequently, it may be more 
effective to provide some statistics on cyber fraud, breaches and the increasing number of cyber 
threats, as 50% of the reviewers indicated that this would make the PISA more motivational in an 
open-ended question. However, 33% indicated that there is no need to make the PISA more 
motivational. Providing reasons why a security item is important did motivate them; and 67% of 
the reviewers agreed that social comparison would also be motivational to them.  
     Displaying the days a user is secure/insecure was found to not be very effective, and reviewers 
indicated that a progress bar would be a better choice for indicating progress towards a goal. 
Reviewers (83%) found that the password strength tester and related tips allowed them to create 
strong passwords. However, most reviewers stated that there should be more security tips regarding 
other security issues, and not only for passwords. The information regarding cyber threats 
increased the security awareness of some reviewers, but reviewers pointed out that there was a lack 
of information regarding cyber threats, and how one should protect oneself. The idea of an 
escalation feature was supported by the reviewers and that some form of reporting insecure users 
should occur in an organisational context. Overall reviewers found the prototype to be more 
persuasive, motivational and educational than the Action Center in Windows 7.  
     The issues found and logged by reviewers included the instability of the prototype, frequency of 
notifications annoying the reviewer, not detecting some security changes that a reviewer had made, 
slowness in starting up after installation, and that the anti-virus software may regard the PISA as 
malware. Most of these are of a technical nature, and are therefore less relevant to this discussion. 
However, the frequency of notification is important, since the PISA should not annoy its users. 
Reviewers differed in opinion regarding this, with 67% being irritated by the notifications, and 
33% not. For the time period between notifications depending on the user’s overall security status 
(Red – very insecure, Green – secure), the following was indicated by respondents as being a more 
appropriate time period: 
• Red status:  5 min or less (33%), 15 min (33%), 3 hours or more (33%) 
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• Yellow status: 30 min (50%), 1hour (17%), 3hours or more (33%) 
• Green status: 3hours or more (100%) 
Table 2. The questionnaire results 
    Functions A% N% D% 
To Persuade 
Q1 The notification messages given by the PISA did not persuade me 0% 50% 50% 
Q2 The security related "news items" made me more aware of the need for 
information security 
33% 50% 17% 
  Q3 Keeping track of the number of days I am insecure is discouraging to me 0% 50% 50% 
  
Q4 The PISA reminded me of "security items" that are not secured and need my 
attention 
83% 17% 0% 
  Q5 The PISA did not praise me when I improved my "security status" 0% 50% 50% 
  Q6 The PISA influenced me towards a more secure behavior 83% 17% 0% 
  Q7 The PISA is more persuasive than the Action Center in Windows 7
1 83% 0% 0% 
To Motivate 
Q8 The security related "news items" motivated me to be more secure by 
keeping me up to date with latest events   
17% 50% 33% 
  
Q9 The information regarding the "security items" that are monitored helped 
me understand why they are important 
83% 17% 0% 
  
Q10 The PISA allowed me to set a goal for myself by keeping track of the 
number of days I am secure or insecure  
33% 33% 33% 
  
Q11 If I know the "security status" of a friend is better than mine, it would 
motivate me to be as secure or even more secure 
67% 17% 17% 
  Q12 The PISA is more motivational than the Action Center in Windows 7
1 67% 17% 0% 
To Educate 
Q13 The PISA enabled me to create strong passwords 83% 0% 17% 
Q14 The password tips were helpful 100% 0% 0% 
  
Q15 The PISA provided me with guidance on how to improve my "security 
status" 
100% 0% 0% 
  
Q16 The information regarding the "cyber threats" increased my security 
awareness 2 
50% 33% 0% 
  Q17 The PISA increased my security awareness 67% 17% 17% 
  Q18 The PISA is more educational than the Action Center in Windows 7
1 67% 17% 0% 
To Escalate 
Q19 In an organisational environment the PISA should report me to a supervisor 
if I am constantly insecure 
83% 17% 0% 
    Characteristics A% N% D% 
Usability  
Q20 The PISA provided me with an easily understandable "at a glance" 
overview of my "security status" 
83% 17% 0% 
and  Q21 The password strength is displayed effectively 83% 17% 0% 
Interface Q22 The notifications given by the PISA confused me 17% 17% 66% 
  
Q23 Using images for the "cyber threats" increased the chance of me reading 
about them 
83% 17% 0% 
  Q24 The PISA does not provide sufficient help 0% 17% 83% 
  Q25 I was not able to follow the instructions given when I clicked on "Fix this" 
3 0% 0% 83% 
  Q26 The PISA should be configurable to some extent 100% 0% 0% 
  Q27 The notifications given by the PISA irritated me 67% 0% 33% 
  Q28 The screen layout of the PISA is visually attractive  67% 0% 33% 
  
Q29 The colours red, yellow and green effectively convey the meaning of 
notification messages and status 
83% 17% 0% 
Context  
Q30 When my "security status" changed the PISA provided me with immediate 
feedback regarding what caused the change 
50% 33% 17% 
Sensitivity 
Q31 
When my "security status" deteriorated the PISA notified me and advised 
me on what to do 
50% 33% 17% 
Information Q32 
The PISA monitors "security items" that are relevant to an average 
computer user 
83% 17% 0% 
Persistency Q33 I should be able to switch off the PISA whenever I want to 33% 33% 33% 
Evolving Q34 
There is no need to update or adapt the PISA when new "cyber threats" 
occur 
17% 17% 66% 
  
 
1 One reviewer indicated he/she had no experience in using the Action 
Center 
   
  
 
2 One reviewer indicated that he/she did not read the information regarding 
cyber threats             
     
 
3 One reviewer indicated that he/she did not use Windows 7 
       All percentages are rounded to the closest percent.       
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     It is interesting to note that the respondents’ opinions differ largely for the red status; and one 
could conclude that what is irritating to one person, may not necessarily be irritating to another. 
However, a period of 15 min or less is favoured. This corresponds with the escalation function of 
notifying users more often when they are insecure. In an organisational environment, a security 
administrator should have the ability to configure these settings. For a home computer user, the 
PISA could track mouse and keyboard input, to avoid interrupting users. Anti-virus software may 
have regarded the PISA as malware, because it is continuously running in the background and 
monitoring security items. Certainly, this has to be addressed, as users need to trust the system.   
 
     Some reviewers indicated that they would have liked to be able to exit and start the PISA 
manually. For home computer users, it may be necessary to allow this, since some might not 
require any security at all, for example a user who is disconnected from the Internet and uses 
his/her computer only for entertainment and gaming. However, in an organisational environment, 
users should not be able to exit or disable the PISA. Rather, it should be a built-in feature similar to 
that of the Action Center. The improvements reviewers logged included some layout suggestions, 
as well as using a smaller display window. The possibility of having a small status indicator and 
notification window, with the option to expand into a larger window with more detail was 
discussed. One reviewer suggested that the size of the window could be linked to the security status 
of the user. For a less secure user the window could be larger than for a secure user. The display of 
the security status could also be in the form of a Windows Gadget that could be placed on the 
desktop, similar to the Windows clock.  Another recommended improvement was to have 
individual content customization, based on the level of the user’s security knowledge. This 
suggests the need to determine how knowledgeable the user is in terms of security. A possibility 
here would be to ask the user to complete a short quiz as soon as the PISA has been installed. 
Depending on the score the user achieved for the quiz, the PISA could configure the displayed 
security items, security tips, cyber threats, news items, messages and the information given. 
Furthermore, in an organizational environment, an information security officer or administrator 
should be able to configure security settings of the PISA. Reviewers also would have liked to 
change the “look and feel” of the PISA. For example, one reviewer said that he would have liked 
the PISA to fade in or out, instead of merely sliding in or out of view. Therefore, to make the PISA 
more appealing and personalized to users, various style themes can be used. In addition, various 
additional security items that could be monitored were indicated in the questionnaire. These 
included the monitoring of removable storage devices, social website usage, those who had logged 
in – and when – and backups of the important data.  
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     The overall usability of the prototype was evaluated using the System Usability Scale (SUS) 
developed by John Brooke [58]. The SUS was chosen because of its simplicity, as well as being 
most reliable across sample sizes [59]. It consists of ten statements that are positively and 
negatively worded, to which the participants are asked to rate their level of agreement [60]. Each 
reviewer was asked to complete the SUS after reviewing the prototype. Based on the individual 
SUS results, an overall SUS score was calculated, according to Tullis and Albert [60]. This overall 
SUS score was calculated to be 81.25%, which, according to Tullis and Albert [60], is reasonably 
good. Therefore, the prototype was found to be very user- friendly by the reviewers. In fact, this 
must have assisted its ability to influence users, and one may conclude that a good usability score is 
essential in achieving this. Based on these findings, a framework for a PISA is presented. This will 
be discussed in the next section. 
 
7. Discussion: The PISA framework 
 
       The PISA framework provides an overview of the criteria that need to be considered when 
developing a PISA. Figure 1 shows that the PISA is the “middleman” between the computer and 
the user.  
 
Fig. 1. The PISA framework 
 
The four functions together have the aim of influencing the security behaviour of the user. These 
functions are supported by the characteristics of the PISA. The following provides a description of 
the factors to consider, as well as some recommendations for implementation. These 
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recommendations stem from the evaluation of the prototype discussed in the previous section. 
 
Motivate 
Factors to consider: Users may have conflicting goals and trade-off information security. Risk 
perception, consequences, and incentives/disincentives. 
Recommendations: Provide users with information regarding the security items that are monitored 
and influence the overall status. Indicate why they are important, and how they should be 
configured. By providing guidance on how to configure a security item, the user’s self-efficacy can 
be increased, especially if he/she is praised for performing the task successfully. Information, such 
as providing news items regarding security, as well as statistics on security breaches, online frauds 
and the increasing number of cyber threats should be included. Fear appeals should be used if users 
ignore the recommended security practices. Johnston and Warkentin [43] investigated the 
effectiveness of fear appeals in changing information security behaviour. Their findings suggest 
that fear appeals are an effective means of influencing end-users to perform the recommended 
security action. However, messages may have different outcomes, based the user’s perception of 
the threat. Therefore, users should be made aware of the risks and threats involved in not following 
recommended security practices [61]. Furthermore, users should be able to achieve certain security 
goals and receive feedback regarding their progress. This is strongly supported by the Goal Setting 
Theory [62] which describes how goals influence the performance and motivation of individuals. 
The Goal Setting Theory is regarded as one of the most applicable and useful theories of employee 
motivation in organizational psychology [63, 64, 65]. Locke and Latham [62] found that specific 
and difficult goals led to higher performance than merely “urging people to do their best”. In 
addition, they emphasise the importance of providing feedback regarding the progress towards a 
goal. Oinas-Kukkonen and Harjumaa [40] recommend that a persuasive system should enable a 
user to make incremental progress towards the target behaviour. This may be achieved in the form 
of a progress bar which was also suggested by some of the reviewers as an improvement. Finally, 
in an organisational environment, users who achieve certain security goals could receive a reward. 
 
Persuade 
Factors to consider: Visual attractiveness of the interface, user’s personal characteristics and user 
recognition.  
Recommendations: Users should be praised whenever their security status has improved. This 
would also help in building the self-efficacy of the user. In addition, reminders should be given 
regarding security items that need attention. Notifications should also encourage users to achieve 
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their next security goal. Users should also trust the PISA and the notifications that it gives. 
Furthermore, in an organisational context, users should be made aware of the fact that the PISA 
will report any continuous insecure behaviour. This aids persuasion, as Brustoloni and Villamarin-
Salomon [66] found. Users make better security decisions when they know that they are being 
audited. Persuasion can also benefit if such users are publicly recognized for their good 
performance [40]. This could be implemented in the form of a leader board which indicates the top 
employees of the month. However, this would only be applicable in an organisational context.  
 
Educate 
Factors to consider: What knowledge does the user have regarding information security? What is 
the mental model of the user?  
Recommendations: Educate users regarding the security items that affect their overall status. 
Provide information on the various security threats that exist. This information should include: a 
description of what the threat is, strategies to protect against the threat, and the risks involved in 
ignoring the threat. In addition to this, a variety of security tips should also be given. Furthermore, 
users should be made aware of the security items on their computer, what they are and why they 
are important. For each monitored security item, guidance should be provided on how to configure 
it.  
 
Escalate 
Factors to consider: The context of the user – is it an organisational or home computer user? How 
is insecure behaviour escalated?  
Recommendations: In an organisational environment, the PISA should track the user’s overall 
security status and report any ongoing insecure behaviour. This may be implemented by logging 
the user information in a log file, which is then sent via email to an information security officer. 
Furthermore, users should be made aware that such reporting can occur.  
 
Usability 
Factors to consider: Frequency of notifications, and whether the user is busy, wording of 
notifications, ease-of-use and simplicity. 
Recommendations: The genius scientist, inventor and artist, Leonardo da Vinci, once said that 
“Simplification is the ultimate sophistication”. Therefore, tasks should be simplified, and made 
easy to execute. The PISA should be easy and straightforward to use, without the need to ask for 
help. Notifications should be concise, and should avoid the use of jargon [67]. Users should be able 
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to easily understand them.  Icons and pictures should be used to facilitate understanding and 
convey meaning. Furthermore, it is important that users are not irritated by the notifications. 
Therefore, the PISA should be aware when the user is busy, and does not want to be distracted. 
This may be achieved by tracking keyboard input and mouse movement. Oinas-Kukkonen and 
Harjumaa [40] support this by stating that persuasive systems should avoid interrupting users while 
they are performing their tasks.  
 
Interface 
Factors to consider: The size of the window and its visual attractiveness. Interface layout and the 
use of icons, images and colours to convey meaning. How the overall security status and the 
progress towards a goal are indicated. 
Recommendations: The overall security status should be visible at a glance. A possible 
implementation of this would be to integrate it into the desktop, similar to a Windows Gadget, such 
as the clock.  An indication of the user’s progress towards becoming a secure user should also be 
provided. Once a user is secure, further goals could be in the form of how long the user has 
maintained a secure system - for example, 30 or 60 or 100 days secure.  Window size should be 
small, and the possibility of a small notification window with the option to view more information 
should be considered.  Images should be used to attract the user’s attention towards cyber threats 
and tips. The “look and feel” of the interface should be customisable and attractive. This could be 
implemented by giving the user the option to choose from various styling themes, whereby users 
can personalize the PISA. Personalization is a design principle for persuasive systems [37, 40] and 
it therefore aids in persuasion. The colours: red, yellow and green should be effectively used during 
notifications and for indicating the security status.    
 
Persistency 
Factors to consider: The context of the user – is it a home user or an organisational computer user? 
Recommendations: An organisational user should not be able to make changes, or to disable the 
PISA. Configurations should only be made by the person who is responsible for information 
security in the organisation. For the home computer user, there should be an option to customise 
the frequency of notifications. However, a user should not be able to completely turn off all 
notifications.  
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Information 
Factors to consider: Is it a home user or an organisational user? What baseline is used for 
evaluating the user’s security state? What factors should be monitored on the computer? 
Recommendations: The PISA should have information regarding the degree of secure behaviour 
that is required. In an organisational context, a policy – such as the computer usage policy – may 
define such a baseline. For home users, the baseline could consist of what is generally accepted as a 
requirement for being a secure home user. However, the following items should be monitored for 
most users: Firewall, anti-virus, anti-malware, windows updates, secure screensaver, removable 
storage devices, use of social media and backups. Collectively, this can be referred to as the 
security status of the computer. How knowledgeable the user is with regard to information security 
as well as the user’s security status should be evaluated, as the mental models influence the security 
decisions one makes [15]. Furthermore, Bravo-Lillo, Cranor, Downs et al. [67] found that the 
security behaviour differed between novices and advanced users. For a novice user, more detailed 
information would normally be required than for advanced users. This evaluation could be 
achieved in the form of a short quiz that a new user has to complete. Based on this, the information 
provided by the PISA could be tailored according to the users’ degree of knowledge.  
 
Context sensitivity  
Factors to consider: Was the change positive or negative? What actions is the user performing? 
Recommendations: Feedback needs to be immediate and describe what has changed. Praise the user 
if a positive change has occurred. If the change is negative, such as disabling the firewall, a fear 
appeal should be made – indicating what caused the change, the risk involved, and giving guidance 
on how to proceed to mitigate the risk. However, context sensitivity should also provide decision 
support to the user when a particular action may be harmful to system security. 
 
Evolving 
Factors to consider: Rapid change in technology and the emergence of new security threats. 
Recommendations: Although this characteristic was not explored in the prototype, there was some 
evidence that the PISA should adapt to changes in the information security environment. One 
cannot deny that technology is advancing at a rapid pace, and that this may result in new challenges 
in information security. Cyber criminals will certainly find new ways to target users, as computing 
power increases and technology advances. This characteristic, therefore, ensures that the PISA 
“evolves” in tandem with new technologies and emerging security threats. 
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This section has provided recommendations, as well as criteria to be considered for the 
development of a PISA. However, these are by no means complete. Therefore, future research 
should expand on them and find additional considerations. The criteria presented in the framework 
have been evaluated to some extent, and findings suggest that a PISA, based on these criteria, can 
be effective in influencing users towards more secure behaviour. 
 
8. Conclusion and future work 
 
  Information security still struggles to effectively address the human factor. This may be due to 
various factors. Surely, one of them is that individual behaviour is complex and difficult to 
understand. Influencing users towards more secure behaviour is therefore not an easy task. This is 
also reflected in research which indicates that information security awareness programs do not 
always produce the envisaged results. In this paper, an alternative approach to convincing a user 
towards information security was described in the form of a PISA. Criteria were proposed for the 
PISA and evaluated by means of a prototype. Based on this, a framework for the development of a 
PISA was proposed.  
 
     Findings of the prototype evaluation suggest that the aspects of the criteria explored in the 
prototype can influence users towards more secure behaviour. It is also evident that principles of 
persuasive technology can be successfully used to achieve this goal. The proposed framework 
provides an insight into the functions and supporting characteristics needed to achieve this. 
Furthermore, it provides recommendations regarding the implementation of some of the criteria. 
Although the framework is by no means exhaustive, it does provide a “starting platform” for the 
development of such a PISA. The proposed framework may, therefore, be an aid to future 
developers intending to create a PISA or related software artefacts.  
     Future work could investigate these criteria in more detail and provide further insights. In 
addition, one could also look at utilising aspects of cloud computing in the creation of a cloud-
based PISA. 
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